Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against individual FBI agents and a Metropolitan Police Department detective, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of a search of his home and his coinciding arrest. The court affirmed the district court's holding that defendants have qualified immunity for the timing of the search where it was not clearly established in Maryland at the time that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the nighttime execution of a daytime-only warrant. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for unlawful seizure and no-knock entry. The court concluded that, taking plaintiff's allegations as true for the purpose of passing upon a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment; the statute of limitations has not yet begun on plaintiff's section 1983 and Bivens claims; and the court rejected defendants' claims that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating the legality of the search and seizure and that Heck v. Humphrey barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Jones v. Kirchner" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an ongoing labor dispute between OHL and the Union. After OHL refused to bargain with the Union, the Board determined that OHL violated the National Labor Relations Act, 158(a)(3), (a)(1). OHL petitioned for review. The court concluded that the Board did not err in affirming and adopting the ALJ’s articulation of the controlling legal standard; substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that OHL employee Jennifer Smith never used the alleged racial slur at issue and that it was unreasonable for OHL to believe that she did; and substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that OHL’s proffered reasons for firing OHL employee Carolyn Jones were pretextual. The court concluded that OHL's remaining arguments lack merit. Accordingly, the court denied OHL's petitions for review and granted the Board's cross-applications for enforcement. View "Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the United States challenges its liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-75, for a portion of the cost of cleaning up hazardous substances at three California facilities owned by Lockheed. The government acknowledges its own share of CERCLA liability and also that it agreed to reimburse Lockheed’s share via overhead charges on unrelated contracts. At issue is whether the government has a valid claim that the particular mechanism by which the United States will pay its share of the costs of environmental remediation under CERCLA interacts with the parties’ agreed-upon contract-based reimbursement method in a way that impermissibly requires the government to make double payment. The court concluded that the district court’s CERCLA judgment did not create any double recovery and the court rejected the government's arguments to the contrary; the government's protest that the crediting mechanism does not help, but instead harms it further, is unavailing; even assuming the court was in a position to review the equities of the parties’ own choice in their Billing Agreement to resort to the indirect-cost billing and crediting mechanism and their apparent decision to use that mechanism for payment and crediting of future costs, the government has not clearly identified how the crediting mechanism is a source of inequity; and, at this juncture, on appeal from the district court’s judgment imposing no liability on the government for past costs, section 114(b) simply is not implicated. Because the all of the government's claims fail, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants, three federal prisoners who spent several years housed in specially designated Communication Management Units (CMUs), filed suit contending that their designation to CMUs violated their due process rights. One appellant also alleges his continued CMU placement was in retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Appellants seek damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e, for injuries arising out of their confinement in CMUs. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The court found that the duration and atypicality of CMU designation sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest and thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether appellants were afforded sufficient process. The court affirmed the judgment as to the retaliation claim because appellant cannot show that his First Amendment rights were violated. The court held that appellants have alleged harms qualifying for compensation under the PLRA because their injuries were neither mental nor emotional in nature and so do not require a showing of physical injury. Nonetheless, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment because the prison official was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Aref v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Board promulgated the Health Care Rule in 1989, which established eight standardized bargaining units for acute-care hospitals. This case concerns the application of the Health Care Rule on a retrospective basis - in particular, to preexisting bargaining units that did not conform to the eight standardized units set forth in the Rule. The Rule prescribes that, if there is a petition to represent an additional unit in a hospital with preexisting nonconforming units, the Board may find the additional unit appropriate only if it comports, to the extent practicable, with one of the eight standardized units. The Board understands that aspect of the Rule to apply as follows: in any representation election that would create a new bargaining unit, the new unit must include all unrepresented employees who would be grouped together in one of the Rule’s standardized units. At issue in this case is whether the same understanding of the Rule governs an election to add unrepresented employees to a preexisting bargaining unit, as opposed to an election to create a new bargaining unit. In other words, when a union seeks to add unrepresented employees to a preexisting nonconforming unit, must the unit embrace all (and not just some) of the unrepresented employees who would fit within the same standardized unit in the Rule? The Board answered in the negative and reasoned that the addition of employees to an already existing unit - the creation of a new unit - necessarily keeps the number of bargaining units constant. Petitioner, an acute-care facility, argues that the Board’s distinction between preexisting units and new units under the Rule is arbitrary and incompatible with the Board’s own precedent. The court rejected petitioner's challenge to the Board’s interpretation and application of its own regulation. Therefore, the court upheld the Board’s understanding that the Rule is inapplicable in the context of elections to add employees to a preexisting unit. The court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After the United States detained Mohammed Jawad at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for more than six years until he was released and returned to his native Afghanistan, Jawad filed suit alleging that they subjected him to torture while he was in their custody. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jawad’s complaint because the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear his claims. Section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2), strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most claims against the United States arising out of the detention of aliens like Jawad captured during the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The court rejected Jawad's reasons why the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) finding that he was an "enemy combatant" does not satisfy the section 7(a) requirements. The court also rejected Jawad's remaining claims. View "Jawad v. Gates" on Justia Law

Care One petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Care One committed a series of unfair labor practices in an effort to prevent the certification of a union at its nursing home and rehabilitation facility in Morristown, New Jersey. The Board held that Care One had interfered with employees’ protected activity and discriminated against union-eligible employees by instituting a system-wide, discretionary benefits increase shortly before a scheduled representation election and denying the increase to the union-eligible employees. The Board also held that the company unlawfully interfered with its employees’ right to organize by distributing to employees eligible to vote in the upcoming election a threatening leaflet associating unionization with job loss; presenting a slideshow depicting employees, without their consent, as if they supported the Company’s antiunion campaign; and issuing a post-election memorandum reiterating the company’s workplace violence policy, which the Board concluded could reasonably be read in context to threaten reprisal for protected union activity. The court concluded that the Board's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and denied Care One's petition for review, affirming the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Care One at Madison Avenue v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after the District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games Control Board terminated his employment, alleging in part that his termination violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. At issue is the district court’s most recent dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, as well as its denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiff has shown that his due process rights were violated and that this violation caused his alleged damages. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District and, in part, its denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court remanded to the district court to address whether the District can be held liable under section 1983 for this violation and, if it can, for a determination of the amount of damages to which defendant is entitled. View "Thompson v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Seed Company Limited, a Japanese company, is led by Shigeru Tamai. Tamai invented a dispenser of correctional tape enabling users to correct printed documents by rolling white tape over errors. Seed and Tamai applied for patents but the application was denied because of legal counsel’s noncompliance with Patent Office regulations when filing a motion related to the application. As a result of the error, another inventor obtained the patent for the same invention. Seed and Tamai filed a legal malpractice suit against counsel. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the statute of limitations had elapsed with respect to the malpractice claims against one group of defendants - those who ceased working on behalf of Seed and Tamai when the law firm engaged in the representation split into two firms. With regard to the remaining defendants - those who continued to represent Seed and Tamai after the breakup of the firm - the court found that the statute of limitations poses no bar to the malpractice action. On the merits of the claims against those defendants, the court concluded that there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the alleged error is one of professional judgment, and whether defendants exercised reasonable care in making the judgment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded as to this issue. View "Seed Co. Ltd. v. Westerman" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor exercised his authority under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, to promulgate regulations that require mine operators to test the continuity and resistance of “grounding systems” for mining equipment. At issue is whether the Secretary properly determined that power cables and extension cords are regulated parts of those “grounding systems.” The court upheld the Secretary’s decision because, under the regulations’ plain language, power cables and extension cords are most naturally considered components of “grounding systems.” Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tilden Mining Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law