Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The District and the Police Department appealed from the district court's grant of preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of a “good reason” standard in the D.C. Code provision governing the issuance of licenses for the carrying of concealed weapons, D.C. Law 20-279, 3(b). The court noted that the controlling fact in this case is the identity of the judge who decided it in the district court – The Honorable Senior United States District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., of the Northern District of New York. Although Judge Scullin served under a properly issued designation, that designation was limited to specific and enumerated cases. The court concluded that the present litigation is not one of those cases. The court concluded that, like the designated judge in Frad v. Kelly, Judge Scullin had a limited designation that did not extend beyond the specifications of that designation. Accordingly, the court vacated the order based on jurisdictional grounds. View "Wrenn v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Coast Guard, after receiving whistleblower complaints, initiated an investigation against two foreign-flagged vessels. The Coast Guard subsequently ordered Customs to withhold departure clearance and the vessels were held for investigation for differing lengths of time, ranging from a couple of days to over a month. The vessels were released after appellants, the ship owners and operators, posted a bond and executed a security agreement. At issue in this appeal is whether the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security – acting through the Coast Guard – may impose certain conditions (nonfinancial in nature) upon the release of ships suspected of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. 1901(a)(4). Determining that the case is justiciable, the court concluded on the merits that the first sentence of section 1908(e) gives the Coast Guard the requisite authority. Section 1908(e) states that “[i]f any ship subject to the [Convention]…is liable for a fine or civil penalty...or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the ship...may be subject to a fine or civil penalty [Customs]...upon request of the Secretary [the Coast Guard]...shall refuse...clearance,” and as such it clearly provides authority in the Coast Guard to simply hold the ship in port until legal proceedings are completed. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watervale Marine Co. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, owner and principal of MacBride Nigeria, seeks review of two of the Commissioner's decisions relating to the loss of concrete masonry equipment shipped from the United States to Nigeria in two separate shipping containers. BDP and Zim organized and carried out the transportation of the equipment. Petitioner alleged two identical complaints against Zim and BDP, contending that they engaged in unreasonable practices when handling the equipment, in violation of Section 10(d)(1) of the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. 41102(c). The court dismissed the portions of the petition relating to the first container because the petition for review of the Commission’s decision was untimely under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342(3)(B), 2344. The court vacated the decision relating to the second container because the Commission improperly reduced petitioner's award for the loss of equipment. The court remanded for an award of the full amount supported by the record without mitigation and permitted under 46 C.F.R. 502.301(b). View "Adenariwo v. FMC" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of distribution of pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2) and subsequently appealed his 144 months of imprisonment followed by 240 months of supervised release. Because the court is unable to discern from the trial judge’s unparticularized in-court and written explanations why he found defendant’s conduct more harmful or egregious than that typically falling within the properly calculated Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months, the sentence violates 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2). Although defendant failed to preserve a section 3553(c)(2) challenge, the district court's clearly insufficient explanation of the sentence meets the four-part plain error test under the law of the circuit. Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion to notice the error and vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Salem petitioned for review of the Board's certification of a bargaining unit and its subsequent determination that Salem unlawfully refused to bargain. The court concluded that the hearing officer's (HO's) premature closing of the record was not an abuse of discretion. In this case, despite the Board’s unexplained failure to allow a party to submit evidence at a representation hearing, Salem has not, as it must, established prejudice. The court also concluded that neither the HO nor the General Counsel abused his discretion where Salem has not shown prejudice by the decision not to transfer for alleged ex parte communications; Salem failed to establish that the Board's error of granting the Union's Special Appeal was prejudicial; Salem does not explain how the Board’s issuance of the erratum order was ultra vires or how the order prejudiced it; and, assuming arguendo that the Board erred by not allowing Salem to use the Sub-Zero Freezer Co. exception, no prejudice resulted. The court concluded that, although the Board's proceedings contain a myriad of missteps, Salem has failed to establish prejudice. The court denied Salem's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Salem Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Mike-sell's petitioned for review of the Board's determination that it violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), when it unilaterally instituted terms and conditions of employment for its employees represented by the Teamsters. The court concluded that, although it is clear that the Union wished to avoid an impasse, the court does not think the ALJ’s determination that the Union did not improperly delay bargaining sessions can be effectively challenged; Mike-sell's criticism of the ALJ’s reliance on bargaining that took place after the Company put into effect its offer is irrelevant; and the Board’s determination that an impasse had not been reached is a legitimate finding (a mixed question of fact and law). Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Mike-sell's Potato Chip Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Nova petitioned for review of the Board's finding that it violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). Nova hired UNICCO to provide maintenance, landscaping, and janitorial services throughout its campus. The court concluded that the Board is entitled to summary enforcement of the uncontested portion of its order regarding the no-solicitation rule as applied to Nova’s own employees; the Board reasonably found that Nova violated section 8(a)(1) by prohibiting an UNICCO employee from engaging in handbilling on a campus parking lot; the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Nova's challenges to the Board’s application of New York New York, LLC d/b/a New York New York Hotel & Casino because Nova failed to urge them before the Board pursuant to NLRA 10(e); and an UNICCO Director’s questions, while at the work site, about a former UNICCO employee’s union activities were, under the circumstances, impermissibly coercive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "NOVA Southeastern Univ. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Secretary issued regulations setting out reasonable cost limits (RCLs) for specified medical services and establishing certain exceptions to those limits. Canonsburg claimed that the Secretary has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., because her method of calculation is inconsistent with governing regulations and was promulgated without notice and comment. In light of Canonsburg I, the district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that issue preclusion barred Canonsburg’s suit. The court concluded that the Secretary did not waive her issue preclusion affirmative defense by not raising it at the administrative stage. Moreover, the Secretary asserted it, expressly and properly, in district court and the court is free to affirm the district court's application of the doctrine to Canonsburg's complaint. In light of the Supreme Court's plain language in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I and II), the court's own construction of the Chenery doctrine and no persuasive case law to the contrary, the court concluded that the Chenery doctrine does not prohibit raising issue preclusion as an affirmative defense in district court even if the party raising the defense was not a party to the administrative proceeding or was otherwise unable to assert the defense at the administrative stage. Finally, the court rejected Canonsburg's claims of equitable considerations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Canonsburg General Hosp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiring to traffic in narcotics and numerous related crimes and subsequently challenged their resentencing on remand. The court rejected Defendant Farrell's contentions that the district court erred by failing to calculate the applicable Guidelines range; the district court erred by increasing his Guidelines offense level by four on the ground that he was an "organizer or leader" of a drug trafficking organization; the district court failed to consider certain relevant factors in determining whether a departure is warranted; and that his 262-month sentence is unreasonable. The court rejected Defendant Law's contentions that the district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate the applicable Guidelines range at resentencing and that the life sentence imposed on Count 1 violates the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court rejected Defendant Fletcher's contentions that the district court failed to calculate the applicable Guidelines range; a life sentence for his conviction on Count 1 violates the Eighth Amendment; his 1987 conviction, which contributed to the enhancement of his sentence on Count 1, was entered pursuant to an Alford plea, and that a conviction based on such a plea is insufficient to establish a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(b); his 1977 conviction, which also contributed to the enhancement of his sentence on Count 1, was set aside under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. 5021 (1976), and hence should not have been considered; and there was a defect in the Judgment and Commitment Order for his 1977 conviction that rendered improper any reliance on that conviction for sentencing enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Law" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to distributing child pornography. The court concluded that the district court properly applied a cross-reference to the guideline governing production of child pornography pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(c)(1) and a two-level enhancement for using a computer to solicit participation with a minor in the production or live transmission of child pornography pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(6)(B). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Zagorski" on Justia Law