Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court determined that the Board lacked authority to act during the time that three of its five members held office via appointments that violated the Recess Appointments Clause. At issue here is whether a Regional Director of the Board had authority to conduct a union election and certify its result during that same time. The court affirmed the Board's decision that the Regional Director had authority to conduct the election. The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation of its authority was reasonable, and the court was bound to defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statute it is charged to administer. Accordingly, the court denied UC Health's petition for review and affirmed the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "UC Health v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Anderson Lumber petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Anderson Lumber unlawfully withdrew recognition from a union. The court concluded that the district court did not unreasonably find that four of the eight employee statements upon which Anderson Lumber relied as its sole ground for withdrawal of recognition failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that those particular employees wanted to end union representation altogether rather than merely end their own membership in the union; the court rejected Anderson Lumber's claim that the Board wrongly barred it from bolstering its position with post-withdrawal evidence; and the court rejected Anderson Lumbers' remaining arguments, concluding that the Board was not unreasonable in finding that, in so doing, Anderson ran aground on the shoals of an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, the court denied Anderson Lumber's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Pacific Coast Supply, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Mystic, operator of a nursing home, petitioned for review of the Board's order granting summary judgment against Mystic and rejecting, among other things, Mystic's arguments that the Hearing Officer had made substantive and procedural errors. The court deferred to the Board's reasonable interpretation that the lack of a quorum at the Board does not prevent Regional Directors from continuing to exercise delegated authority that is not final because it is subject to eventual review by the Board; substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Mystic’s efforts to limit a supervisory employee’s effectiveness and its own anti-union campaign cancelled out the employee’s efforts on the Union’s behalf and preserved the environment necessary for a valid representation election; the Board was entitled to conclude that the election result challenged here was valid; and the Board’s ultimate conclusion as to the propriety of the election remains valid regardless of whether the employee was acting as an agent of the Union. Accordingly, the court denied Mystic's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "SSC Mystic Operating Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. At issue was whether the exclusionary rule is applicable when law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule while executing a warrant to arrest a suspect found at home. The court analyzed the factors the Supreme Court considered in Hudson v. Michigan to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies when the knock-and-announce rule is violated in the arrest warrant context. The court considered whether the violation causes the seizure of evidence such that evidentiary suppression furthers the interests underlying the knock-and-announce rule, and whether the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule outweigh its costs. Examining those factors, the court concluded that exclusion was the appropriate remedy here, where officers executing a warrant for defendant’s arrest sought him at home, violated the knock-and-announce rule, and discovered defendant’s marijuana upon their forced entry into defendant’s apartment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The County seeks attorneys' fees from the Government under the Voting Rights Act of 1965's (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10310(e), fee-shifting provision after the County prevailed in a challenge to the constitutionality of the VRA. The court agreed with the district court that the County is not entitled to attorneys’ fees because its lawsuit did not advance any of the purposes that Congress meant to promote by making fees available. Even though the County has based its argument for fees entirely on Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., the district court considered whether the County might also be entitled to fees under the Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC standard, which would allow a fee award only if the Government’s defense of the coverage formula’s constitutionality was frivolous or without foundation. But since the County has never maintained that it could even theoretically obtain fees under that standard, the court did not resolve whether Christiansburg Garment should sometimes apply in cases like this one. The court concluded that it is enough to resolve this fee dispute by holding that the County is not entitled to fees under the only standard it has urged the court to apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of attorneys' fees. View "Shelby County v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Nationals of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago abducted wealthy individuals, held them captive in the island's mountainous forests, and extorted ransoms from terrified family and friends. The conspirators were extradited to the United States, tried, and convicted of violating the Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. 1203. Principally at issue was whether the Act applies if the victim secured his United States citizenship through fraud. The court agreed with the district court that the Act does apply. The court concluded that, by its plain language, section 1203 broadly protects United States citizens. The statute imposes no restriction on this protection. It does not, for example, exclude citizens who, in retrospect, are unworthy of the honor. Nor does it exclude persons whose citizenship might at some later time be invalidated. In other words, section 1203 protects victims according to their status at the time of the hostage-taking. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to this issue. Further, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the United States Attorney to initiate posthumous denaturalization proceedings against the victim under 8 U.S.C. 1451. The court rejected defendants' remaining claims. The court affirmed the convictions and the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Straker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit contending that the government's "bulk data program" collection constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The program operates pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, where section 215 of the Act empowered the FBI to request, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to enter, orders “requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism.” The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the government from collecting plaintiffs’ call records, but stayed its order pending appeal. After the court determined that the case was not moot, Judge Brown and Judge Williams wrote separate opinions stating the reasons for reversal. Judge Brown wrote separately to emphasize that, while plaintiffs have demonstrated it is only possible - not substantially likely - that their own call records were collected as part of the bulk-telephony metadata program, plaintiffs have nonetheless met the bare requirements of standing. Having barely fulfilled the requirements for standing at this threshold stage, plaintiffs fall short of meeting the higher burden of proof required for a preliminary injunction. Judge Williams wrote that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the government is collecting from Verizon Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury. They thus cannot meet their burden to show a “likelihood of success on the merits” and are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. View "Klayman v. Obama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that 40 U.S.C. 6135's Assemblages and Display Clauses, by restricting his intended activities, violate his rights under the First Amendment. Plaintiff seeks to picket, leaflet, and make speeches in the Supreme Court plaza, with the aim of conveying to the Supreme Court and the public what he describes as “political messages” about the Supreme Court’s decisions. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional in all its applications to the Supreme Court's plaza. The court concluded, however, that the Supreme Court's plaza is a nonpublic forum and the government can impose reasonable restrictions on speech as long as it refrains from suppressing particular viewpoints. In this case, neither the Assemblages Clause nor the Display Clause targets specific viewpoints, and both clauses reasonably relate to the government’s long-recognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure. The statute’s reasonableness is reinforced by the availability of an alternative site for expressive activity in the immediate vicinity: the sidewalk area directly in front of the Supreme Court’s plaza. Therefore, the court upheld the statute’s constitutionality. View "Hodge v. Talkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the SEC to invalidate a four-year-old rule, promulgated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b, regulating campaign contributions by investment advisers. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed and concurrently filed a petition asking this court for direct review. The court consolidated and expedited the cases. The court held that courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to rules promulgated under the Investment Advisers Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court further held that such challenges must be brought in this court within sixty days of promulgation of the rule, and there are no grounds for an exception in this case: The law governing where to file was clear during the limitations period, and the length of time the statute affords for pre-enforcement review is adequate. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition as time-barred. View "New York Republican State Comm. v. SEC" on Justia Law

D.C. Code. Mun. Regs. Title 24, 121.1 is a municipal regulation that forbids any person from “set[ting] up, maintain[ing], or establish[ing] any camp or any temporary place of abode in any tent” on public property without the Mayor’s authorization. Members of the "Occupy Movement" filed suit alleging that their arrests for violating the regulation violated their rights under the Constitution and District law. The court held that the arresting officers had probable cause to conclude that plaintiffs had violated the temporary-abode regulation, and there is no dispute that plaintiffs “set up” a “tent” on public property, within the meaning of the District regulation. The court had no doubt that the officers’ judgment was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, plaintiffs' arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment or constitute a false arrest. Further, the court concluded that qualified immunity bars plaintiffs' claim that the officers arrested them in retaliation for their protest in violation of their First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The court noted that the district court’s decision to dismiss one count of the complaint without prejudice, as part of its final order dismissing the action in its entirety, did not deprive the court of appellate jurisdiction. View "Dukore v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law