Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The SEC created a new class of securities offerings freed from federal-registration requirements so long as the issuers of these securities comply with certain investor safeguards (Regulation A-Plus). Petitioners, the chief securities regulators for Massachusetts and Montana, seek review of Regulation A-Plus. The court concluded that, because Regulation A-Plus does not conflict with Congress’s unambiguous intent, it does not falter at Chevron Step 1. Furthermore, because the Commission’s qualified-purchaser definition is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” it does not fail Chevron Step 2. By providing a reasoned analysis of how its qualified-purchaser definition strikes the “appropriate balance between mitigating cost and time demands on issuers and providing investor protections,” the court concluded that the Commission has complied with its statutory obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court denied the consolidated petitions for review. View "Lindeen v. SEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she was suspended without pay for seven days in 2008 and was terminated in 2010. The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff's suspension claims and dismissed her termination claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her termination-based claims because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court concluded that plaintiff introduced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to concluded that her suspension was motivated by racial discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this issue. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the retaliation claim because plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that either her supervisors knew of any protected activity. View "Morris v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

After defendant was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of PCP, he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The court concluded that defendant was seized when the officer touched him and instructed him to "hold on" and defendant complied. In this case, no reasonable person in defendant’s position and subject to the officer's directives would have believed that he was free to go on about his business. The Government asserts that defendant walked quickly toward a certain neighborhood, made furtive gestures, and recognized the police. Based on the facts on the record, the court concluded that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying their stop of defendant. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Castle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring with her boyfriend to extort money from a prominent doctor with whom defendant had previously had an affair. The district court denied defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, holding that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. The district court therefore did not need to (and did not) decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. The court concluded, however, that defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. In this case, the duress instruction would have given jurors a legal basis upon which to vote not guilty, and the expert testimony on battered woman syndrome would have supported both elements of defendant’s duress defense. The factors here add up to a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt if expert testimony on battered woman syndrome had been presented at defendant’s trial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to decide whether counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to present such testimony. View "United States v. Nwoye" on Justia Law

Defendants Knight and Thorpe were convicted of charges related to the kidnapping and burglary of a couple. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia prosecutes both federal offenses and most D.C. Code offenses. It may prosecute combined federal and D.C. Code charges in either U.S. District Court or D.C. Superior Court. The court concluded that there was no Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b), violation. In this case, because the January arrests were for D.C. Code offenses, those arrests did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day clock. Therefore, the court affirmed as to the Speedy Trial Act issue. The court affirmed Thorpe's sentence and concluded that his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Finally, the court remanded for the district court to address Knight’s and Thorpe’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first instance. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

Aggregate Industries transferred work from one bargaining unit to another over the objections of the union representing both units. The ALJ found that because the company had bargained over the issue to impasse, it was entitled to make the change unilaterally. The Board held, however, that the company had merely transferred work and thus it had changed the scope of the bargaining unit. Therefore, the Board determined that the company no right to insist that the union bargain over the issue. The Board also held that even if the company had merely transferred work, it had not given the union a fair chance to bargain. The court disagreed and granted the petition for review and denied the application for enforcement of all aspects of the Board’s order addressing the company’s decision to transfer material hauling work. In this case, because the company had the right to unilaterally transfer material hauling work, the union acted improperly when it refused to fill the company’s dispatch order. Under Article 3 of the Ready-Mix Agreement, Aggregate therefore had the right to hire anyone it wanted, including its own drivers. Thus, Aggregate did not engage in unlawful direct dealing when it made its proposal to the construction drivers. The court upheld the Board's decision in a collateral matter. View "Aggregate Indus. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Defendants plead guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbing a liquor store in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Defendants argued that undercover police officers instigated the use of firearms in the reverse sting operation leading to their arrest. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the five-level enhancement under USSG 2B3.1(b)(2) for possession of a firearm where the actual possession of a firearm is not a prerequisite to application of the enhancement for inchoate offenses, such as the robbery conspiracy in this case. Furthermore, the record amply supports the district court’s finding that defendants intended that firearms would be possessed during the robbery and that such possession was reasonably foreseeable. The court agreed with defendants, however, that the case must be remanded for the district court to address whether the alleged police introduction of firearms into the conspiracy was sentencing entrapment. Finally, the court found no merit in defendant Hopkins' other challenges. View "United States v. McKeever" on Justia Law

After petitioner was charged with violating FAA regulations while on board a flight, including interfering with crewmember duties, the ALJ rejected petitioner's claim that a medical emergency caused his erratic behavior. The charges stemmed from petitioner's actions on the flight where he thought he was in love with another passenger and would not follow crewmember instructions to stop talking to her and leave her alone. The court rejected amicus's argument and concluded that it had no doubt that proscribing passenger interference with crewmember duties satisfies the “minimum nexus” to safety in flight required by Bargmann v. Helms; the FAA has authority to impose civil penalties on passengers under 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(5)(A) where the term "individual" applies to the common sense understanding that the term refers to a natural person; the Agency did not improperly add omitted violations to the amended notice and thus petitioner did not receive inadequate notice of the violations; and the court rejected petitioner's arguments regarding the Administrator's determination that petitioner violated the Interference Rule and the Seatbelt Rules. Because the court found no merit in petitioner's challenges, the court denied the petition for review. View "Wallaesa v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Companies, operators of nursing homes, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Companies violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by engaging in bad-faith bargaining with the Union. The Companies challenged two of the remedies the Board imposed: reimbursement of litigation costs incurred by both the Board and the Union during Board proceedings; and reimbursement of “all” of the negotiation expenses the Union incurred during its bargaining sessions with the Companies. The court concluded that the Board lacks authority to require the reimbursement of litigation costs incurred during Board proceedings. The court held, however, that the Board may require an employer to reimburse a union’s bargaining expenses pursuant to its remedial authority under section 10(c) of the Act. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Companies’ alternative challenge to the amount of the bargaining-costs award because they failed to raise it before the Board. Accordingly, the court granted the Companies’ joint petition in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part. View "Camelot Terrace, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four retired correctional officers, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District deprived them of their federal right under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), 18 U.S.C. 926C, to carry a concealed weapon. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege that they meet the statutory requirements but have been unable to obtain firearms training because the District of Columbia has refused to certify that, as correctional officers, they had a statutory power of arrest. The court held that, taken together, the LEOSA’s plain text, purpose, and context show that Congress intended to create a concrete, individual right to benefit individuals like plaintiffs and that is within “the competence of the judiciary to enforce.” The court, applying de novo review, held that the complaint states a claim under section 1983. In this case, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the federal right they seek to enjoy has been unlawfully deprived by the District to be remediable under Section 1983. Further, plaintiffs allege that the District’s actions resulting from its erroneous interpretation of how the LEOSA applies to these facts have deprived them of their federally established concealed-carry right. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Duberry v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law