Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

by
The case revolves around Stephen Wynn, a casino owner and real estate developer, who was accused by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of acting as an unregistered foreign agent for the People's Republic of China in 2017. The DOJ alleged that Wynn lobbied then-President Trump and his administration on behalf of China to cancel a certain Chinese businessperson's visa or to otherwise remove that person from the United States. Wynn's lobbying efforts ceased in October 2017, and he never registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).The DOJ sued Wynn in 2022, seeking to compel him to register as a foreign agent under FARA. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that since Wynn's alleged agency relationship with the Chinese government ended in October 2017, FARA no longer required him to register.The DOJ appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the precedent set by United States v. McGoff, Wynn's obligation to register under FARA expired when he ceased acting as a foreign agent. The court rejected the DOJ's argument that the civil enforcement provision of FARA allowed for an injunction to compel compliance for past violations, stating that the provision only applies to ongoing or imminent violations. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no legal basis for the government to compel Wynn to register now. View "Attorney General v. Wynn" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) approval of a project to expand a natural-gas pipeline from western Pennsylvania to the New York metropolitan area. The petitioner, Food & Water Watch, argued that FERC overlooked environmental issues in approving the project. Specifically, they claimed that FERC's Environmental Impact Statement failed to quantify greenhouse-gas emissions from upstream drilling for the extra gas, to quantify ozone emissions from its downstream burning, and to categorize emissions impacts as either significant or insignificant. Additionally, Food & Water Watch argued that FERC did not adequately consider New York State and New York City laws mandating reductions in carbon-dioxide emissions.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The lower courts had approved the project, with FERC issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the East 300 Upgrade Project. FERC had prepared a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which estimated the downstream carbon-dioxide emissions but declined to address upstream environmental effects. FERC also declined to characterize downstream emissions as significant or insignificant.The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioner's contentions and denied the petitions for review. The court found that FERC had reasonably concluded that there was too much uncertainty regarding the number and location of additional upstream wells. The court also held that FERC had reasonably explained its decision not to give a quantitative estimate of how much ozone would be produced as a result of the project. Finally, the court found that FERC had amply discussed the significance of GHG emissions and that it was not required to label the increased emissions and ensuing costs as either significant or insignificant. The court also found that FERC had reasonably explained why the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act did not undercut its finding of need for the project. View "Food & Water Watch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

by
The case involves attorney Larry Klayman, who has been subject to multiple disciplinary investigations and proceedings by the District of Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In response, Klayman filed a series of lawsuits against the District of Columbia Bar, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and individual D.C. Bar officials, alleging torts and constitutional claims. In June 2020, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered a ninety-day suspension of Klayman’s license to practice law. Employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel mailed notice of that suspension to other jurisdictions where Klayman is admitted to practice law. Klayman then brought three lawsuits against the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees and the Chair of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, alleging that the notification letters amounted to tortious interference and abuse of process. The district court dismissed Klayman’s suits in full and entered a pre-filing injunction restricting Klayman’s ability to file any related actions or claims for relief in any forum, state or federal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the pre-filing injunction. The court affirmed on immunity grounds the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for damages, but it affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court held that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees were entitled to absolute immunity from Klayman’s damages claims. However, the court found that there was no relevant pending state proceeding to support Younger abstention at the time of the dismissal, and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on those injunctive-relief claims. View "Klayman v. Porter" on Justia Law

by
The case revolves around EIG, an American investment fund, which lost $221 million after investing in a project to exploit newly discovered oil reserves off the coast of Brazil. The project was led by Petróleo Brasileiro, S.A. (Petrobras), Brazil’s state-owned oil company. A criminal investigation later revealed that Petrobras executives were accepting bribes from contractors and sharing the proceeds among themselves and Brazilian politicians. When this corruption was exposed, the project's lenders withdrew, causing the project to collapse and EIG’s investment to become worthless.The District Court for the District of Columbia had previously denied Petrobras' motion to dismiss the case, arguing that it was immune from liability under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court held that EIG had sufficiently alleged that Petrobras’ fraud had a "direct effect in the United States" and therefore fell within the direct-effect exception to the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that Petrobras had caused a direct effect in the United States because it had engaged with EIG in a sustained course of dealing over many months that conveyed its desire to obtain an investment from EIG. The court also found that the direct effect in the United States was not the result of happenstance or coincidence. It was wholly foreseeable, given that Petrobras had contemplated and tried to attract U.S. investment. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Petrobras’ assertion of foreign sovereign immunity at this stage and remanded for further proceedings. View "EIG Energy Fund XIV, L.P. v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A." on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance and the Advanced Medical Technology Association, two trade associations representing medical device manufacturers, who sued the Library of Congress and the Librarian of Congress. The dispute arose from an exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that allowed some access to the software of advanced medical devices. The trade associations claimed that the exemption violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the APA claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the Library of Congress is part of “the Congress” and therefore not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA’s judicial review provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court held that irrespective of whether the Library is an “agency,” Congress has specified that copyright regulations under Title 17 of the U.S. Code are subject to the APA. The court concluded that DMCA rules are subject to the APA just like other copyright rules, and therefore, the APA provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for this suit. The court remanded the case back to the district court to assess the APA claims. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a group of Afghan and Iraqi nationals who served the United States during recent armed conflicts and are now facing serious threats due to their service. They applied for special-immigrant visas, but their applications were delayed. Congress had authorized the Secretary of State to issue these visas and later mandated that the government should improve its efficiency to process the applications within nine months, except in cases involving unusual national-security risks. However, the plaintiffs' applications had been pending for more than nine months.The district court held that the government had unreasonably delayed processing these applications. In 2020, the court approved a plan requiring the prompt adjudication of applications filed by class members and pending for more than nine months as of May 21, 2020. In 2022, the Secretary moved to terminate or modify the plan based on changed circumstances in the two years since 2020. The district court recognized that changed circumstances warrant modifying the plan, but it refused to terminate the plan. The government appealed the refusal to terminate.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court reasonably responded to the changes and that some continued judicial involvement remains appropriate. The court also noted that the government's increased difficulties in processing visa applications cannot retroactively make past unreasonable delays reasonable. The court concluded that the district court permissibly balanced the various competing interests in declining to terminate the 2020 adjudication plan. View "Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Blinken" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Federal Education Association Stateside Region (FEA-SR), a teachers' union, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when they reached an impasse. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) was called in to resolve the remaining issues. The FSIP issued an order resolving the impasse, but FEA-SR refused to sign the agreement, arguing that the FSIP lacked jurisdiction to resolve certain issues. FEA-SR filed an arbitral grievance claiming that the Department of Defense's submission of the agreement for agency head review without FEA-SR's signature violated the contractual ground rules and constituted bad faith bargaining.The arbitrator found in favor of FEA-SR, concluding that the Department of Defense had committed unfair labor practices by cutting negotiations short and submitting an unexecuted agreement for agency head review. The FLRA, however, set aside the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator could not review whether the FSIP had jurisdiction over the disputed issues and that the agreement was "executed" when the FSIP issued its order.FEA-SR petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FLRA's decisions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because the FLRA's decisions involved an unfair labor practice. However, on the merits, the court rejected FEA-SR's claims and denied the petition for review. The court agreed with the FLRA that the arbitrator lacked authority to review the FSIP order and that the agreement was executed when the FSIP issued its order. View "Federal Education Association Stateside Region v. FLRA" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Troy Sargent, who participated in the January 6, 2021, protest at the U.S. Capitol. During the protest, Sargent assaulted a U.S. Capitol Police officer and attempted to do so again after being explicitly ordered not to. He was charged with assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement officers under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Sargent pleaded guilty, and the District Court sentenced him according to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court had to determine which of two guidelines was most appropriate for Sargent's conduct: § 2A2.2, which applies to aggravated assaults, or § 2A2.4, which applies to obstructing or impeding officers. The District Court determined § 2A2.2 was most applicable, which carries a higher base offense level than § 2A2.4.Sargent appealed, arguing that his conduct did not fall within the plain meaning of "aggravated assault" in the guideline text of § 2A2.2. He relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which held that courts may apply Auer deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations only if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after applying “all the standard tools of interpretation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the District Court was correct to apply § 2A2.2. The court found that the plain meaning of "aggravated assault," according to the text, structure, and context of the Guidelines, unambiguously captures Sargent’s conduct. Therefore, the court did not need to address the degree of deference to afford the commentary to the Guidelines. View "USA v. Sargent" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The case revolves around a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made by The National Security Archive ("Archive") to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the disclosure of the Perroots Memo. The memo, written by Lieutenant General Perroots in 1989, detailed events from 1983 that helped avert a nuclear crisis. The CIA produced the memo's cover letter but withheld the rest of the document, citing FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. The Archive sued the CIA to compel disclosure of the memo.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, as the Archive conceded that the response was justified under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, and the CIA had not waived its right to claim the exemptions. The district court also denied the Archive's motion to amend judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, upon de novo review, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Archive had standing to bring the case, as it had suffered a concrete injury when the CIA refused its FOIA request. However, the court rejected the Archive's arguments that the CIA had waived its right to assert the exemptions through the official acknowledgment and public domain doctrines. The court found that the CIA was not involved in the disclosure of the Perroots Memo, and therefore, the exemptions were not waived. The court also declined to consider the Archive's request to reclassify the Perroots Memo, as the Archive failed to make any substantive arguments regarding its reclassification request in its briefs. View "National Security Archive v. CIA" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Trenton Palmer, an experienced private pilot, who was charged by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for flying his plane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level and within 500 feet of people, a house, and other structures. The FAA claimed that Palmer violated a regulation establishing minimum safe altitudes. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Palmer guilty of the violation, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) affirmed the decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed multiple prejudicial errors and that the complaint against him should have been dismissed.Previously, the ALJ had denied Palmer's motion to dismiss the FAA’s complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to give fair notice of the charges. The ALJ found that Palmer violated Sections 91.119(a), (c), and 91.13(a) of the FAA regulations. The ALJ mitigated Palmer’s suspension from 120 days to 60 days. Palmer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board and the FAA cross-appealed the ALJ’s mitigation of Palmer’s suspension. On de novo review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s order and reversed the ALJ’s mitigation of the Administrator’s sanction because the Administrator’s selected sanction was supported by a reasonable explanation and there were no mitigating circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision from the NTSB. The court found that Palmer's arguments on appeal as to the Section 91.119 violations turn on whether he proved his defense that the low flight was necessary for takeoff or landing. The court rejected Palmer's claim of inadequate notice as legally unsupported and facially implausible. The court also found no error in the ALJ’s reliance on expert witness testimony and the Board’s subsequent affirmance. The court denied Palmer’s petition for review. View "Palmer v. FAA" on Justia Law