Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Company, DHL, petitioned for review of the Board's finding that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158, by prohibiting nonworking employees from distributing union literature in the hallway of its facility. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it was precluded from considering any direct challenge to the Board’s mixed-use presumption. In regard to the balancing of rights, the court concluded that while the Company may be able to dictate the terms of access to strangers, contractors, and other business invitees, “no restriction may be placed on the employees’ right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline.” The court rejected DHL's challenge to the "heightened" presumption purportedly employed by the ALJ and concluded that the Board’s mixed-use determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The court concluded that, given the absence of evidence that discipline, production, or security had been adversely affected, the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Finally, the court concluded that, under the circumstances, it was satisfied that the General Counsel proved the unfair labor practice, regardless of whether some employees who received the distribution were on the clock. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's application for enforcement. View "DHL Express, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Douglas B. Huron and the Society filed suit against OPM and its Director challenging the agency’s approval of health benefits plans for federal employees that exclude or limit insurance coverage of speech-generating devices. The court concluded that Huron and the Society never identified a procedural injury or raised procedural standing before the district court, and instead argued vigorously for “traditional” standing until their briefing on appeal. Huron’s and the Society’s appellate about-face on the nature of Huron’s claimed injury leaves them no viable basis on which to establish standing. Because Huron and the Society forfeited twice over the claims on which they predicate standing, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Huron v. Cobert" on Justia Law

After Congress directed the FDA to establish a twelve-member Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee to, among other things, report on the safety of menthol cigarettes, plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the FDA appointed to the Committee three members with pecuniary interests hostile to their products, in violation of relevant conflict-of-interests statutes and regulations, and that these appointments injured plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that the FDA’s appointments of these Committee members caused them three injuries: (1) an increased risk that the FDA will regulate menthol tobacco products adversely to plaintiffs’ interests; (2) access by the challenged Committee members to plaintiffs’ confidential information, with a probability of their using the information to plaintiffs’ detriment; and (3) the shaping of the menthol report to support the challenged members’ consulting and expert witness businesses, with injuries flowing both from the report itself and from its use as support for their expert testimony and consulting. The court concluded that plaintiffs' alleged injuries are too remote and uncertain. Because the alleged injuries are insufficiently imminent to confer standing, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction and dissolved the district court's injunction barring the use of the menthol report and ordering the reconstitution of the Committee. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA" on Justia Law

The district court held that NSC, a small nonprofit corporation registered in Virginia, is ineligible for attorney's fees under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 5524(a)(4)(E)(i). In keeping with Kay v. Ehrler, Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the decisions of its sister circuits, the court held that a corporation with a legal identity distinct from the attorney who represents it in litigation is eligible to recover attorney’s fees under FOIA. Because NSC is such a corporation, it is not barred by the pro se litigant exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Security Counselors v. CIA" on Justia Law

Silverado Stages, a California charter bus service, petitioned for review of the FMCSA's determination denying Silverado's petition for administrative review after the FMCSA publicly reported that Silverado violated a number of federal and state safety regulations. The court concluded that Silverado's contention that the FMCSA's dismissal of Silverado's petition was arbitrary and capricious lacks merit because the FMCSA was not required to provide Silverado with any more process than it received. The court also concluded that Silverado's contention that the violations issued against it are invalid because they were not promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures and because they constitute impermissible sanctions are foreclosed by the court's decision in Weaver v. FMCSA. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Silverado Stages, Inc. v. FMCSA" on Justia Law

Defendants, convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States, appealed the district court's imposition of the same sentences on remand. Although not required for a district court to provide an opportunity to object, the court believed that United States v. Locke describes the best procedure for district judges to follow - after sentencing the judge should ask if there are any objections to the sentence imposed not already on the record. Because defendants were given a fair opportunity to object and they failed to do so, their claims may be properly reviewed for plain error. The court rejected defendants' contention that the sentencing judge failed to consider the effect the vacated enhancement had on the original sentence and that he erred by reconsidering the seriousness of the offense. Finally, the court concluded that defendants' sentence was procedurally reasonable where the sentencing judge adequately addressed defendants’ post-sentencing rehabilitation argument and adequately explained reimposition of the original sentences. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Mach Mining petitioned for review of the Commission's final order concluding that two of Mach's regulatory violations under the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. 801, were the result of “high negligence” and one violation was also “significant and substantial.” Mach operates a longwall coal mine that releases more than 1 million cubic feet of methane daily. An inspector issued a citation to Mach based on coal that had accumulated around two conveyor belts and the inspector concluded that the accumulations violation was the result of high negligence and was "significant and substantial." Mach also received a violation for locating battery charging stations in primary escapeways. The inspector investigating the charging station concluded that the violation was a result of Mach's high negligence. The court rejected Mach's arguments based on mitigating circumstances and denied the petition for review, concluding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings for the "high negligence" and the "significant and substantial" determinations. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

After appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to participate in racketeer influenced corrupt organization, he challenged his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds. The court rejected the Government's argument that appellant's challenge is moot and followed the approach in United States v. Epps, holding that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a sentencing challenge brought by an appellant who had completed his prison sentence but not his period of supervised release. On the merits, the court concluded that appellant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court acknowledged appellant’s contention that he should have been excused from the halfway house requirement and explained why, in keeping with the district court’s intended sentence, he would not be excused from it. Further, the sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and there is nothing in the record that indicates that the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "In re: Sealed Case" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two membership organizations, filed suit alleging that federal agencies unlawfully neglected to manage stocks of river herring and shad in the Atlantic Ocean from New York to North Carolina. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no basis for judicial review of the Fishery Council’s decision. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' claims are not subject to judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801(b)(3), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title IX, and various D.C. tort laws, seeking damages from the District. Plaintiff alleged that, while attending a District school for emotionally disturbed students, she and a teacher had a consensual sexual relationship that led to the birth of a child. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court concluded that in order for the district court to assess whether plaintiff stated a facially plausible complaint, plaintiff needed to assert the elements of the type of municipal policy that caused her injury. Plaintiff failed to do so in this case. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court also concluded that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education standard where she has not alleged that anyone - much less an appropriate official - knew of any acts of sexual harassment while the harassment was ongoing. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet the statutory notice requirement for her tort claim and that her alternative claim seeking to discover a police report about the incident is forfeited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law