Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cincinnati filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a duty to defendant or indemnify claims brought against its insured, All Plumbing, for sending unsolicited faxed advertisements alleged to be in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court ruled that Cincinnati could not assert any of its defenses to coverage under the primary liability provision of the policy because it had failed to reserve its rights, but could assert such defenses under the excess liability provision. However, the district court did not address the asserted defenses under that provision. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final decision as to all requested relief where the district court's decision did not resolve all of Cincinnati’s rights and liabilities under the excess liability provision of the policy. View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. All Plumbing, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, contending that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant was sentenced for possession of 68 grams of crack cocaine that occurred five days after Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, when Presidential approval was imminent and virtually assured. Despite knowing that when the FSA was signed by the President, the mandatory minimum sentence for his client’s offense would be cut in half, from 10 years to five years, defendant’s then-counsel failed to seek a continuance of sentencing. The court held that, under Strickland v. Washington’s two-prong test, counsel’s failure to seek a continuance of defendant’s sentencing was, in the absence of any informed strategic choice, objectively unreasonable, and it also was prejudicial because, but for counsel’s failure, there was a reasonable probability that a continuance would have been granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Abney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, fourteen Jewish survivors of the Hungarian Holocaust, filed suit against the Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian state-owned railway arising from defendants’ participation in - and perpetration of - the Holocaust. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting plaintiffs’ lawsuit to proceed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1603 et seq., would conflict with the peace treaty’s terms. The court held that the peace treaty poses no bar to plaintiffs’ lawsuit, and the FSIA's treaty exception does not preclude this action. The court concluded, however, that the FSIA’s expropriation exception affords plaintiffs a pathway to pursue certain of their claims: those involving the taking of plaintiffs’ property in the commission of genocide against Hungarian Jews. Because those expropriations themselves amount to genocide, they qualify as takings of property “in violation of international law” within the meaning of the FSIA’s expropriation exception. Finally, plaintiffs’ claims do not constitute nonjusticiable political questions falling outside of the Judiciary’s cognizance. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Simon v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the FEC’s rule requiring corporations and labor organizations to disclose only those donations “made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.” At issue in this appeal is whether the rule survives Step Two of the Chevron framework and State Farm's arbitrary and capricious test, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. The court held that the FEC’s purpose requirement satisfies both Chevron Step Two and State Farm review has the benefit both of being a correct application of black letter administrative law and of forestalling to some other time an answer to the important constitutional questions bubbling beneath the surface of this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC" on Justia Law

Jefferson Morely, a journalist and news editor appealed for a second time from the district court’s denial of his request for attorney’s fees and costs under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E)(i), as a prevailing party. Morely submitted a FOIA request to the CIA for all records related to a CIA officer. Morely believed that the information on the officer could shed new light on President Kennedy's assassination. The district court concluded that the public-benefit factor weighed strongly against a fee award because the actual documents produced by the CIA provided little if any public benefit. The court concluded, however, that the district court improperly analyzed the public-benefit factor by assessing the public value of the information received rather than the potential public value of the information sought. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded again. View "Morley v. CIA" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of three counts of possession of illegal drugs with intent to distribute, appealed the denial of his motion to suppress drug-related evidence police discovered in his home. The court concluded that defendant did not establish good cause for not raising his preclusion argument before the district court and, assuming plain-error review applies, the district court did not plainly err by failing to give preclusive effect to the superior court’s probable-cause determination. The court also concluded that the district court's finding that defendant was one of four suspects who fled from a stolen car was not clearly erroneous because it was supported by testimony from an officer whose credibility defendant does not contest. The district court's finding provided probable cause for defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Burroughs" on Justia Law

The Company, DHL, petitioned for review of the Board's finding that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158, by prohibiting nonworking employees from distributing union literature in the hallway of its facility. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it was precluded from considering any direct challenge to the Board’s mixed-use presumption. In regard to the balancing of rights, the court concluded that while the Company may be able to dictate the terms of access to strangers, contractors, and other business invitees, “no restriction may be placed on the employees’ right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline.” The court rejected DHL's challenge to the "heightened" presumption purportedly employed by the ALJ and concluded that the Board’s mixed-use determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The court concluded that, given the absence of evidence that discipline, production, or security had been adversely affected, the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Finally, the court concluded that, under the circumstances, it was satisfied that the General Counsel proved the unfair labor practice, regardless of whether some employees who received the distribution were on the clock. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's application for enforcement. View "DHL Express, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Douglas B. Huron and the Society filed suit against OPM and its Director challenging the agency’s approval of health benefits plans for federal employees that exclude or limit insurance coverage of speech-generating devices. The court concluded that Huron and the Society never identified a procedural injury or raised procedural standing before the district court, and instead argued vigorously for “traditional” standing until their briefing on appeal. Huron’s and the Society’s appellate about-face on the nature of Huron’s claimed injury leaves them no viable basis on which to establish standing. Because Huron and the Society forfeited twice over the claims on which they predicate standing, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Huron v. Cobert" on Justia Law

After Congress directed the FDA to establish a twelve-member Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee to, among other things, report on the safety of menthol cigarettes, plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the FDA appointed to the Committee three members with pecuniary interests hostile to their products, in violation of relevant conflict-of-interests statutes and regulations, and that these appointments injured plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that the FDA’s appointments of these Committee members caused them three injuries: (1) an increased risk that the FDA will regulate menthol tobacco products adversely to plaintiffs’ interests; (2) access by the challenged Committee members to plaintiffs’ confidential information, with a probability of their using the information to plaintiffs’ detriment; and (3) the shaping of the menthol report to support the challenged members’ consulting and expert witness businesses, with injuries flowing both from the report itself and from its use as support for their expert testimony and consulting. The court concluded that plaintiffs' alleged injuries are too remote and uncertain. Because the alleged injuries are insufficiently imminent to confer standing, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction and dissolved the district court's injunction barring the use of the menthol report and ordering the reconstitution of the Committee. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA" on Justia Law

The district court held that NSC, a small nonprofit corporation registered in Virginia, is ineligible for attorney's fees under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 5524(a)(4)(E)(i). In keeping with Kay v. Ehrler, Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the decisions of its sister circuits, the court held that a corporation with a legal identity distinct from the attorney who represents it in litigation is eligible to recover attorney’s fees under FOIA. Because NSC is such a corporation, it is not barred by the pro se litigant exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Security Counselors v. CIA" on Justia Law