Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Salem petitioned for review of the Board's certification of a bargaining unit and its subsequent determination that Salem unlawfully refused to bargain. The court concluded that the hearing officer's (HO's) premature closing of the record was not an abuse of discretion. In this case, despite the Board’s unexplained failure to allow a party to submit evidence at a representation hearing, Salem has not, as it must, established prejudice. The court also concluded that neither the HO nor the General Counsel abused his discretion where Salem has not shown prejudice by the decision not to transfer for alleged ex parte communications; Salem failed to establish that the Board's error of granting the Union's Special Appeal was prejudicial; Salem does not explain how the Board’s issuance of the erratum order was ultra vires or how the order prejudiced it; and, assuming arguendo that the Board erred by not allowing Salem to use the Sub-Zero Freezer Co. exception, no prejudice resulted. The court concluded that, although the Board's proceedings contain a myriad of missteps, Salem has failed to establish prejudice. The court denied Salem's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Salem Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Mike-sell's petitioned for review of the Board's determination that it violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), when it unilaterally instituted terms and conditions of employment for its employees represented by the Teamsters. The court concluded that, although it is clear that the Union wished to avoid an impasse, the court does not think the ALJ’s determination that the Union did not improperly delay bargaining sessions can be effectively challenged; Mike-sell's criticism of the ALJ’s reliance on bargaining that took place after the Company put into effect its offer is irrelevant; and the Board’s determination that an impasse had not been reached is a legitimate finding (a mixed question of fact and law). Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Mike-sell's Potato Chip Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Nova petitioned for review of the Board's finding that it violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). Nova hired UNICCO to provide maintenance, landscaping, and janitorial services throughout its campus. The court concluded that the Board is entitled to summary enforcement of the uncontested portion of its order regarding the no-solicitation rule as applied to Nova’s own employees; the Board reasonably found that Nova violated section 8(a)(1) by prohibiting an UNICCO employee from engaging in handbilling on a campus parking lot; the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Nova's challenges to the Board’s application of New York New York, LLC d/b/a New York New York Hotel & Casino because Nova failed to urge them before the Board pursuant to NLRA 10(e); and an UNICCO Director’s questions, while at the work site, about a former UNICCO employee’s union activities were, under the circumstances, impermissibly coercive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "NOVA Southeastern Univ. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Secretary issued regulations setting out reasonable cost limits (RCLs) for specified medical services and establishing certain exceptions to those limits. Canonsburg claimed that the Secretary has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., because her method of calculation is inconsistent with governing regulations and was promulgated without notice and comment. In light of Canonsburg I, the district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that issue preclusion barred Canonsburg’s suit. The court concluded that the Secretary did not waive her issue preclusion affirmative defense by not raising it at the administrative stage. Moreover, the Secretary asserted it, expressly and properly, in district court and the court is free to affirm the district court's application of the doctrine to Canonsburg's complaint. In light of the Supreme Court's plain language in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I and II), the court's own construction of the Chenery doctrine and no persuasive case law to the contrary, the court concluded that the Chenery doctrine does not prohibit raising issue preclusion as an affirmative defense in district court even if the party raising the defense was not a party to the administrative proceeding or was otherwise unable to assert the defense at the administrative stage. Finally, the court rejected Canonsburg's claims of equitable considerations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Canonsburg General Hosp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiring to traffic in narcotics and numerous related crimes and subsequently challenged their resentencing on remand. The court rejected Defendant Farrell's contentions that the district court erred by failing to calculate the applicable Guidelines range; the district court erred by increasing his Guidelines offense level by four on the ground that he was an "organizer or leader" of a drug trafficking organization; the district court failed to consider certain relevant factors in determining whether a departure is warranted; and that his 262-month sentence is unreasonable. The court rejected Defendant Law's contentions that the district court committed procedural error by failing to calculate the applicable Guidelines range at resentencing and that the life sentence imposed on Count 1 violates the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court rejected Defendant Fletcher's contentions that the district court failed to calculate the applicable Guidelines range; a life sentence for his conviction on Count 1 violates the Eighth Amendment; his 1987 conviction, which contributed to the enhancement of his sentence on Count 1, was entered pursuant to an Alford plea, and that a conviction based on such a plea is insufficient to establish a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(b); his 1977 conviction, which also contributed to the enhancement of his sentence on Count 1, was set aside under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. 5021 (1976), and hence should not have been considered; and there was a defect in the Judgment and Commitment Order for his 1977 conviction that rendered improper any reliance on that conviction for sentencing enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Law" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to distributing child pornography. The court concluded that the district court properly applied a cross-reference to the guideline governing production of child pornography pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(c)(1) and a two-level enhancement for using a computer to solicit participation with a minor in the production or live transmission of child pornography pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(6)(B). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Zagorski" on Justia Law

After the United States prevailed in a civil action brought pursuant to the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, based on certifications by MWI to the Bank to secure loans financing MWI's sale of water pumps to Nigeria, a jury awarded the government $7.5 million in damages. The damages were trebled to $22.5 million pursuant to the FCA. Because an FCA defendant is entitled to an offset from the trebled damages by any amount paid to compensate the government for the harm caused by the false claims, and the district court considered Nigeria’s repayment of the loan to be compensatory, MWI’s damages were reduced from $22.5 million to $0. The district court did impose civil penalties at the highest level. The government appealed and MWI cross-appealed. The court reversed the judgment because the government failed to establish that MWI knowingly made a false claim. Absent evidence that the Bank, or other government entity, had officially warned MWI away from its otherwise facially reasonable interpretation of an undefined and ambiguous term, the FCA’s objective knowledge standard, as the Supreme Court clarified while this litigation was pending in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, did not permit a jury to find that MWI “knowingly” made a false claim. View "United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants Cordova, Gutierrez, and Sorto appealed their convictions for conspiracy, violent crimes in aid of racketeering, murder, assault, and federal and District of Columbia weapons offenses. The court rejected defendants' argument that the court-imposed restrictions limiting their personal access to certain discovery documents deprived them of their Sixth Amendment rights to effective representation and to assist in their defense because defendants suffered no plausible prejudice. The court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in declining to recuse himself in response to an allegedly threatening letter; the district court did not plainly err by holding its preliminary jury instruction conference outside the presence of defendants and plaintiffs have failed to show prejudice in support of their claim that the off-the-record proceeding deprived them of effective representation; and defendants are not entitled to a new trial where the court found that the district court's dismissal of defendants' second appointed attorneys was neither contrary to the statute nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cordova" on Justia Law

Western Minnesota and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's award of a permit for a hydroelectric project in Polk County, Iowa. The Commission concluded that the municipal preference under Section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 800(a), applies only to municipalities “located in the[] vicinity” of the water resources to be developed. Petitioners claimed that the Commission’s geographic proximity test is an impermissible interpretation of the plain text of the statute. The court agreed that Congress has spoken directly to the question in defining “municipality” in Section 3(7) of the FPA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the permit order and rehearing order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Minnesota Municipal v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, seeking to vacate his conviction for federal wire fraud on the ground that his attorney failed to properly advise him about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The district court denied relief partly because the district court believed appellant was unable to show prejudice. The court concluded that appellant's first contention that his lawyer’s performance was deficient because he failed to “negotiate an effective plea bargain” and to “mitigate harm under the plea agreement[.]” was foreclosed by Padilla v. Kentucky and Chaidez v. United States. The court concluded that it makes no sense to suggest that although defense attorneys had no duty to advise their clients about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty prior to Padilla, they nonetheless had a duty to research those consequences and take them into account when negotiating a plea deal. In regard to appellant's contention that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by affirmatively misrepresenting the potential immigration consequences of a conviction, the court concluded that the district court should not have denied the petition based solely on the timing of defense counsel’s misrepresentations. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law