Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sierra Club filed suit against the government seeking to set aside several federal agencies' regulatory approvals relating to the Flanagan South pipeline and to enjoin the pipeline's construction and operation in reliance on any such approvals. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and entered summary judgment in favor of the agencies and Enbridge. The court held that the federal government was not required to conduct National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, analysis of the entirety of the Flanagan South pipeline, including portions not subject to federal control or permitting; the court rejected Sierra Club’s Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, challenge to the Corps’s verifications of Flanagan South’s water crossings under Nationwide Permit 12 because the Corps was authorized to conduct its review on a regional rather than nationwide basis, and the Corps’s District Managers adequately supported their verification decisions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sierra Club’s motion to supplement and amend its complaint, because the proposed new allegations would not have affected the dispositive legal analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps" on Justia Law

The SEC brought an administrative proceeding against George Jarkesy, Jr., for securities fraud. Meanwhile, Jarkesy filed this suit seeking the administrative proceeding's termination, arguing that the proceeding’s initiation and conduct infringe his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Congress, by establishing a detailed statutory scheme providing for an administrative proceeding before the Commission plus the prospect of judicial review in a court of appeals, implicitly precluded concurrent district-court jurisdiction over challenges like Jarkesy’s. In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the Supreme Court set forth a framework for determining when a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review forecloses parallel district-court jurisdiction. Applying the considerations outlined in Thunder Basin and its progeny, the court found that Congress intended exclusivity when it established the statutory scheme. Consequently, instead of obtaining judicial review of his challenges to the Commission’s administrative proceeding now, Jarkesy can secure judicial review in a court of appeals when (and if) the proceeding culminates in a resolution against him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jarkesy, Jr. v. SEC" on Justia Law

The district court determined as a matter of law that the District’s efforts “to combat gun violence and promote public safety” by means of its registration laws were “constitutionally permissible.” Plaintiffs challenged the district court's admission of, and its reliance upon, certain expert reports proffered by the District and the final order denying plaintiffs' and granting the District’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the admission of the challenged expert reports was not an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed with respect to the basic registration requirement as applied to long guns, D.C. Code 7- 2502.01(a); the requirement that a registrant be fingerprinted and photographed and make a personal appearance to register a firearm, D.C. Code 7-2502.04; the requirement that an individual pay certain fees associated with the registration of a firearm, D.C. Code 7-2502.05; and the requirement that registrants complete a firearms safety and training course, D.C. Code 7-2502.03(a)(13). The court reversed with respect to the requirement that a person bring with him the firearm to be registered, D.C. Code 7- 2502.04(c); the requirement that a gun owner re-register his firearm every three years, D.C. Code 7-2502.07a; the requirement that conditions registration of a firearm upon passing a test of knowledge of the District’s firearms laws, D.C. Code 7-2502.03(a)(10); and the prohibition on registration of “more than one pistol per registrant during any 30-day period,” D.C. Code 7-2502.03(e). View "Heller v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Amtrak, alleging that it discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and District of Columbia law. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak. After the engine plaintiff was driving passed a stop signal at the rail yard and was forced off the rails by a safety derailer, Amtrak fired him and suspended his engineer certificate. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that no jury could reasonably conclude based on the evidence in the record that Amtrak was motivated by plaintiff's race to take the adverse actions of which he complains. View "Burley v. Nat'l Passenger Rail Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the Department of the Interior’s misadministration of Native American trust accounts and an ensuing complex, nationwide litigation and settlement. The class action representatives appealed the district court's denial of compensation for expenses incurred during the litigation and settlement process. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of additional compensation for expenses for the lead plaintiff because the district court expressly wrapped those costs into an incentive award given to her earlier. However, the district court erred in categorically rejecting as procedurally barred the class representatives’ claim for the recovery of third-party payments, and remanded for the district court to apply its accumulated expertise and discretion to the question of whether third-party compensation can and should be paid under the Settlement Agreement. View "Cobell v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a freelance journalist, filed suit against the Secretary of Defense and subordinating officers in both the present appeal, reversal of the memorandum terminating his embed status and reinstatement of his credentials and accommodation status. Plaintiff's status was withdrawn and he was returned to the United States after he reported on a controversial shooting incident at an adjoining Afghan national army base over the military personnel's objections. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims, concluding that plaintiff failed to assert a cognizable claim where plaintiff failed to show constitutional entitlement to the status of embed journalist. Further, the court noted that, even if it erred in determining that plaintiff brought no justifiable claim in the first instance, any claim which he may have asserted is now moot. View "Anderson v. Carter" on Justia Law

In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court determined that the Board lacked authority to act during the time that three of its five members held office via appointments that violated the Recess Appointments Clause. At issue here is whether a Regional Director of the Board had authority to conduct a union election and certify its result during that same time. The court affirmed the Board's decision that the Regional Director had authority to conduct the election. The court concluded that the Board’s interpretation of its authority was reasonable, and the court was bound to defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statute it is charged to administer. Accordingly, the court denied UC Health's petition for review and affirmed the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "UC Health v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Anderson Lumber petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Anderson Lumber unlawfully withdrew recognition from a union. The court concluded that the district court did not unreasonably find that four of the eight employee statements upon which Anderson Lumber relied as its sole ground for withdrawal of recognition failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that those particular employees wanted to end union representation altogether rather than merely end their own membership in the union; the court rejected Anderson Lumber's claim that the Board wrongly barred it from bolstering its position with post-withdrawal evidence; and the court rejected Anderson Lumbers' remaining arguments, concluding that the Board was not unreasonable in finding that, in so doing, Anderson ran aground on the shoals of an unfair labor practice. Accordingly, the court denied Anderson Lumber's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Pacific Coast Supply, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Mystic, operator of a nursing home, petitioned for review of the Board's order granting summary judgment against Mystic and rejecting, among other things, Mystic's arguments that the Hearing Officer had made substantive and procedural errors. The court deferred to the Board's reasonable interpretation that the lack of a quorum at the Board does not prevent Regional Directors from continuing to exercise delegated authority that is not final because it is subject to eventual review by the Board; substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Mystic’s efforts to limit a supervisory employee’s effectiveness and its own anti-union campaign cancelled out the employee’s efforts on the Union’s behalf and preserved the environment necessary for a valid representation election; the Board was entitled to conclude that the election result challenged here was valid; and the Board’s ultimate conclusion as to the propriety of the election remains valid regardless of whether the employee was acting as an agent of the Union. Accordingly, the court denied Mystic's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "SSC Mystic Operating Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. At issue was whether the exclusionary rule is applicable when law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule while executing a warrant to arrest a suspect found at home. The court analyzed the factors the Supreme Court considered in Hudson v. Michigan to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies when the knock-and-announce rule is violated in the arrest warrant context. The court considered whether the violation causes the seizure of evidence such that evidentiary suppression furthers the interests underlying the knock-and-announce rule, and whether the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule outweigh its costs. Examining those factors, the court concluded that exclusion was the appropriate remedy here, where officers executing a warrant for defendant’s arrest sought him at home, violated the knock-and-announce rule, and discovered defendant’s marijuana upon their forced entry into defendant’s apartment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Weaver" on Justia Law