Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Chief of Police sanctioned plaintiff, pursuant to MPD General Order 204.01, Part VI-C-1, for releasing to the media a recording of Emergency Response Team (ERT) radio communications that occurred during an incident in which a suspect exchanged gunfire with the police and barricaded himself inside a private home, plaintiff filed suit against the District and MPD officials, alleging that he was being punished for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment and the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA), D.C. Code 1-615.52(a)(6). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the First Amendment and DCWPA claims, and dismissed the DCWPA claims against the individual defendants. The court held that Part VI-C-1 as applied to plaintiff is sufficiently tailored temporally and in scope to enable law enforcement better to investigate criminal activity and police operations implicating police safety, and that the MPD’s interests in non-disclosure outweigh plaintiff’s and the public’s interests in releasing the recording at the time he did; Part VI-C-1 bars disclosure of confidential information only during ongoing investigations and does not otherwise bar speech about police activity, including the barricade incident; and releasing the confidential ERT recording could have harmed pending criminal investigations because it contained potentially critical information about the barricade and, only if kept confidential, could it provide a means to gauge other evidence offered by witnesses and persons involved in the incident. Finally, plaintiff's statutory challenge under the pre-2010 DCWPA is unavailing for failure to identify a “protected disclosure.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baumann v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between Ecuador and Chevron involving a series of lawsuits related to an investment and development agreement. On appeal, Ecuador challenged the district court's confirmation of an international arbitral award to Chevron. In this case, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) includes a standing offer to all potential U.S. investors to arbitrate investment disputes, which Chevron accepted in the manner required by the treaty. Therefore, the court concluded that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Ecuador in order to consider an action to confirm or enforce the award. The dispute over whether the lawsuits were “investments” for purposes of the treaty is properly considered as part of review under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court further concluded that, even if it were to conclude that the FSIA required a de novo determination of arbitrability, the court still would find that the district court had jurisdiction where Ecuador failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Chevron's suits were not "investments" within the meaning of the BIT. Likewise, the court rejected Ecuador's arguments against confirmation of the award under the New York Convention as meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador" on Justia Law

The company appealed the Board's finding that the company had committed various unfair labor practices during the relocation of union employees from a dealership that was closing down to a larger dealership with non-union employees. The Board concluded that the company acted unlawfully when it withdrew recognition of the Union. The company argued that it had no choice but to withdraw recognition of the Union, on the ground that the relocated employees had been absorbed into a larger unit of non-union employees at the new dealership. The court rejected the company's arguments and concluded that it was required to bargain with the Union about the former employees' initial wages, benefits, schedules, and other terms and conditions. During such bargaining, the employer was required to consider “any proposals” put forth by the Union on these topics. The court upheld as reasonable the Board’s conclusion that the company unlawfully withdrew recognition of the Union when it did so immediately upon the relocation, prior to any effects bargaining. The court rejected the company's challenge to the composition of the Board itself. Accordingly, the court denied the company's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Dodge of Naperville v. NLRB" on Justia Law

American Coal appealed the MSHA's citation and fine for a "fire" on one of its coal stockpiles when safety inspectors observed patches of smoldering, smoking coal without visible flames. American Coal argued that the citation and fine should be vacated because a "fire," for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., exists only when there are visible flames and that, even if a fire could exist without visible flames, there was insufficient proof to show a fire of any kind. The court rejected these arguments and denied American Coal's petition for review, concluding that the statutory term “fire” is ambiguous, the Secretary of Labor reasonably determined that the term does not require the presence of flames, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the smoldering patches on American Coal’s stockpile satisfied the Secretary’s interpretation of a “fire.” View "The American Coal Co. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two Kazakh businessmen, filed suit alleging that defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) - (d), by engaging in criminal activity through the Krull Corporation. The specific predicate racketeering crimes alleged are money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956, and extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The amended complaint also alleged a defamation claim. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Determining that it has jurisdiction over the appeal, the court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations failed to state a RICO claim where plaintiffs do not contend that their complaint states a claim of domestic Hobbs Act extortion by defendants; plaintiffs do not assert that the actual extortion of their assets in Kazakhstan was itself in any way a violation of the Hobbs Act; and defendants only argue that Defendant Mirtchev's agreement in D.C. to Dariga Nazarbayeva’s extraterritorial, non-Hobbs-Act extortion scheme in Kazakhstan constituted a conspiracy in the United States to violate the Hobbs Act. The court also concluded that the complaint fails to state a claim for defamation or for conspiracy to defame. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hourani v. Mirtchev" on Justia Law

In 1985, Carl Oglesby filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, with federal agencies seeking information on Reinhard Gehlen. Gehlen was a former Nazi general through whom the United States engaged in clandestine espionage after World War II. In this appeal, Oglesby's daughter and her partner challenge the adequacy of the Army's and the CIA's justification for withholding certain information on national security grounds. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Army and CIA with respect to the Army’s transfer of documents to the National Archives, both agencies’ searches for responsive documents, and the CIA’s withholding of information under Exemptions 1 and 3. The court's remand is limited to issues arising from the Army’s release to plaintiff during the appeal of responsive but redacted Army documents that had been held by the National Archives. View "DiBacco v. United States Army" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 144-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. At issue on appeal was whether a district court must consider the crack/powder disparity before deciding whether to assign concurrent or consecutive sentences to a defendant. The court concluded that, although the district court misinterpreted 18 U.S.C. 3584(a) as having embedded in it a presumption in favor of consecutive sentences for separate conduct and offenses, this error did not sufficiently affect the district court's exercise of its discretion to require remand and resentencing. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the sentencing order. View "United States v. Ayers" on Justia Law

Appellees, medical records coders employed by appellants, filed suit against appellants for unlawfully failing to pay overtime pay. Appellees prevailed in a jury verdict and the district court denied appellants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to alter or amend the judgment. The court concluded that the jury fulfilled its function by considering conflicting evidence, resolving factual disputes, and returning a verdict. In this case, there is no reason for the court to upset that verdict or order a new trial. Because the court found no merit in appellants' arguments, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Radtke v. Caschetta" on Justia Law

The Commission imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans and its treasurer, David Wiggs, in his official capacity, for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. Combat Veterans filed suit against the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power to act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment to the Commission. At issue, among other things, was whether the Commission’s voting procedures may contravene the Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(2). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure was harmless even if it was in error. In this case, Combat Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. The court rejected Combat Veterans' remaining challenges, agreeing with the district court's explanations. View "Combat Veterans for Congress v. FEC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Colombian citizen, was indicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. 70503(a), and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs “on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” in violation of the MDLEA. The court concluded that the MDLEA’s conspiracy provision reaches appellant’s extraterritorial conduct in this case; the overt acts of other conspirators on board the vessel are attributable to appellant, satisfying any “on board a vessel” requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application; the Felonies Clause provides Congress with authority to “punish” appellant for his role in the conspiracy; the application of the MDLEA in appellant's case does not violate the Due Process Clause; the district court did not err when it assumed the truth of the government’s proffered facts in denying appellant’s motion, including with regard to whether the pertinent vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the court rejected appellant's Brady claims; and the court rejected appellant's sentencing claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ballestas" on Justia Law