Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ADX petitioned the FCC to deny the assignment to a competitor of several radio licenses in the Pensacola, Florida, and Mobile, Alabama, markets. The FCC denied the petition and ADX appealed, contending that, in applying the statutory caps on ownership of radio stations, the Commission should not have used its normal market definition methodology because of unique aspects of the Pensacola and Mobile markets. Alternatively, ADX contends that the Commission should have applied the two-year waiting period applicable to changes in market definition. Determining that ADX has Article III standing, the court affirmed the judgment because the Commission reasonably exercised its judgment in deciding not to deviate from the market definition methodology it adopted in 2003, and because its interpretation of the waiting period was consistent with the policy established in its prior order and not otherwise suspect. View "ADX Communications v. FCC" on Justia Law

After a federal court of appeals entered judgment enforcing petitioner’s right to reinstatement and backpay with interest for his unlawful termination, the Board entered into a settlement agreement with petitioner's former employer under which petitioner's backpay would be paid by monthly installments over eleven years with no interest accruing. The Board also ruled that reinstatement to a position with reduced pay, benefits, and job security satisfied the court’s judgment because it paralleled what current employees received. The court concluded that the Board's decision departs without any reasoned explanation from longstanding Board precedent constraining the Board’s ability to alter the terms of a judicially enforced Order, and it relies on a finding of substantial equivalence between petitioner’s old job and his reinstatement offer that is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part, vacated the Board's ruling, and remanded. View "Dupuy v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Department, alleging a claim under the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code 1–615.51 et seq., after she was discharged as a result of the Department's disciplinary proceedings stemming from a major fire of a high-rise building. The district court grouped appellant’s numerous communications with her supervisors into broad categories, and then granted summary judgment to the Department on the ground that most of those categories were not statutorily protected types of communications, and for the one group that was protected, the Department had articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. The court concluded, however, that Whistleblower protection is not disbursed or denied en masse. When appellant's complaints are considered individually rather than categorically, a reasonable jury could conclude that one or more of them qualifies as a protected complaint under the Whistleblower Act. Appellant also came forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a prima facie case of retaliation as to those complaints. The Department failed to meet its burden of establishing that any reasonable juror would have to find by clear and convincing evidence that it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the Whistleblower claims. The court affirmed, with one exception, the grant of summary judgment as to appellant's other claims. View "Coleman v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to five counts of filing a false tax return and appealed his sentence of 110 months in prison, arguing that the sentence was impermissibly influenced by his refusal to reveal the source of his unreported income. This court then vacated the sentence and the district court again sentenced appellant to 110 months imprisonment on remand, stating that its initial sentence had nothing to do with appellant's refusal to discuss the source of his unreported funds. Appellant appealed again. The court concluded that the district court did not plainly err in its reasoning for an upward variance where deterrence of tax evasion was a permissible reason. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Saani" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees, including fees for work performed by a special education expert employed by their attorney, after prevailing in actions brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the special education expert is a highly experienced special education consultant and expert. Because the expert is not a paralegal, her fees were nonrecoverable as part of reasonable attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McAllister v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who suffers from Multiple Sclerosis (MS), filed suit against her former employer, TEFCU, for wrongful termination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. CODE 2-1401.01 et seq.; and Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140. Plaintiff alleged that the cost of treating her MS was causing the monthly healthcare insurance premium to rise and that TEFCU dismissed her to reduce its health care costs. TEFCU claimed that plaintiff's termination was due to her poor performance as an employee. The district court granted TEFCU's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer that TEFCU dismissed plaintiff because of the costs associated with insuring her. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions where plaintiff provides no citation to authority or to the record demonstrating that the district court's denial was premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law, an erroneous factual finding, or that it was otherwise unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Giles v. Transit Emp. Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

The SEC found that petitioner and his company repeatedly marked the close - buying or selling stock as the trading day ends to artificially inflate the stock's value - and sanctioned them accordingly. The court concluded that the Commission applied the correct legal standard and properly concluded that there is ample evidence petitioner manipulated the market by marking the close; petitioner was properly charged as a primary violator under both the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(1), (4); but the Commission cannot apply the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, to bar petitioner from associating with municipal advisors and rating organizations because such an application is impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review. The court vacated the portion of the SEC order that is impermissibly retroactive. View "Koch v. SEC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, several biofuel producers and others, want EPA to approve E30, which is a fuel that contains about 30% ethanol, for use as a test fuel. EPA has adopted regulations that require vehicle manufacturers to test the emissions of new vehicles. Vehicle manufacturers must conduct emissions testing using a “test fuel” that must be a fuel that is “commercially available.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing to maintain their suit; petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); petitioners' challenge is timely; and petitioners' suit is ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that it is entirely commonsensical and reasonable for EPA to require vehicle manufacturers to use the same fuels in emissions testing that vehicles will use out on the road. Moreover, the regulation is rooted in (if not compelled by) the statute, which says that EPA must ensure that “vehicles are tested under circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel.” Because the “commercially available” requirement is not arbitrary and capricious, the court denied the petition for review. View "Energy Future Coalition v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the Parole Commission's denial of his 2010 and 2012 applications for parole, alleging that the Commission violated the Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws by incorrectly applying the regulations in place at the time of appellant’s underlying offense. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed, finding that the Commission's denial of appellant’s requests for parole was a valid exercise of parole authority as it existed at the time of his offense. The court further concluded that the Commission did not rely on the retroactive application of any law, regulation, or guideline to justify its decisions, and therefore could not have violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Bailey v. Fulwood, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of HUD after an ALJ found them liable for violations of governing programs administered by HUD. The Secretary upheld the ALJ's liability determinations but imposed higher penalty amounts. Determining that the court had jurisdiction, the court denied petitioners' petition for review, upholding the Secretary's finding of Section 8 violations where Mantua Gardens increased Section 8 tenants' rents without giving the tenants and HUD one year's notice of the proposed termination of a Housing Assistance Payment contract; the Secretary’s reversal of the ALJ’s $450,000 penalty, imposing instead the original amount sought by HUD of $1,260,000; the Secretary's determination that no request was made for Secretarial approval of a prepayment, and therefore no cancellation of the agreement occurred; and the Secretary's determination that HUD conducted an appropriate penalty analysis. Because the Secretary's conclusions are not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court denied the petition for review. View "Grier v. HUD" on Justia Law