Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking damages from the District, the Family Services Agency, and District employees after plaintiffs' children were removed from their home after they were sexually abused by plaintiffs' other children. The court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the District and remanded those claims to the district court to determine whether there is municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the First Amendment, tort, and post-adoption services claims. View "Doe v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This appeal involves a labor dispute between an ambulance company and its employees. The court concluded that the unfair labor practice (ULP) complaint issued against the ambulance company was unauthorized because Lafe Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, served in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the Board’s order. View "SW General, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate in Maryland, filed a mandamus petition seeking to compel the USCIS to grant him a hearing to review the denial of his application for naturalization. The court rejected appellant's claim that he qualifies for in forma pauperis (IFP) status under the imminent danger exception to the three strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In this case, appellant's allegations were insufficient to establish imminent danger where the beatings, which took place while appellant was in the general prison population, do not indicate that he continued to face imminent danger at the time he filed his complaint. Further, appellant makes no allegation that he suffered any beatings or received specific threats while in protective custody. The court also rejected appellant's claim that the three-strikes rule is unconstitutional as applied to his case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, denying appellant IFP status. View "Asemani v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white Foreign Service Officer, filed suit alleging that the State Department's hiring plan aimed to increase racial diversity among the officers corps in the Foreign Service violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court agreed with the district court's reliance on two Supreme Court decisions, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, to grant summary judgment in favor of the State Department. Johnson and Weber both upheld employers' affirmative action plans against Title VII challenges. In this case, the Department has introduced evidence that the plan worked to target manifest imbalances in senior-level positions in the Foreign Service and that those imbalances resulted from past discrimination. The Department has also introduced evidence that the plan refrained from unnecessarily trammeling the rights of non-minority candidates. Further, plaintiff failed to prove that the Department's justification is pretextual and that the plan is invalid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Shea v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the Gulf Cartel and a former Mexican state police officer, was convicted of conspiring to manufacture and distribute cocaine and marijuana for importation into the United States. On appeal, defendant raised numerous challenges to his conviction and sentence. The court rejected all of defendant's challenges except for one exception. The court concluded that the $15 billion forfeiture assessed by the district court must be recalculated under the terms of 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1), and the court remanded to the district court for that purpose. The court did not reach defendant's argument that the forfeiture constituted an “excessive” fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment, or his contentions that the district court miscalculated the forfeiture under its understanding of section 853(a)(1). View "United States v. Cano-Flores" on Justia Law

Grossmont and four other California hospitals sought reimbursement under the Medicare program for so-called “bad claims.” Payment was denied because the claims were submitted to Medicare without first being submitted to the State of California for a determination of any payment responsibility it may have for the claims. The court concluded that Grossmont has failed to preserve its challenge that the mandatory state determination policy violates the bad debt moratorium; Grossmont also failed to preserve its claim that the Secretary’s effort to limit the alternative documentation policy must be rejected because it is a change in policy that must be adopted in a notice and comment rule; and, as applied in this case, the Secretary’s state determination requirement was not arbitrary or capricious. The court need not decide whether the Secretary acts arbitrarily and capriciously if she refuses to allow claims as bad debt if a recalcitrant state refuses to issue state determinations of payment responsibility despite reasonably diligent efforts to obtain them. Finally, the Secretary's conclusion that the hold harmless provision, in Joint Signature Memorandum 370 (JSM 370), does not apply is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Grossmont Hosp. Corp. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, users and operators of independent (non-bank) ATMs, filed related actions against Visa, MasterCard, and certain affiliated banks, alleging anticompetitive schemes for pricing ATM access fees. Plaintiffs alleged anticompetitive harm because Visa and MasterCard prevent an independent operator from charging less, and potentially earning more, when an ATM transaction is processed through a network unaffiliated with Visa and MasterCard. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to establish standing or the existence of a horizontal conspiracy to restrain trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Osborn v. Visa Inc." on Justia Law

After the Chief of Police sanctioned plaintiff, pursuant to MPD General Order 204.01, Part VI-C-1, for releasing to the media a recording of Emergency Response Team (ERT) radio communications that occurred during an incident in which a suspect exchanged gunfire with the police and barricaded himself inside a private home, plaintiff filed suit against the District and MPD officials, alleging that he was being punished for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment and the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (DCWPA), D.C. Code 1-615.52(a)(6). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the First Amendment and DCWPA claims, and dismissed the DCWPA claims against the individual defendants. The court held that Part VI-C-1 as applied to plaintiff is sufficiently tailored temporally and in scope to enable law enforcement better to investigate criminal activity and police operations implicating police safety, and that the MPD’s interests in non-disclosure outweigh plaintiff’s and the public’s interests in releasing the recording at the time he did; Part VI-C-1 bars disclosure of confidential information only during ongoing investigations and does not otherwise bar speech about police activity, including the barricade incident; and releasing the confidential ERT recording could have harmed pending criminal investigations because it contained potentially critical information about the barricade and, only if kept confidential, could it provide a means to gauge other evidence offered by witnesses and persons involved in the incident. Finally, plaintiff's statutory challenge under the pre-2010 DCWPA is unavailing for failure to identify a “protected disclosure.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baumann v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between Ecuador and Chevron involving a series of lawsuits related to an investment and development agreement. On appeal, Ecuador challenged the district court's confirmation of an international arbitral award to Chevron. In this case, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) includes a standing offer to all potential U.S. investors to arbitrate investment disputes, which Chevron accepted in the manner required by the treaty. Therefore, the court concluded that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Ecuador in order to consider an action to confirm or enforce the award. The dispute over whether the lawsuits were “investments” for purposes of the treaty is properly considered as part of review under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court further concluded that, even if it were to conclude that the FSIA required a de novo determination of arbitrability, the court still would find that the district court had jurisdiction where Ecuador failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Chevron's suits were not "investments" within the meaning of the BIT. Likewise, the court rejected Ecuador's arguments against confirmation of the award under the New York Convention as meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador" on Justia Law

The company appealed the Board's finding that the company had committed various unfair labor practices during the relocation of union employees from a dealership that was closing down to a larger dealership with non-union employees. The Board concluded that the company acted unlawfully when it withdrew recognition of the Union. The company argued that it had no choice but to withdraw recognition of the Union, on the ground that the relocated employees had been absorbed into a larger unit of non-union employees at the new dealership. The court rejected the company's arguments and concluded that it was required to bargain with the Union about the former employees' initial wages, benefits, schedules, and other terms and conditions. During such bargaining, the employer was required to consider “any proposals” put forth by the Union on these topics. The court upheld as reasonable the Board’s conclusion that the company unlawfully withdrew recognition of the Union when it did so immediately upon the relocation, prior to any effects bargaining. The court rejected the company's challenge to the composition of the Board itself. Accordingly, the court denied the company's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Dodge of Naperville v. NLRB" on Justia Law