Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Upon remand of relator's qui tam suit, the district court ruled that the District violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), when it submitted a Medicaid reimbursement claim for FY 1998 and imposed the maximum penalty of $11,000. Both parties appealed. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the relevant federal regulations, which were incorporated into the District’s Medicaid State Plan, required the District to maintain records supporting its Medicaid reimbursement claims that could be produced for audit. Pursuant to contractual obligations, relator’s firm was to prepare the FY 1998 interim Medicaid claims and year-end cost report, and consequently his firm, not the District, had physical possession of the underlying documentation supporting the District’s claim. Given this arrangement, the District reasonably understood when it submitted the claim for payment that it could, through the firm, make the supporting records available for audit. View "United States ex. rel. Davis v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The parent of K.E., a student who was diagnosed with several learning issues, seeks reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., after she chose a private boarding school for K.E. The hearing officer and the district court denied reimbursement because, in their view, the child had no need to be in a residential program. The court concluded, however, that all statutory, regulatory, and judicial requirements for reimbursement of the costs of private school have been satisfied: the school district failed to offer the child a “free appropriate public education” in either a public school or a non-residential private school; the private boarding school the parent selected was, at the time, the only one on the record “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits” designed to meet the child’s needs; the residential component of the private school was in fact “necessary to provide a free appropriate public education to” the child; and the school district has not shown that the parent acted unreasonably. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leggett v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Peruvian national who founded and led a low-cost airline operating throughout Latin America, challenged the determination of the Department of the Treasury that the President had lawfully designated him a significant foreign narcotics trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), 21 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim that Treasury’s denial of his delisting request was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that Treasury did not err by relying on five different sets of evidence to delist petitioner: (1) newspaper articles discussing the recent seizure of assets he continued to control in Panama; (2) newspaper articles discussing new charges filed against him in Peru in 2011 and 2012; (3) newspaper articles discussing his ongoing control of assets in Peru; (4) newspaper articles discussing the recent discovery of an illicit cellphone and memory stick in his prison cell in Peru; and (5) his 2007 criminal indictment in the Southern District of Florida. The court also concluded that there was no shortage of additional evidence. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Zevallos v. Obama" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the SEC's final order finding that petitioners violated Sections 204, 206, and 207 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-4, 80b-6(1)–(2), 80b-7, and Advisors Act Rule 204-1(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. 275.204-1(a)(2). Determining that, by failing to disclose $210,000 in fees received from an investment manager, petitioners misrepresented that they were providing independent and conflict-free advice, the Commission imposed industry bars and cease-and-desist orders, ordered disgorgement, and levied a total of $650,000 in civil penalties. The court denied the petition for review, holding that the Commission reasonably interpreted Section 4E as not imposing a jurisdictional bar to late-filed actions, and that the Commission acted reasonably in imposing its sanctions. View "Montford and Co. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District, alleging a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.1400 et seq. After plaintiff prevailed, the district court awarded her $62,225 in attorneys' fees and costs for approximately one hundred hours of work. On appeal, the District argued that the district court abused its discretion when it adopted plaintiff's proposed fee matrix. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in relieving plaintiff of her burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the rates. In this case, plaintiff's proposed fee matrix set the prevailing market rate for her lawyer’s services well beyond the next highest hourly rate used by district courts in IDEA litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the fee award and remanded. View "Eley v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The NLRB determined that the Venetian committed an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, when it requested that police officers at the scene of a union demonstration issue criminal citations to the demonstrators and block them from the walkway because they were allegedly trespassing. The Venetian argues that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes it from liability under the Act. Under that doctrine, conduct that constitutes a direct petition to government, but would otherwise violate the Act, is shielded from liability by the First Amendment. The court granted the Venetian's petition for review because the act of summoning the police to enforce state trespass law is a direct petition to government subject to protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement; and vacated the Board's order. Because the Board did not address whether the Venetian’s petition was a sham, the court remanded so that the Board may consider that question in the first instance. View "Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The NLRB ruled that AT&T committed an unfair labor practice by barring its employees from wearing union shirts that say "Inmate" and "Prisoner" while interacting with customers or working in public. The court concluded that, while Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 157, protects the right of employees to wear union apparel at work, there is a special circumstances exception to that general rule. The court held that a company may lawfully prohibit its employees from displaying messages on the job that the company reasonably believes may harm its relationship with its customers or its public image. In this case, it was reasonable for AT&T to believe that the “Inmate/Prisoner” shirts may harm AT&T’s relationship with its customers or its public image. Thus, AT&T lawfully prohibited its employees from wearing the shirt. The court granted AT&T's petition for review, vacated the Board's decision and order with respect to these shirts, and denied the cross-application for enforcement. View "Southern New England Telephone v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Board issued a complaint against the Hospital charging it with violating the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. At issue was whether an employer has a duty to arbitrate grievances with the old union under an expired collective bargaining agreement after a new union has been certified. The court concluded that the interplay of section 8(a)(5) and section 9(a) of the NLRA is a question of statutory interpretation - one that the Board does not unambiguously resolve where the Board does not identify where the duty to resolve unfinished business with the old union ends and the duty to bargain exclusively with the new union begins. Because the Board failed to address the relevant statutory provisions, the court granted the Hospital’s petition for review, denied the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Children's Hosp. and Research v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investigators with the Department, filed suit against the District under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code 1-615.51 et seq., alleging that they were unlawfully reassigned to a less desirable position in retaliation for disclosures they allegedly made accusing their superiors of gross mismanagement and racial discrimination in the workplace. The unrebutted explanation the District has offered is that the Department reassigned plaintiffs because District prosecutors refused to work with either of them and not because they had filed Equal Employment Opportunity complaints with the Department alleging racial discrimination. Because plaintiffs failed to rebut this explanation, the court held that they have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of disputed fact sufficient to survive summary judgment on their claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District. View "Bowyer v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against three officials of the AO, in their official capacities, claiming that their refusal to consider her job application violated her right to travel protected by the Constitution of the United States. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held that the AO’s decision to limit its applicant pool to employees of the federal judiciary and individuals who lived in the Washington metropolitan area did not violate plaintiff’s right to travel, whether that right is considered under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV because it does not constrain the powers of the federal government; the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the geographical limitation does not implicate the component of plaintiff's right to travel; or the essential structure of the Constitution. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s request for discovery before entering summary judgment for defendants. View "Pollack v. Duff" on Justia Law