Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the mother of Karl Grimes, a juvenile who was allegedly beaten to death at a detention facility. Plaintiff claimed that the District showed deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for, her son’s safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, and denied as moot plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike the summary judgment motion and to disqualify the Attorney General of the District of Columbia based on an asserted conflict of interest. The court concluded that the district court should resolve a motion to disqualify counsel before it turns to the merits of any dispositive motion because a claim of counsel’s conflict of interest calls into question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participates. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in the sequence in which it rendered its decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and its denial of the motion to disqualify, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenge the EPA's 2012 regulation revising Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(d), standards for emissions of hexavalent chromium. The new rule imposes more stringent emissions limitations than its predecessor and mandates the phase-out of a category of fume suppressants containing the toxic compound perfluorooctyl sulfonate (PFOS). The court rejected, as contrary to the court's precedent, environmental petitioners' contention that EPA was required to calculate a new maximum achievable control technology (MACT) floor when it revised emissions standards pursuant to its technology review under section 112(d)(6) of the CAA; the court deferred to EPA’s methodology as well as its ultimate balancing decisions where it took into account the statutorily required considerations, inter alia, cost, emissions reductions, and health risk, as well as provided a transparent, reasoned explanation of its decision; the court was satisfied with the EPA's data-gathering and analysis and therefore, rejected the Association's argument that EPA unreasonably determined in its technology review that “developments” had occurred after the original rulemaking that required revision of the existing emissions standards; it suffices for EPA to show that non-PFOS based suppressants are as effective at controlling surface tension as PFOS-based suppressants; and EPA's risk review under section 112(f)(2) was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and upheld the rule. View "Nat'l Assoc. for Surface Finishing v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Medicaid recipients who unsuccessfully sought coverage for prescription drugs, filed suit contending that the District and its officials unlawfully failed to afford them notice of their entitlement to a hearing before denying their prescription drug claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Title XIX’s notice regulations are triggered whenever there has been a denial of a claim for prescription drug coverage at the point-of-sale. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the due process claims because the prescription drug coverage sought by plaintiffs qualifies as a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment; plaintiffs adequately alleged that Xerox, a private company, determined their eligibility for benefits while acting as an agent of the District; and the court remanded the case to permit the district court to conduct an inquiry in the first instance into what process is due. The court also remanded to the district court to reconsider its jurisdiction over the D.C. -law claims in light of the court's partial reversal. View "NB v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that a police officer violated her Fourth Amendment right when, during her husband’s traffic stop and arrest, the officer ordered her to get out of the car and put her hands on the hood. Given the circumstances of plaintiff’s alleged seizure, nothing in her brief shows that existing precedent has placed her Fourth Amendment right beyond debate. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the officer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the factual allegations in the complaint do not plausibly suggest that the officer violated plaintiff's clearly established Fourth Amendment right. View "Fox v. Government of DC" on Justia Law

After the court held, in 2005, that a Postal Service regulation was unconstitutional based on the regulation's ban on signature collection on perimeter sidewalks, the Postal Service amended its regulation to correct the constitutional defects. The plaintiff nonprofit organizations subsequently applied for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The district court denied the fee application on the ground that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties under the Act. However, the court concluded that its 2005 decision effectuated a court-ordered change in the legal relationship of the parties. The court agreed with plaintiffs that they obtained a favorable, court-ordered change and plaintiffs easily satisfy the remaining two prongs of the “prevailing party” test: They achieved a judgment “in favor of the party seeking the fees” and a judicial pronouncement “accompanied by judicial relief.” Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. USPS" on Justia Law

The NSA requested investigative materials, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., that the SEC had gathered involving payments made to paramilitary groups in Colombia by a subsidiary of Chiquita. Chiquita requested that the Commission deny the Archive’s request, arguing that releasing the records at this point in time would deprive the company of a fair trial in pending multi-district litigation in Florida. The court construed Exemption 7(B) narrowly and according to its text, the same way the Commission did here: to apply when the release of documents would likely deprive a party of a fair trial, not merely complicate the discovery schedule. In this case, the Commission properly disposed of Chiquita’s arguments on the ground that the company could not show how disclosure would matter in the big picture and impact the fairness of a future trial. This is the proper legal standard under both the text of Exemption 7(B) and Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice. Finally, the court concluded that the Commission reasonably applied Exemption 7(B) and concluded that disclosure of the records to the Archive will not “seriously interfere with the fairness” of the Florida proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and vacated the injunction pending appeal. View "Chiquita Brands Int'l v. SEC" on Justia Law

ADX petitioned the FCC to deny the assignment to a competitor of several radio licenses in the Pensacola, Florida, and Mobile, Alabama, markets. The FCC denied the petition and ADX appealed, contending that, in applying the statutory caps on ownership of radio stations, the Commission should not have used its normal market definition methodology because of unique aspects of the Pensacola and Mobile markets. Alternatively, ADX contends that the Commission should have applied the two-year waiting period applicable to changes in market definition. Determining that ADX has Article III standing, the court affirmed the judgment because the Commission reasonably exercised its judgment in deciding not to deviate from the market definition methodology it adopted in 2003, and because its interpretation of the waiting period was consistent with the policy established in its prior order and not otherwise suspect. View "ADX Communications v. FCC" on Justia Law

After a federal court of appeals entered judgment enforcing petitioner’s right to reinstatement and backpay with interest for his unlawful termination, the Board entered into a settlement agreement with petitioner's former employer under which petitioner's backpay would be paid by monthly installments over eleven years with no interest accruing. The Board also ruled that reinstatement to a position with reduced pay, benefits, and job security satisfied the court’s judgment because it paralleled what current employees received. The court concluded that the Board's decision departs without any reasoned explanation from longstanding Board precedent constraining the Board’s ability to alter the terms of a judicially enforced Order, and it relies on a finding of substantial equivalence between petitioner’s old job and his reinstatement offer that is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part, vacated the Board's ruling, and remanded. View "Dupuy v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Department, alleging a claim under the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code 1–615.51 et seq., after she was discharged as a result of the Department's disciplinary proceedings stemming from a major fire of a high-rise building. The district court grouped appellant’s numerous communications with her supervisors into broad categories, and then granted summary judgment to the Department on the ground that most of those categories were not statutorily protected types of communications, and for the one group that was protected, the Department had articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. The court concluded, however, that Whistleblower protection is not disbursed or denied en masse. When appellant's complaints are considered individually rather than categorically, a reasonable jury could conclude that one or more of them qualifies as a protected complaint under the Whistleblower Act. Appellant also came forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a prima facie case of retaliation as to those complaints. The Department failed to meet its burden of establishing that any reasonable juror would have to find by clear and convincing evidence that it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the Whistleblower claims. The court affirmed, with one exception, the grant of summary judgment as to appellant's other claims. View "Coleman v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law