Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) extending the construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) Southgate Project. Initially, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Southgate Project in June 2020, setting a construction completion deadline of June 18, 2023. However, due to unresolved permitting issues for the Mainline, which Southgate extends from, the construction could not proceed as planned. MVP requested an extension shortly before the deadline, citing delays in Mainline permitting as the reason for not meeting the original deadline.The Commission granted MVP's extension request, finding that MVP had demonstrated good cause due to unavoidable circumstances, specifically the Mainline permitting delays. FERC also maintained that its previous assessments of market need and environmental impacts for the Southgate Project remained valid and did not require reevaluation.Eight environmental organizations petitioned for review, arguing that FERC's decision to extend the construction deadline and its refusal to revisit prior assessments were arbitrary and capricious. They contended that MVP had not made reasonable efforts to advance the Southgate Project and that the market need and environmental impact analyses were outdated.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably found that MVP had satisfied the good cause standard for the extension, given the permitting and litigation delays with the Mainline. The court also upheld FERC's decision not to revisit its prior findings on market need and environmental impacts, concluding that the information presented by the petitioners did not constitute significant changes in circumstances. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

In August 2022, a bin full of phosphate rock collapsed at the Lee Creek Mine in Beaufort, North Carolina, injuring three miners. Industrial TurnAround Corporation (ITAC), the independent contractor responsible for checking the structural integrity of the bin's support columns, was cited by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for failing to take defective equipment out of service. MSHA sent a notice of proposed penalty to ITAC's outdated address of record, and ITAC did not contest the penalty, which became final 30 days later. ITAC subsequently filed a motion to reopen the penalty, claiming it had inadvertently failed to update its address of record.The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission granted ITAC's motion to reopen the penalty, citing excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Commission noted that ITAC had not occupied the address since 2009 and had only discovered the MSHA notice when an employee checked for missing packages. The Secretary of Labor, representing MSHA, opposed the motion, arguing that ITAC's failure to update its address could not be excused under FRCP 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission’s order to reopen the penalty was not an appealable collateral order and dismissed the Secretary’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the order did not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix a legal relationship, and that the interest in immediate review did not meet the high threshold required under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision to reopen the penalty did not involve a substantial public interest or a particular value of a high order that justified immediate appeal. View "Secretary of Labor v. Industrial TurnAround Corporation" on Justia Law

Media Matters for America and Eric Hananoki, a senior investigative reporter, filed a lawsuit against Warren Kenneth Paxton, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the Texas Office of the Attorney General launched a retaliatory campaign against them after they published an unfavorable article about X.com, a social media platform owned by Elon Musk. The article reported that corporate advertisements on X appeared next to antisemitic posts and that Musk endorsed an antisemitic conspiracy theory. Following the publication, the Texas Attorney General's office issued a civil investigative demand (CID) to Media Matters, requiring them to produce extensive records.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and denied Paxton's motion to dismiss for improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the investigation and CID constituted cognizable injuries sufficient to establish the plaintiffs' standing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied the requisite factors for a preliminary injunction, including a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The appellate court held that Paxton was subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia because he purposefully directed actions at the plaintiffs in the District. The court also found that the plaintiffs' complaint raised a justiciable claim of First Amendment retaliation, as they alleged concrete and ongoing harms resulting from the retaliatory investigation. The court concluded that the District of Columbia was a proper venue for the action and that the District Court did not err in issuing the preliminary injunction. View "Media Matters for America v. Paxton." on Justia Law

Ryan Castaneira, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition to obtain permanent residency for his spouse, a Mexican national. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the petition due to Castaneira's prior convictions in Georgia for crimes that appeared to qualify as "specified offenses against a minor" under the Adam Walsh Act. Castaneira argued that his convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus should not be considered offenses against a minor. He also challenged the agency's use of the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard to prove he posed no risk to his spouse.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Castaneira's claims. The court held that his prior convictions fell within the statutory definition of "specified offense against a minor" and that the Adam Walsh Act's grant of "sole and unreviewable discretion" to USCIS precluded judicial review of the evidentiary standard applied by the agency. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the standard of proof used by USCIS in making the no-risk determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in part, agreeing that Castaneira's prior convictions were covered by the Adam Walsh Act. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's jurisdictional ruling regarding the evidentiary standard. The court held that while USCIS's ultimate no-risk determinations are unreviewable, challenges to the agency's departure from its own binding precedent, such as the standard of proof, are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USCIS violated its own precedent by applying the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard. View "Castaneira v. Noem" on Justia Law

Judith Jeltsje Pietersen, a Dutch citizen, and her fiancé, Daniel Gerhard Brown, an American citizen, sought to obtain a visa for Pietersen to enter the United States so they could marry. Pietersen had previously traveled to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program but was denied entry in February 2020 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for alleged unlawful employment. Pietersen and Brown applied for a K-1 visa, but consular officers denied the applications, citing willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).The appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of State, challenging the visa denials and the guidance in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). They argued that the consular officers failed to properly review Pietersen’s applications and that the "reason to believe" standard used to determine inadmissibility was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred the claims and that the claims were otherwise meritless.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine did not bar the appellants' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for prospective relief. The court expressed doubts about the viability of the State Department's "reason to believe" standard and vacated the District Court’s alternative holding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the INA authorizes the challenged FAM guidance. View "Pietersen v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, who own New York’s electric-transmission grid, sought to finance upgrades required when new power sources connect to the grid. This would allow them to raise rates and earn a return on these investments. However, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied their requests to change the rules prohibiting owner upgrade funding.The transmission owners filed two petitions with FERC on April 9, 2021, under Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, requesting amendments to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to allow them to fund interconnection upgrades. On September 3, 2021, FERC rejected the Section 205 filing, stating that the owners’ agreement with the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) limited their Section 205 rights. FERC also dismissed the Section 206 complaint, concluding that the owners failed to demonstrate that the existing funding mechanism was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential. The owners’ requests for rehearing were deemed denied by operation of law on November 4, 2021, and FERC issued a new order on March 24, 2022, modifying its original orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decisions. The court found that FERC acted reasonably in dismissing the Section 205 filing, as the owners had relinquished their rights to file for changes to the OATT without NYISO’s approval. The court also agreed with FERC’s dismissal of the Section 206 complaint, noting that the owners failed to provide sufficient evidence that the current rates were unjust or unreasonable. The court concluded that FERC’s orders were not arbitrary or capricious and denied the owners’ petitions for review. View "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. FERC" on Justia Law

Carter W. Page filed a lawsuit against the United States, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and several current and former FBI officials. Page alleged that the FBI unlawfully obtained four warrants to electronically surveil him under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and leaked information obtained from these warrants to the press, causing him reputational harm and lost business opportunities. The district court dismissed Page's claims, finding them either time-barred or insufficiently pleaded.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Page's second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Page's FISA claims were time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations and that his claims were insufficiently pleaded. The court also dismissed Page's Patriot Act claim against the United States, with the majority concluding it was time-barred and the partial dissent finding it legally insufficient. Additionally, the court dismissed Page's Bivens claim and Privacy Act claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Page's FISA and Patriot Act claims as time-barred. The court held that Page had actual or inquiry notice of his FISA claims by April 2017, more than three years before he filed his complaint in November 2020. The court also found that Page's Patriot Act claim was barred because he failed to file his administrative claim with the FBI within two years of its accrual. The court concluded that Page had sufficient information by April 2017 to discover the basis for his claims, making them time-barred. View "Page v. Comey" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and manufacture and distribute methamphetamine into the United States. The district court sentenced her to 264 months’ imprisonment, 60 months’ supervised release, and ordered her to forfeit $18,000,000. The appellant sought reversal on multiple grounds, including lack of proper venue, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in sentencing and forfeiture.The appellant was indicted in the District of Columbia in 2016 for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and manufacture methamphetamine, knowing the drugs would be imported into the United States. The drug trafficking occurred in various countries, including Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. The appellant was arrested in Bogotá, Colombia, in 2017 and voluntarily accompanied DEA agents to the United States. She challenged her prosecution in the District of Columbia, arguing that no part of the conspiracy occurred there.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that venue was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which allows for trial in the District of Columbia when the offense is committed outside the United States and the offender is not arrested or brought into any district. The court also found that the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy, as the appellant played a central role in coordinating the drug trafficking operations. The court rejected the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Regarding sentencing, the court found no clear error in the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, including enhancements for using non-commercial aircraft, bribing law enforcement, maintaining a drug premises, and being an organizer or leader of the conspiracy. The court also upheld the $18,000,000 forfeiture order, finding that the appellant obtained the proceeds directly and indirectly from the drug trafficking operations under her control. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Campos" on Justia Law

The Village of Morrisville, Vermont, sought to renew its federal license to operate a hydroelectric project in the Lamoille River Basin. The project had been in operation since 1981. Morrisville applied for a water quality certification from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, which is required under the Clean Water Act for projects that may result in discharges into navigable waters. After lengthy discussions and two rounds of revisions, Vermont issued a conditional water certification. Dissatisfied with the conditions, Morrisville argued that Vermont waived its certification authority by allowing Morrisville to withdraw and resubmit its application twice.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that Morrisville had unilaterally withdrawn and resubmitted its application to negotiate more favorable conditions, rather than at the behest of the state. FERC concluded that there was no evidence of a coordinated scheme between Morrisville and Vermont to delay the certification process. Consequently, FERC determined that Vermont did not waive its statutory certification authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC's decision. The court found that Morrisville's actions were unilateral and in its own interest, and there was no mutual agreement with Vermont to delay the certification process. The court distinguished this case from Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, where there was a clear agreement to delay certification. The court concluded that Vermont did not waive its certification authority and denied Morrisville's petitions for review. View "Village of Morrisville, VT v. FERC" on Justia Law