Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stingray Pipeline Company LLC operates a pipeline system under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Due to declining throughput and financial losses, Stingray sought FERC's permission to abandon part of its pipeline network by selling it to a non-jurisdictional entity. However, a hurricane damaged a segment of the pipeline, Segment 3394, which has remained out of service since 2020. FERC granted the abandonment request but imposed a condition that Stingray must either restore Segment 3394 to service or reach an agreement with the affected shipper, ERT.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission largely granted Stingray's application to abandon the pipeline but imposed the condition regarding Segment 3394. Stingray challenged this condition as unreasonable and unsupported by the record. FERC reaffirmed its order, leading Stingray to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and denied the Petition for Review. The court held that FERC's decision to impose the condition was not arbitrary and capricious. The court found that Stingray had not met its burden to show that unconditional abandonment was consistent with the public convenience and necessity. The court emphasized that Stingray had repeatedly assured FERC that it would restore Segment 3394 to service but failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify abandoning the segment without restoring service or reaching an agreement with ERT. The court also rejected Stingray's arguments that the condition exceeded FERC's regulatory authority. View "Stingray Pipeline Company, L.L.C. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule implementing section 2613 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), as amended by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. The rule concerns the assertion and treatment of confidential business information (CBI) claims for information reported to or obtained by the EPA under the TSCA. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenged three aspects of the rule, arguing that it was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) also challenged the rule, arguing that it allowed for the unlawful disclosure of information protected by section 2613(a) of the TSCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. EDF argued that the EPA's regulatory definition of "health and safety study" was impermissibly narrow, that the EPA should require substantiation and routine review of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization, and that the EPA's use of permissive language in the rule was inappropriate. ACC argued that the rule allowed for the unlawful disclosure of specific chemical identities when downstream entities reported information without knowledge of the specific chemical identity.The court denied EDF's petition for review, holding that the EPA's definition of "health and safety study" was consistent with the statute and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the TSCA does not require reassertion and substantiation of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization and that the EPA's use of permissive language was reasonable. However, the court granted ACC's petition for review, holding that the rule was unlawful to the extent it required entities reporting by non-confidential accession numbers and without knowledge of the underlying chemical identity to assert CBI claims for the underlying chemical identity. The court vacated these requirements under the rule. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought fast track designation from the FDA for its investigational drug, tradipitant, intended to treat gastroparesis. The FDA denied the request, citing a partial clinical hold on the drug due to the lack of long-term animal studies to assess its toxicological effects. Vanda argued that the FDA's denial was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA, upholding the agency's decision. Vanda then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the FDA's denial of Vanda's fast track application was neither contrary to law nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the FDA properly considered the drug's development plan, including the clinical hold, in assessing whether tradipitant demonstrated the potential to address unmet medical needs. The court also noted that the FDA's definition of the unmet medical need as long-term treatment of gastroparesis symptoms was reasonable, given the chronic nature of the condition and the existing short-term treatment options. The court rejected Vanda's arguments that the FDA's decision was inconsistent with its prior positions and that the agency improperly considered the clinical hold. The court concluded that the FDA's decision was supported by a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

VTCU Corp., a manufacturer of electrical transformers, contested the results of a mail ballot representation election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 302, won the election by 21 votes. VTCU alleged misconduct by the NLRB’s Region 27 Office and the Union, claiming insufficient voting time, failure to provide ballots to eligible voters, and counting of void ballots. VTCU also accused Union agents of threatening and intimidating employees. VTCU requested the election be overturned or an evidentiary hearing be held.The Regional Director found no merit in VTCU’s claims, overruled the objections without a hearing, and certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The Director determined many of VTCU’s objections were untimely, unsupported, or refuted by an administrative investigation. The Director concluded the Regional Office’s conduct was consistent with the Board’s Casehandling Manual, the parties’ Stipulated Election Agreement, and Board precedent.After the Board denied VTCU’s request for review, VTCU refused to bargain with the Union. The Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging VTCU’s refusal to bargain violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Board concluded VTCU committed unfair labor practices and ordered it to recognize and bargain with the Union. VTCU petitioned for review, arguing the Board erred in rejecting its objections and denying requests for an extension of time and a post-election hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found no merit in VTCU’s claims. The court held the Board’s decision was consistent with applicable law and supported by established precedent. The court also noted it lacked jurisdiction to consider several of VTCU’s claims due to failure to raise them with the Board. Consequently, the court denied VTCU’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order. View "VTCU Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Acumen Capital Partners, LLC, a commercial property management company, discharged engineer Gregory Zapata, allegedly due to his failure to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Zapata had been involved in union activities, including signing union authorization cards and discussing unionization with colleagues. Acumen's chief engineer, Salvatore Coppola, who was aware of Zapata's union activities, had informed Zapata that the company's owner, Jeffrey Rosenblum, did not want a union in the building.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Acumen discharged Zapata because of his protected union activities, violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) credited the testimonies of Zapata and another engineer, Gabriel Garcia, while discrediting Rosenblum's testimony. The ALJ concluded that Acumen's stated reason for discharging Zapata—non-compliance with the vaccination mandate—was pretextual, as the company had not enforced the mandate consistently and had not excluded other unvaccinated employees from the workplace.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's findings that Acumen had knowledge of Zapata's union activities and that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in his discharge. The court noted the timing of the discharge, the pretextual nature of Acumen's explanation, and the disproportionate response to Zapata's unvaccinated status. The court denied Acumen's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its decision and order, which included reinstating Zapata with backpay. View "Acumen Capital Partners, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Bryan Burwell and Aaron Perkins were involved in a series of bank robberies and were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, including mandatory minimum sentences for firearms-related convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which mandates enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Burwell and Perkins argued that their convictions under § 924(c) were erroneous because federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.The District Court denied their post-conviction motions, which challenged the application of § 924(c) based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague. Burwell and Perkins appealed, arguing that bank robbery by extortion does not involve the use or threat of force and thus cannot be considered a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is indivisible regarding the means of committing bank robbery—by force and violence, intimidation, or extortion. The court concluded that extortion, as a means of committing bank robbery, does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. Therefore, bank robbery under § 2113(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Consequently, the court vacated Burwell's and Perkins's § 924(c) convictions and remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether to release them immediately. View "United States v. Burwell" on Justia Law

The case involves the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which was signed into law on April 24, 2024. The Act identifies certain countries, including China, as foreign adversaries and prohibits the distribution or maintenance of applications controlled by these adversaries, specifically targeting the TikTok platform. TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Ltd., along with other petitioners, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection and takings clauses, and the Bill of Attainder Clause.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case, as it was brought directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing the Act. The court had to determine whether the petitioners had standing and whether their claims were ripe for judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that TikTok had standing to challenge the Act and that its claims were ripe. The court assumed without deciding that strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment claims and upheld the Act, finding that it served compelling governmental interests in national security and was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. The court also rejected the equal protection, bill of attainder, and takings clause claims, concluding that the Act did not constitute a punishment, was not overinclusive or underinclusive, and did not result in a complete deprivation of economic value. The petitions were denied. View "TikTok Inc. v. Garland" on Justia Law

Abram J. Harris, a pro se plaintiff, sued the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in the D.C. Superior Court, alleging fraud and abuse of process. Harris claimed that a female employee he hired, who also worked for FMCSA, turned the agency against him after their working relationship soured. The Superior Court dismissed the case sua sponte for failure to state a claim, and Harris appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the DOT removed the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after removal. Harris did not object to the removal or seek remand to the Superior Court. The district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because Harris's claims fell outside the Federal Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity and because Harris had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Alternatively, the court held that Harris had failed to state a claim. Harris timely appealed the dismissal as to DOT but not as to Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Johnson, whom he had added as a defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), a federal defendant may remove a case from state appellate court to federal district court. The court also determined that Harris forfeited any arguments regarding procedural defects in the removal process by not objecting in the district court or moving for remand. Additionally, Harris forfeited any arguments that the district court erred in dismissing his case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim by failing to raise them in his briefs. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Harris v. Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law

Blake Adams failed to file federal income tax returns for the years 2007 and 2009-2015. The IRS calculated that he owed over $1.2 million in back taxes, interest, and penalties. Due to the significant amount of unpaid taxes, the IRS certified Adams's tax debt as seriously delinquent to the State Department, which could then deny, revoke, or limit his passport. Adams received notice of this certification and subsequently sued the IRS in Tax Court, claiming procedural errors in the assessment of his tax debt.The Tax Court found that Adams had forfeited his opportunities to contest his underlying tax liability through the procedures provided by the Tax Code. Specifically, Adams did not file a petition in Tax Court within the 90-day period after receiving deficiency notices, nor did he request any collection due process hearings after receiving notices of lien and intent to levy. The Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that Adams's challenge under section 7345 was foreclosed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the certification of Adams's seriously delinquent tax debt was not erroneous. The court found that all elements defining a seriously delinquent tax debt under section 7345(b)(1) were satisfied: the tax debt was assessed, exceeded the statutory threshold, and Adams's administrative rights had lapsed. The court also noted that Adams's attempt to challenge the underlying tax liability was untimely, as he had not utilized the available administrative procedures when initially notified. Thus, the court upheld the certification and denied Adams's motion to transfer venue to the Eleventh Circuit. View "Adams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

Alpine Securities Corporation, a securities broker-dealer and member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), faced sanctions from FINRA in 2022 for violating its rules. FINRA imposed a cease-and-desist order and sought to expel Alpine from membership. Alpine challenged the constitutionality of FINRA in federal court, arguing that FINRA's expedited expulsion process violated the private nondelegation doctrine and the Appointments Clause.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Alpine's request for a preliminary injunction to halt FINRA's expedited proceeding. The court held that FINRA is a private entity, not subject to the Appointments Clause, and that the SEC's ability to review FINRA's decisions satisfied the private nondelegation doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Alpine demonstrated a likelihood of success on its private nondelegation claim, as FINRA's expulsion orders take effect immediately without prior SEC review, effectively barring Alpine from the securities industry. The court held that this lack of governmental oversight likely violates the private nondelegation doctrine. The court also found that Alpine faced irreparable harm if expelled before SEC review, as it would be forced out of business.The court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, instructing it to enjoin FINRA from expelling Alpine until the SEC reviews any expulsion order or the time for Alpine to seek SEC review lapses. However, the court did not grant a preliminary injunction on Alpine's Appointments Clause claims, as Alpine did not demonstrate irreparable harm from participating in FINRA's expedited proceeding itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings. View "Alpine Securities Corporation v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc." on Justia Law