Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Holtec International applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct and operate a spent nuclear fuel storage facility in New Mexico. The NRC denied multiple requests for intervention and a hearing from various petitioners, including Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Fasken Land and Minerals. These petitioners argued that the NRC acted unreasonably and contrary to law in denying their requests.The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) found the petitioners' contentions inadmissible and denied their petitions to intervene. The NRC affirmed the Board’s decisions. Beyond Nuclear, Environmental Petitioners (including Sierra Club), and Fasken each petitioned for review of the orders denying intervention. The case was held in abeyance until the NRC issued Holtec a license, after which the case was removed from abeyance for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions and found that the NRC reasonably declined to admit the petitioners' factual contentions and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court held that Beyond Nuclear did not raise a genuine dispute of law or fact regarding the NRC’s authority to consider Holtec’s application. The court also found that Environmental Petitioners failed to demonstrate any genuine disputes of material fact or law in their contentions related to statutory authority, alleged misrepresentations by Holtec, and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the court determined that Fasken’s late-filed contentions were procedurally defective, untimely, and immaterial.The court denied all the petitions for review, affirming the NRC’s decisions to deny the requests for intervention. View "Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC" on Justia Law

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) have a longstanding dispute over PG&E's obligation to wheel energy to SFPUC's customers. SFPUC generates power and sells it to end users in San Francisco but relies on PG&E to distribute this energy. The disagreement centers on which consumers are entitled to wheeled service under a grandfathering clause in PG&E's 2015 Tariff, which incorporates a statutory provision allowing wheeling for consumers served by SFPUC as of October 24, 1992.Initially, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected SFPUC's class-based approach, which argued that PG&E should wheel energy to the same types of customers served in 1992. FERC's 2019 order was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which remanded the case for FERC to provide a reasoned analysis of the statutory requirements. On remand, FERC adopted a class-based interpretation, allowing wheeling to all customers of the same class served in 1992, not just specific end users.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC's orders and found them contrary to law. The court held that the plain meaning of "ultimate consumer" in the statutory provision refers to specific end users, not classes of consumers. The court emphasized that the statutory text does not support a class-based interpretation and that such an interpretation would undermine the primary restriction against FERC-ordered wheeling. Consequently, the court vacated FERC's orders and remanded the case for FERC to apply the plain meaning of the statute and determine which of SFPUC's consumers qualify for wheeled service under the 2015 Tariff. View "Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. FERC" on Justia Law

United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) challenged the Postal Regulatory Commission's (Commission) handling of the United States Postal Service's (Postal Service) pricing of competitive products, arguing that the Postal Service underprices these products by not accounting for "peak-season" costs incurred during the holiday season. UPS claimed that these costs, driven by increased demand for package deliveries, should be attributed to competitive products rather than being treated as institutional costs.The Commission denied UPS's petition to initiate rulemaking proceedings and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Commission found that UPS's methodology for calculating peak-season costs was flawed and did not produce reliable estimates. It also concluded that the existing cost-attribution framework already accounted for the costs caused by competitive products during the peak season. The Commission explained that the Postal Service's costing models, which use an incremental-cost approach, appropriately attribute costs to competitive products and that the remaining costs are correctly treated as institutional costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission's rejection of UPS's methodology was reasonable and well-explained. The court noted that the Commission had addressed UPS's concerns about the Postal Service's costing models and had initiated further proceedings to explore potential updates to the models. The court also rejected UPS's argument that the Commission failed to consider whether peak-season costs are institutional costs uniquely associated with competitive products, noting that this issue was not properly presented in this case.The court denied UPS's petition for review, affirming the Commission's orders. View "United Parcel Service, Inc. v. PRC" on Justia Law

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued new and revised safety standards for pipelines in 2022. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), representing pipeline companies, challenged five of these standards, arguing that PHMSA failed to justify the benefits outweighing the costs as required by law.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that four of the five challenged standards were inadequately justified. Specifically, PHMSA failed to properly analyze the costs associated with the high-frequency electric resistance welding (ERW) standard, the crack maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) standard, the dent-safety-factor standard, and the corrosive-constituent standard. The court noted that PHMSA either did not recognize new costs imposed by these standards or provided inconsistent explanations regarding the costs.The court vacated the high-frequency-ERW standard as applied to seams formed by high-frequency ERW, the crack-MAOP standard, the dent-safety-factor standard and related provisions, and the corrosive-constituent standard. The court also vacated the high-frequency-ERW standard but only as applied to seams formed by high-frequency ERW.However, the court upheld the pipeline-segment standard. INGAA had argued that a change in terminology from "SCC segment" to "covered pipeline segment" would significantly increase the number of required excavations. PHMSA clarified that there was no substantive difference between the proposed and final versions of the rule. The court accepted PHMSA's explanation and found no basis to challenge the cost-benefit analysis for this standard.In summary, the court granted INGAA's petition in part, vacating several standards due to inadequate cost-benefit analyses, but denied the petition regarding the pipeline-segment standard. View "Interstate Natural Gas Association of America v. PHMSA" on Justia Law

A collection of Dutch and Luxembourgish energy companies invested in solar power projects in Spain, relying on promised economic subsidies. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Spain withdrew these subsidies, prompting the companies to challenge Spain's actions through arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The companies won multi-million-euro awards in arbitration. However, the European Union argued that the ECT's arbitration provision does not apply to disputes between EU Member States, rendering the awards invalid under EU law. The companies sought to enforce the awards in the United States, invoking the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the cases. In NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain and 9REN Holding S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, the court held it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) arbitration exception and denied Spain's motion to dismiss. The court also granted anti-anti-suit injunctions to prevent Spain from seeking anti-suit relief in foreign courts. Conversely, in Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, the district court found Spain immune under the FSIA and dismissed the case, denying the requested injunction as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the cases. The court held that the district courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception to confirm the arbitration awards against Spain. However, it found that the district court in NextEra and 9REN abused its discretion by enjoining Spain from pursuing anti-suit relief in Dutch and Luxembourgish courts. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part in NextEra, reversed in 9REN and Blasket, and remanded for further proceedings. View "NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemptions under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The RFS program mandates that refineries blend renewable fuels into fossil fuels or purchase credits to comply. Small refineries can petition for exemptions if compliance causes disproportionate economic hardship. In 2022, the EPA denied all pending exemption petitions, arguing that compliance costs are passed on to consumers, thus no refinery faces economic hardship due to the RFS program. The EPA also provided alternative compliance options for certain refineries whose exemptions were initially granted but later denied.Previously, the EPA had granted exemptions based on a Department of Energy (DOE) study and a scoring matrix that considered various economic factors. However, following a Tenth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court's ruling in HollyFrontier, the EPA revised its approach, focusing solely on compliance costs and the RIN cost passthrough theory. This led to the denial of all pending petitions, including those of Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company and Wynnewood Refining Company, which had initially received exemptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the EPA's rationale for denying the exemptions was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" was too narrow and inconsistent with the Clean Air Act. The court also found that the EPA failed to adequately support its assumption that refineries could always purchase RINs ratably and pass the costs to consumers. Consequently, the court vacated the EPA's denial actions, except for two refineries deemed ineligible on other grounds, and dismissed Growth Energy's petition for lack of standing. The court denied Sinclair's petition challenging the alternative compliance action and dismissed Wynnewood's petition for not challenging a final agency action. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A chemical manufacturer and two trade associations challenged an EPA rule regulating emissions from certain facilities, specifically disputing the EPA’s assessment of cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. The EPA had determined that emissions from these sources posed an unacceptable risk to public health and tightened emissions standards accordingly. The EPA’s assessment concluded that the maximum lifetime individual risk of cancer from exposure to ethylene oxide was significantly higher than what is generally considered acceptable.The petitioners initially raised their complaints during the EPA’s rulemaking process and sought reconsideration after the final rule was issued. The EPA granted reconsideration and solicited further public comment, ultimately affirming its decision to use its existing cancer-risk assessment and rejecting an alternative assessment proposed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found that the EPA had adequately explained its modeling approach and decisions. The court held that the EPA’s reliance on its 2016 cancer-risk assessment was not arbitrary or capricious and that the EPA had properly considered and rejected the TCEQ’s alternative assessment. The court also found that the EPA had provided sufficient opportunities for public comment and had not violated any procedural requirements. The court denied the petitions for review, upholding the EPA’s rule and its assessment of the cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. View "Huntsman Petrochemical LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Jacquelyn N’Jai filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education, New York University (NYU), Long Island University (LIU), Immediate Credit Recovery, Inc. (ICR), and FMS Investment Corporation (FMS), alleging various violations of federal law. N’Jai claimed that she had repaid her student loans but was falsely certified for additional loans by a bank analyst, with NYU and LIU allegedly signing her name on fraudulent loan applications. She contended that the Department of Education and its debt collectors used unlawful practices to collect on these loans, including garnishing her tax refund and threatening to garnish her Social Security checks.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed N’Jai’s claims against LIU, NYU, ICR, and FMS for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing the government contacts exception. This exception prevents the assertion of personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant’s contact with federal government agencies in the District of Columbia. The court dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants for other reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the government contacts exception under D.C. law is limited to First Amendment activities. The court noted the ongoing uncertainty about the scope of this exception, referencing previous cases where the D.C. Court of Appeals had not definitively resolved whether the exception is confined to First Amendment activity. Due to this uncertainty, the appellate court certified two questions to the D.C. Court of Appeals: whether the government contacts exception is limited to First Amendment activity and, if so, whether the contacts alleged in this case fall under that exception. The appellate court did not make a final ruling on the personal jurisdiction issue, pending the D.C. Court of Appeals' response to the certified questions. View "N'Jai v. Department of Education" on Justia Law

Jose Vasquez was detained twice by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) because he shares the same name and birthdate as a wanted criminal. He sued the District of Columbia and an officer for constitutional violations under Section 1983, and the District alone for negligence, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The District Court granted summary judgment on the Section 1983 and negligence claims. The jury found the District liable for false imprisonment but not for malicious prosecution, awarding Vasquez $100,000. However, the District Court later granted the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law, nullifying the jury's award, and alternatively granted a motion for remittitur.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially reviewed the case. It granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Officer Agosto on the Section 1983 claims, finding no constitutional violations. The court also dismissed the negligence claim. The jury trial on the common law claims resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding damages for false imprisonment but not for malicious prosecution. The District Court subsequently overturned the jury's verdict on false imprisonment and reduced the damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims, agreeing that there was no clearly established constitutional violation and that qualified immunity applied to Officer Agosto. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's judgment as a matter of law and the alternative remittitur on the false imprisonment claim. The appellate court reinstated the jury's verdict and remanded for further proceedings, emphasizing that the jury could reasonably find that the differing social security numbers indicated Vasquez was not the wanted criminal, and that the jury's damages award was justified based on the emotional harm suffered. View "Vasquez v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The case involves the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) challenging the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) approval of Perdue's "Fresh Line" chicken and turkey product labels. ALDF claimed that the labels, which depicted birds roaming outside, were misleading because the birds were raised indoors. ALDF requested the USDA to disapprove these labels, arguing that they misled consumers. The USDA declined, leading ALDF to sue, alleging violations of the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed ALDF's complaint, concluding that ALDF lacked standing to challenge the USDA's actions. The court found that ALDF failed to establish both organizational and associational standing. Specifically, the court determined that ALDF's member, Marie Mastracco, did not suffer a sufficiently concrete injury to confer standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court, finding that ALDF did not demonstrate that Mastracco faced an ongoing or imminent injury. The court noted that while Mastracco was misled by the labels in the past, she now knows the truth about the birds' living conditions, making any future reliance on the labels self-inflicted. Additionally, the court found that ALDF failed to show that other poultry-product labels with similar misleading graphics existed, which would be necessary to establish a substantial likelihood of future harm.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of ALDF's complaint without prejudice, holding that ALDF lacked standing to pursue its claims. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack" on Justia Law