Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to five counts of filing a false tax return and appealed his sentence of 110 months in prison, arguing that the sentence was impermissibly influenced by his refusal to reveal the source of his unreported income. This court then vacated the sentence and the district court again sentenced appellant to 110 months imprisonment on remand, stating that its initial sentence had nothing to do with appellant's refusal to discuss the source of his unreported funds. Appellant appealed again. The court concluded that the district court did not plainly err in its reasoning for an upward variance where deterrence of tax evasion was a permissible reason. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Saani" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees, including fees for work performed by a special education expert employed by their attorney, after prevailing in actions brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the special education expert is a highly experienced special education consultant and expert. Because the expert is not a paralegal, her fees were nonrecoverable as part of reasonable attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McAllister v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who suffers from Multiple Sclerosis (MS), filed suit against her former employer, TEFCU, for wrongful termination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. CODE 2-1401.01 et seq.; and Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140. Plaintiff alleged that the cost of treating her MS was causing the monthly healthcare insurance premium to rise and that TEFCU dismissed her to reduce its health care costs. TEFCU claimed that plaintiff's termination was due to her poor performance as an employee. The district court granted TEFCU's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer that TEFCU dismissed plaintiff because of the costs associated with insuring her. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions where plaintiff provides no citation to authority or to the record demonstrating that the district court's denial was premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law, an erroneous factual finding, or that it was otherwise unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Giles v. Transit Emp. Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

The SEC found that petitioner and his company repeatedly marked the close - buying or selling stock as the trading day ends to artificially inflate the stock's value - and sanctioned them accordingly. The court concluded that the Commission applied the correct legal standard and properly concluded that there is ample evidence petitioner manipulated the market by marking the close; petitioner was properly charged as a primary violator under both the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(1), (4); but the Commission cannot apply the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, to bar petitioner from associating with municipal advisors and rating organizations because such an application is impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review. The court vacated the portion of the SEC order that is impermissibly retroactive. View "Koch v. SEC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, several biofuel producers and others, want EPA to approve E30, which is a fuel that contains about 30% ethanol, for use as a test fuel. EPA has adopted regulations that require vehicle manufacturers to test the emissions of new vehicles. Vehicle manufacturers must conduct emissions testing using a “test fuel” that must be a fuel that is “commercially available.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing to maintain their suit; petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); petitioners' challenge is timely; and petitioners' suit is ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that it is entirely commonsensical and reasonable for EPA to require vehicle manufacturers to use the same fuels in emissions testing that vehicles will use out on the road. Moreover, the regulation is rooted in (if not compelled by) the statute, which says that EPA must ensure that “vehicles are tested under circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel.” Because the “commercially available” requirement is not arbitrary and capricious, the court denied the petition for review. View "Energy Future Coalition v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the Parole Commission's denial of his 2010 and 2012 applications for parole, alleging that the Commission violated the Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws by incorrectly applying the regulations in place at the time of appellant’s underlying offense. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed, finding that the Commission's denial of appellant’s requests for parole was a valid exercise of parole authority as it existed at the time of his offense. The court further concluded that the Commission did not rely on the retroactive application of any law, regulation, or guideline to justify its decisions, and therefore could not have violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Bailey v. Fulwood, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of HUD after an ALJ found them liable for violations of governing programs administered by HUD. The Secretary upheld the ALJ's liability determinations but imposed higher penalty amounts. Determining that the court had jurisdiction, the court denied petitioners' petition for review, upholding the Secretary's finding of Section 8 violations where Mantua Gardens increased Section 8 tenants' rents without giving the tenants and HUD one year's notice of the proposed termination of a Housing Assistance Payment contract; the Secretary’s reversal of the ALJ’s $450,000 penalty, imposing instead the original amount sought by HUD of $1,260,000; the Secretary's determination that no request was made for Secretarial approval of a prepayment, and therefore no cancellation of the agreement occurred; and the Secretary's determination that HUD conducted an appropriate penalty analysis. Because the Secretary's conclusions are not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court denied the petition for review. View "Grier v. HUD" on Justia Law

Upon remand of relator's qui tam suit, the district court ruled that the District violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), when it submitted a Medicaid reimbursement claim for FY 1998 and imposed the maximum penalty of $11,000. Both parties appealed. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the relevant federal regulations, which were incorporated into the District’s Medicaid State Plan, required the District to maintain records supporting its Medicaid reimbursement claims that could be produced for audit. Pursuant to contractual obligations, relator’s firm was to prepare the FY 1998 interim Medicaid claims and year-end cost report, and consequently his firm, not the District, had physical possession of the underlying documentation supporting the District’s claim. Given this arrangement, the District reasonably understood when it submitted the claim for payment that it could, through the firm, make the supporting records available for audit. View "United States ex. rel. Davis v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The parent of K.E., a student who was diagnosed with several learning issues, seeks reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., after she chose a private boarding school for K.E. The hearing officer and the district court denied reimbursement because, in their view, the child had no need to be in a residential program. The court concluded, however, that all statutory, regulatory, and judicial requirements for reimbursement of the costs of private school have been satisfied: the school district failed to offer the child a “free appropriate public education” in either a public school or a non-residential private school; the private boarding school the parent selected was, at the time, the only one on the record “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits” designed to meet the child’s needs; the residential component of the private school was in fact “necessary to provide a free appropriate public education to” the child; and the school district has not shown that the parent acted unreasonably. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Leggett v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Peruvian national who founded and led a low-cost airline operating throughout Latin America, challenged the determination of the Department of the Treasury that the President had lawfully designated him a significant foreign narcotics trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), 21 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim that Treasury’s denial of his delisting request was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that Treasury did not err by relying on five different sets of evidence to delist petitioner: (1) newspaper articles discussing the recent seizure of assets he continued to control in Panama; (2) newspaper articles discussing new charges filed against him in Peru in 2011 and 2012; (3) newspaper articles discussing his ongoing control of assets in Peru; (4) newspaper articles discussing the recent discovery of an illicit cellphone and memory stick in his prison cell in Peru; and (5) his 2007 criminal indictment in the Southern District of Florida. The court also concluded that there was no shortage of additional evidence. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Zevallos v. Obama" on Justia Law