Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Defendant pled guilty to federal charges stemming from a series of armed robberies. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay restitution, as well as a special assessment. Both amounts were payable immediately under the district court's order. The sentencing order also provided that, during plaintiff's time in prison, he was to participate in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) through which he would make payments to satisfy the restitution obligation. On appeal, appellant contended that the district court's delegation to the IFRP violated the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA)18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(2). Section 3664(f)(2) mandates that the court shall specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid. Because the filing requirement under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) is a non-jurisdictional, claim processing rule, the court proceeded to the merits of the appeal. The court concluded that in United States v. Baldwin, the court determined that restitution arrangements like the one at issue here do not constitute plain error. The court rejected Amicus' attempts to distinguish Baldwin and its claims that Baldwin is bad law. Accordingly, the court denied the appeal. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendants challenged a district court order requiring that they add two statements to their cigarette packages and advertisements: an announcement that a federal court has ruled that they “deliberately deceived the American public” about the dangers of cigarettes; and a declaration that they “intentionally designed cigarettes” to maximize addiction. The court concluded that given its earlier decisions in this case, the manufacturers’ objection to disclosing that they intentionally designed cigarettes to ensure addiction is both waived and foreclosed by the law of the case. Those decisions make equally clear that the district court, in ordering defendants to announce that they deliberately deceived the public, exceeded its authority under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, to craft remedies that “prevent and restrain” future violations. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought review of the SEC's order to cease and desist from violating the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77e(a), (c), and the agency's subsequent order denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner sold shares of stock in Lexington, Inc. through offshore bank accounts for millions of dollars in profit, but failed to comply with the SEC's registration requirements for the sale of securities. The SEC found that petitioner had violated the Act in two separate enforcement actions. The court found no merit in petitioner’s objections to the SEC’s application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The court further held that the Commission correctly rejected petitioner's affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel, and waiver. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Pierce v. SEC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Securities Law
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Plaintiffs, hospitals that participate in Medicare, filed suit against the Secretary, claiming that she violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., by engaging in arbitrary and capricious decision-making. This dispute arose from plaintiffs' belief that the Secretary set the monetary threshold for outlier payments too high in 2004, 2005, and 2006. The court affirmed the district court’s partial denial of the motion to supplement the administrative record and its rejection of the APA challenges to the 2005 and 2006 outlier thresholds. The district court erred, however, in concluding that the Secretary adequately explained the 2004 outlier threshold. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on this claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "District Hosp. Partners v. Burwell" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102 et seq., discrimination suit in which a jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff, a diabetic, was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that there was evidence presented at trial that plaintiff could control his diabetes by eating three meals a day, plus snacks, and taking his medication. The court concluded that there is no good reason to assume that the jury was misled by the Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc. instruction given by the district court where the jury had before it sufficient evidence to determine that plaintiff was allowed to eat his regular meals and snacks, and thus conclude that he did not have a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lee v. Government of D.C." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against law enforcement officers, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, after he was tased when resisting arrest at an Occupy D.C. encampment. The district court concluded that the officers were protected by qualified immunity against plaintiff's claims because the officer's use of the Taser did not violate the Constitution. The court agreed with the district court that qualified immunity shields the officers from plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, but on different grounds. The court held that a person actively resisting arrest does not have a clearly established right against a single use of a Taser to subdue him. The court also granted summary judgment to the officers on the First Amendment claim where plaintiff failed to meaningfully advance the argument on appeal. View "Lash v. Lemke" on Justia Law

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Home Builders challenged a preliminary, internal determination, made by the EPA and the Corps in 2008, that two stretches of the Santa Cruz River in southern Arizona are traditional navigable waters. In Home Builders I, the court dismissed a similar suit involving the same parties for want of constitutional standing. The court held that Home Builders’ case for standing, although since supplemented with new declarations from members adding factual detail to their assertions of injury, is materially unchanged and thus precluded by Home Builders I. View "Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA" on Justia Law

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The Districts and the Trust petitioned for review of FERC's order determining that the La Grange Hydroelectric Project fell within the mandatory licensing provisions of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817(1). Because the Trust has failed to establish standing either for itself or on behalf of its members, the court dismissed its petition for lack of jurisdiction. As to the merits of the Districts' arguments, the court concluded that FERC’s evidence of actual use in the past, together with current use of the Tuolumne River by California DFG crews, constitutes substantial evidence supporting FERC’s finding that La Grange is located on a navigable water of the United States; FERC properly relied on the results of its backwater analysis to conclude that the La Grange reservoir extends onto federal lands; and the Districts' challenges to FERC's finding that the La Grange Project is subject to FERC's mandatory licensing jurisdiction based on Congress's "authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" are without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition, concluding that FERC's jurisdictional determinations were supported by substantial evidence and reached by reasoned decisionmaking. View "Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging twenty-one causes of action stemming from the Government's collection, maintenance, and use of information about him. The court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss each claim except those brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that DHS is in possession of his full and specific credit card number, along with information regarding the type and issuer of the card. That plaintiff possesses a major credit card of a specific type and number bears on his mode of living for purposes of the definition of "consumer report" within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's ruling that the Act's claims failed on the first prong of the definition of "consumer report" and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdelfattah v. DHS" on Justia Law

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Defendant pled guilty to one count of interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor and was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed procedural error by failing to address his nonfrivolous sentencing manipulation argument when imposing the sentence. The court held that the Supreme Court’s post-Booker decisions required sentencing courts to consider nonfrivolous mitigation arguments at sentencing. When a judge fails to address a defendant’s nonfrivolous mitigation claim based on a 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factor, a reviewing court and the public cannot adequately evaluate the judge’s sentence selection. Moreover, where, as here, a district court may have thought it was prohibited, as a matter of law, from considering a claim for mitigation, the error seriously affects the public reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court committed plain error by failing to consider defendant's nonfrivolous mitigation argument and the court vacated the sentence, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Bigley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law