Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, three Iranian émigré siblings and the estate of their deceased brother, sought recovery for imprisonment, torture, and an extrajudicial killing that they allegedly suffered at the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1999, as leaders in the Iranian pro-democracy movement.The three surviving siblings live in the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, principally because of defendants’ foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on the Act’s terrorism exception, for “torture” or “extrajudicial killing” where the victim was a “national of the United States” at the time of those acts. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, does not confer any waiver of foreign sovereign immunity. View "Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

Shabban, an Egyptian national, met Hernandez, a Mexican national, in Washington, D.C. They had a son in 2001. They entered into a consensual order giving Hernandez primary physical custody of the boy. Shabban had unsupervised visitation rights; their son was not to be removed from the country without the written consent of both parties. Three years later, Shabban sold his business and had his roommate to take over their apartment lease. Shabban and his son boarded a flight, with Shabban flying under the name “Khaled Rashad.” Days later, Shabban called and told Hernandez that they were in Egypt. Hernandez worked with the FBI for 22 months to convince Shabban to bring the child back to the U.S. During taped conversations, Shabban referred to their son’s difficulty learning to communicate and told Hernandez that he had taken the child to learn a single language, Arabic, rather than the three he was hearing at home, Arabic, Spanish, and English. Shabban admitted taking the child without permission. Charged with international parental kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1204(a), Shabban argued that he lacked the specific intent to obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights because his sole purpose was to place the child in an environment that would improve his speech. The trial judge sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Regardless of his motive, Shabban was aware his actions would obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights. View "United States v. Shabban" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission denied applications to renew 689 wireless spectrum licenses in the 24 gigahertz (GHz) and 39 GHz bands for failure to meet the “substantial service” performance standard during the license term. FiberTower claimed that the Commission’s interpretation of the performance standard as requiring some actual construction in each license area conflicted with the Commission’s statutory mandate in 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(B). The D.C. Circuit declined to address that argument, which was not presented to the Commission. FiberTower also argued that the Commission’s interpretation of “substantial service” was inconsistent with that standard as originally promulgated by the Commission. The court rejected that argument. The court vacated with respect to 42 licenses because FiberTower claimed that their renewal applications stated construction had occurred. View "FiberTower Spectrum Holdings, LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Adams based on a scheme to defraud the United States Agency for International Development. Adams agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud; in return the government would move to dismiss the other 21 counts in the indictment. The agreement explained the sentence would be determined by the court and the range indicated by the United States Sentencing Guidelines was 51 to 63 months imprisonment. The parties agreed that a sentence within that range would constitute a reasonable sentence and that Adams waived the right to appeal his sentence or the manner in which it was determined under 18 U.S.C. 3742, “except to the extent that (a) the Court sentences [Adams] to a period of imprisonment longer than the statutory maximum, or (b) the Court departs upward from the applicable Sentencing Guideline range pursuant to the provisions of U.S.S.G. 5K.2 or based on a consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).” The district court sentenced him to 51 months imprisonment and to three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution. The D.C. Circuit dismissed his appeal, based on the waiver. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Miranda and Carvajal, citizens of Colombia, participated in an operation that used high-speed boats to smuggle drugs from Colombia to Central American countries. Neither planned to, or did, leave Colombia in furtherance of the conspiracy. Carvajal was an organizer of the operations, and Miranda provided logistical support. In 2011, Colombian officials arrested them. They were extradited to the United States and pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) 46 U.S.C. 70501. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting their arguments that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, that the MDLEA fails to reach extraterritorially to encompass their conduct in Colombia, and that the facts failed to support acceptance of their guilty pleas. They waived all but one of the arguments when they entered pleas of guilty without reserving any right to appeal. Their remaining claim, whether vessels used by the drug conspiracy were “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA, implicates the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and could not be waived by appellants’ pleas. On the merits of the issue, the stipulated facts fully supported the conclusion that the vessels were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. View "United States v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Rattigan is a black male of Jamaican descent who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the FBI’s primary liaison to the Saudi intelligence service. In 2001, he accused supervisors in the FBI’s Office of International Operations, of discriminating against him on the basis of race and national origin and pursued charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office. One of those supervisors later sent Special Agent Leighton on a short assignment to Riyadh, where he evidently grew suspicious about Rattigan. The FBI Security Division conducted an investigation and concluded that the alleged security risks were “unfounded.” Rattigan filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the FBI because the memo on which Rattigan based his claim had been prepared not by one of the accused supervisors, but by Special Agent Donovan Leighton, who was not charged with discrimination and had no apparent reason to retaliate against him. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rattigan v. Holder" on Justia Law

The 2008 contract for the design and construction of nuclear electrical generating units at a Georgia power plant specifies that it is to be governed by Georgia law. The contractor sought payment after Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements delayed the project and imposed additional costs. The contract calls for mediation. After 60 days, either party may proceed to litigation “in a court of competent jurisdiction,” the parties “agree to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for any legal proceedings.” After mediation the contractor filed its District of Columbia complaint, seeking more than $900 million. The court’s electronic filing log reported “11/01/2012 20:00:01” as the filing time. Georgia Power filed in the Southern District of Georgia, seeking to recover more than $100 million paid under protest and a declaratory judgment. The hard copy of the complaint notes November 1, 2012, 8:00 p.m. as the time of the filing. The district court did not decide who filed first, but determined that the controversy should be adjudicated in Georgia, regardless of which party filed first. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. A clause permitting first-to-file challenges (comparing one lawsuit to another) contemplated that the venue clause was permissive. View "Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Georgia Power Co." on Justia Law

The TSA screens passengers and property moving by passenger aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) and is authorized to impose a “uniform fee . . . on passengers . . . in air transportation and intrastate air transportation originating at airports in the United States.” Airlines collect the fees from passengers and remit the funds to TSA. In 2013, Congress reset the fee to “$5.60 per one-way trip in air transportation or intrastate air transportation that originates at an airport in the United States.” TSA implemented the amendment; a “one-way trip” means a continuous trip from one point to another with no stopover exceeding specified limits, so that a trip from New York to Los Angeles to San Francisco and back to New York, with stopovers exceeding four hours would be three one-way trips. Airlines challenged TSA’s rules, arguing that TSA lacked authority to impose fees in excess of $11.20 on roundtrip itineraries that involved multiple “one-way trips.” While the case was pending, Congress amended the statute, mooting that claim. The airlines also claimed that the statute precludes TSA from charging a fee on travel that begins abroad but includes a connecting flight within the U.S. The D.C. Circuit held that the airlines have standing but accepted TSA’s explanation that its construction of ambiguous text better aligns the imposition of the fee with those who benefit from the security services provided. View "Airlines for Am. v. Transp. Sec. Admin" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Nationality Act limits the number of annual visas, 8 U.S.C. 1101, creates categories for which visas may be granted, and imposes country-based limits. The category at issue, “Skilled workers, professionals, and other workers” (EB-3) has a general limit of about 40,000 visas annually in three subcategories. Xie fits within the subcategory EW for workers in occupations that require less than two years of training, education, or experience, and for which qualified workers are not available in the U.S. The subcategory is subject to a separate cap of 5,000. The government indicated that the current annual EW limit for China is 319. Under a complicated system of cut-off dates, Xie has waited for over eight years. She argued that widely differing cutoff dates for Chinese EW applicants, other Chinese EB-3 applicants, and EW applicants from other countries violate section 203’s temporal priority mandate. The district court dismissed, stating that Xie failed “to identify any discrete agency action that DOS is required to take” and failed to point to any authority requiring that action. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Xie specifically sought application of 8 U.S.C. 1153(e)(1), which directs State to process applications in the order of their filing. While varying lengths of wait among categories may comply with the mandate, Xie is entitled to have her claim assessed. View "Xie v. Kerry" on Justia Law

The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) extends roughly 200 miles into the ocean to the limit of U.S. international-law jurisdiction. Billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the OCS. Concerns about ecological vulnerability and potential harm to coastal tourism led to moratoriums on OCS drilling from 1982 until they were partially lifted in 2009. In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster renewed debate about the safety of offshore drilling, but energy companies remain interested in offshore drilling. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) created a framework for exploration and extraction of OCS oil and gas deposits. It requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a program every five years with a schedule of proposed leases for OCS resource exploration and development; the program must balance competing economic, social, and environmental values, 43 U.S.C. 1344. CSE challenged the latest leasing program as failing to comply with Section 18(a), which governs the balancing of competing economic, social, and environmental values; quantifying and assessing environmental and ecological impact; and ensuring equitable distribution of benefits and costs between OCS regions and stakeholders. CSE claimed that the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement violated National Environmental Policy Act procedural requirements by using a biased analytic methodology and providing inadequate opportunities for public comment. The D.C. Circuit denied CSE’s petition. While CSE had associational standing to petition for review, its NEPA claims are unripe; two other challenges were forfeited and remaining challenges failed on their merits. View "Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell" on Justia Law