Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Investigating narcotics activity at Potomac Gardens, a D.C. housing project, agents obtained a wiretap on a telephone owned by Joseph, a former resident, and learned that Joseph coordinated a distribution network for heroin, suboxone pills, and crack cocaine. An acquaintance described Sanders to Joseph as a potential heroin supplier. The three met at a shopping center, where Joseph purchased 200 grams of heroin for $15,000. Joseph purchased heroin from Sanders five more times. Officers obtained a wiretap on Sanders’ phone and searched Sanders’ house. Sanders and eight others were indicted. Sanders was named only in Count One, which charged all nine with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, and 100 grams or more of heroin. Eight codefendants pled guilty; Joseph testified as a cooperating witness at Sanders’ trial. Sanders represented himself, with standby counsel. He did not testify or present defense evidence. The jury convicted Sanders with respect to heroin; it acquitted him as to cocaine and crack cocaine. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred by foreclosing a request for hybrid legal representation, by denying a request for a multiple conspiracies jury instruction, and by failing to give an adequate response to a note from the jury. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PBGC, alleging claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., and seeking to correct PBGC's benefit determinations. The court concluded that PBGC properly interpreted the provisions of ERISA and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in declining to provide shutdown benefits to plaintiff; PBGC properly interpreted ERISA and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in failing to insure plaintiff's individual account; and, assuming arguendo that PBGC in fact amended the pension plan, plaintiff cannot identify a statutory provision that bars PBGC from doing so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to PBGC. View "Deppenbrook v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, Capitol Police, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615, when Capitol Police interfered with her exercise of FMLA rights and retaliated against her for that exercise. Plaintiff sought leave from a system allowing an employee to obtain a pre-approval of a "bank" leave. After the grant of her leave, police superiors ordered plaintiff to submit to a "fitness for duty examination," and told her that the facts supporting her FMLA requests were the basis for the order. Plaintiff's "police powers" were revoked and she was assigned to administrative duties while she waited to take the examination. In regards to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting Capitol Police's motion to dismiss where plaintiff's allegations amply supported the inference of retaliatory purpose and are enough to defeat the motion. In regard to the interference claim, the court held that an employer action with a reasonable tendency to "interfere with, restrain, or deny" the "exercise of or attempt to exercise" an FMLA right may give rise to a valid interference claim under section 2615(a)(1) even where the action fails to actually prevent such exercise or attempt. Plaintiff's claim satisfies this element as well as the second element of prejudice. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the interference claim. View "Gordon v. United States Capitol Police" on Justia Law

In these consolidated petitions, Carriers challenged FERC's authority to approve a cost pooling agreement among the Carriers that allocates most fixed costs on the basis of each Carrier's share of combined interstate and intrastate utilization of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). The court found that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U.S.C. App. 13(6)(b), permits incidental regulation of intrastate commerce pursuant to approval of a pooling agreement under section 5(1); that any regulation of intrastate commerce challenged here was incident to the Pooling Agreement that FERC found just and reasonable for interstate commerce; and that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the Pooling Agreement or make findings unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, FERC did not have statutory authority to approve the settlement; did not improperly regulate intrastate commerce; and did comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., requirements in reaching the order challenged in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Tesoro Alaska Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The FTC initiated an enforcement proceeding against Boehringer after the pharmaceutical company failed to comply with an administrative subpoena seeking various documents related to a settlement agreement between the company and Barr, a generic drug manufacturer. Boeringer subsequently certified compliance with the subpoena but withheld hundreds of responsive documents under the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Te court rejected the FTC's assertion that the district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that settlement documents pertaining to a co-promotion agreement between Boehringer and Barr were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The court held that a settlement term may have independent economic value and still be considered part of a settlement for purposes of work product protection. The court also found that the district court reasonably concluded that the bulk of the contested co-promotion materials were prepared in anticipation of the Boehringer-Barr litigation, with a single exception pertaining to post-settlement documents. Therefore, the court generally affirmed the district court's finding on this issue but remanded for further consideration with respect to post-settlement documents. The court agreed with the FTC that the district court misapprehended the proper distinction between fact and opinion work product and reversed and remanded on this issue. View "FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against three deputy federal marshals, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. Plaintiff, then sixteen-years-old, was pulled into a parking lot of an apartment complex where the officers waited to enforce an eviction order. Fearing for the safety of themselves and bystanders, two of the officers opened fire on plaintiff when he tried to drive off in his car when the officers attempted to speak to him. Plaintiff was charged as a juvenile with three counts of felony assault on a police officer. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers violated no clearly established law and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Fenwick v. Pudimott" on Justia Law

EPIC made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request for Standard Operating Procedure 303 (SOP 303), which DHS describes as a protocol for shutting down wireless networks during critical emergencies. On appeal, DHS challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to EPIC. The court held that the plain text of Exemption 7(F) protects law enforcement records the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual," during a critical emergency, without requiring the withholding agency to specifically identify the individuals who would be endangered. In this case, much if not all of SOP 303 is exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether any reasonable segregable portions of SOP 303 can be disclosed. View "Electronic Privacy Info. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Defendant was awarded monetary sanctions for attorney's fees and expenses he accrued in defending a defamation action brought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendant, publisher of a website called Iranianlobby.com, defamed plaintiffs in a series of articles and blog posts claiming that they had secretly lobbied on behalf of the Iranian regime in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's award of sanctions. The court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where plaintiffs failed to obey two direct court orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in light of their failure to explain their withholding of so many relevant documents, some of which they misrepresented to the district court that they could not locate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's award of sanctions. The court reversed the award related to defendant's expenses in preparing the portions of his motion related to NIAC's alteration of a document and Trita Parsi's interrogatory responses, as well as the award of post-judgment interest to run from September 13, 2010. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Parsi v. Daioleslam" on Justia Law

After Ozark contested the union's certification as the bargaining representative of company employees, the Board ordered the company to bargain with the union. Mainly at issue on appeal was whether, during a hearing on the validity of the election, the hearing officer erred in revoking Ozark's subpoenas duces tecum, and if so, whether the error prejudiced Ozark. In this case, the hearing officer never attempted to balance the employee interests against the company's need for the documents at issue, and there is no indication that the Board did so either. Had the Board done so, it would have recognized that at least some of the document requests did not implicate an employee's confidentiality interest. Further, the error in quashing the subpoenas caused Ozark prejudice where, among other things, the documents are not part of the administrative record available for judicial review. The court granted the petition for judicial review and denied the cross-petition for enforcement. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded. View "Ozark Auto Distrib. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Maurice McGinnis sought a loan through federal farm credit programs and alleges that he was denied access to such programs by the Department because of his race. This appeal concerns McGinnis' participation in a claims process established by a class action settlement agreement to resolve his and other farmers' discrimination claims. The court concluded that Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree empowers the District Court to correct an error by the facilitator in transmitting a claim to the wrong track. If it is true that McGinnis selected Track B and the facilitator nevertheless sent his claim package to the adjudicator, the district court did no more than enforce the parties' agreement. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that it could review the facilitator's claim processing and vacate the adjudicator's determination. The court concluded that McGinnis' request to change his claim to Track B was sufficiently close in time to his submission of the claim package, and the language of the Consent Decree defining what constitutes a "completed claim package" is sufficiently ambiguous, to justify the district court in granting his petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pigford v. Vilsack" on Justia Law