Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yasser Abbas is the son of current Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. In 2012, the Foreign Policy Group published an article on its website about Yasser and his brother Tarek, asking: “Are the sons of the Palestinian president growing rich off their father’s system?” and “Have they enriched themselves at the expense of regular Palestinians – and even U.S. taxpayers?” Yasser filed suit, alleging defamation under D.C. law. The D.C. Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation Act of 2010 (Anti-SLAPP Act) requires courts, upon motion by the defendant, to dismiss defamation lawsuits that target political or public advocacy, unless the plaintiff can show a likelihood of success on the merits. Applying that law, the district court dismissed. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that the allegations did not suffice to make out a defamation claim under D.C. law. The questions were not factual representations. The court acknowledged that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction may not apply the D.C. AntiSLAPP Act’s special motion to dismiss provision, which makes it easier for defendants to obtain dismissal before trial than the more plaintiff-friendly standards in Federal Rules 12 and 56. View "Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the New York Times published the Sanger article, describing a classified government initiative to “undermine the Iranian nuclear program” through “increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems.” Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, Freedom Watch sought records from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the State Department, including “information that refers or relates in any way to information” released or made available to Sanger. The CIA, NSA, and DoD cited national security; each stated that it could “neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence” of responsive records. After FOIA’s deadline expired, Freedom Watch filed suit. The district court dismissed the CIA and NSA based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies; granted DoD summary judgment based on FOIA’s national security exemption; and granted the State Department partial judgment, finding certain requests unduly speculative. Concerning information released to Sanger, the State Department obtained a 60-day extension and produced 79 documents. The court denied a motion to depose a records custodian, finding no evidence of bad faith, and granted the State Department summary judgment. Before oral argument, Freedom Watch moved to supplement the record with news articles relating to the revelation that former Secretary of State Clinton had maintained a private email account on a private server and sought to expand the search on remand. The D.C. Circuit remanded to allow the court to oversee the search of the former Secretary’s emails for records responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request, but otherwise affirmed. View "Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, that Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7521(a))requires regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from vehicles, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued coordinated rules governing the greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy of cars and trucks. In 2012 the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s car emission standards. Opponents, including purchasers of new vehicles and POP, a business that makes after-market modifications to diesel engines enabling them to run on vegetable oil, then challenged the car rules on procedural grounds; challenged EPA’s truck standards on procedural grounds; and challenged both agencies’ regulations concerning trucks as arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit declined to reach the merits. The purchasers of new vehicles, arguing that EPA neglected to comply with a nondiscretionary statutory duty to provide its emission standards to the Science Advisory Board prior to issuing them, lacked standing, having failed to identify a discrete injury that a favorable decision by the court would remedy. POP’s interest in promoting alternative fuel does not fall within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. 7521, the provision of the Clean Air Act governing emissions standards for motor vehicles. View "Delta Constr. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Standley went to a D.C. public library to complete her homework and study for upcoming college exams. She sat in an area of the library reserved for children. Officer Edmonds-Leach asked Standley to move. Finding no seats in the adult area, Standley relocated to the young-adult area, although she was too old to sit there. The officer again asked Standley to move. Aan altercation ensued. The officer arrested Standley. Standley sued Officer Leach and the District of Columbia for the unconstitutional use of excessive force and common law torts. At trial, Standley and Officer Leach disputed the specifics of their encounter. Other than an inconclusive video, the only evidence was provided by Kellar, a librarian. The court allowed the defense to call Kellar for impeachment, although Kellar had not been identified before trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) and the defense had agreed not to call undisclosed witnesses. The D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that Kellar’s testimony was not confined to impeachment; that the outcome of the trial turned on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Standley and Officer Edmonds-Leach; and that the testimony of the relatively disinterested witness likely influenced that outcome. View "Standley v. Edmonds-Leach" on Justia Law

In April 2011, Mathis-Gardner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and making false claims against the United States. The charges were related to the falsification of information regarding the performance of government contracts. She was sentenced to concurrent 18-month terms of imprisonment and concurrent three-year terms of supervised release and ordered to perform community service and to pay restitution. Mathis-Gardner served her time without incident and began her term of supervised release on December 31, 2012. On February 25, 2014, Mathis-Gardner filed a motion for early termination of her supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e). The government supported her motion. The court denied the motion in a minute order that stated, in its entirety, “It is hereby ordered that defendant’s motion is DENIED.” The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded. While a district court is required to consider certain factors before granting or denying a motion to terminate supervised release, there is no requirement that it explain its decision to deny such a motion so long as the court’s reasoning is discernible from the record. In this case, the reviewing court could not discern the reasoning from the record. View "United States v. Mathis-Gardner" on Justia Law

In 2004 the law firm was engaged to bring a medical malpractice action on behalf of a 14-year-old girl who had become paralyzed after surgery. The firm filed two complaints in Virginia state court. Each was dismissed: the first without prejudice for failure to correctly caption a pleading; the second with prejudice for filing outside the statute of limitations. Shortly thereafter, the firm applied for and obtained a new professional liability insurance policy. Asked whether there were “any circumstances which may result in a claim being made,” the firm responded “no.” The firm informed the insurer of the incident in 2009, but represented that it had occurred in 2008. In 2011, the insurance company noticed that the firm had made the caption error in 2006, before the policy period. In 2012, it notified the firm that it reserved its rights to deny coverage under the known risk exclusion. The girl filed a legal malpractice action in 2012, and was awarded $1,750,000 in 2013. The court found, as a matter of law and without expert testimony, that the firm was on notice of the potential malpractice claim and rejected arguments that the insurer had forfeited or waived its right to deny coverage. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Chicago Ins. Co. v. Paulson & Nace, PLLC" on Justia Law

Gun Recovery Unit officers were in an unmarked car, wearing vests that said “police.” Gross was walking the sidewalk. Officer Bagshaw slowed the car and shined a flashlight, saying “[H]ey, it is the police, how are you doing? Do you have a gun?” Gross stopped, but did not answer. Bagshaw stopped the car and asked, “Can I see your waistband?” Not speaking, Gross lifted his jacket to show his left side. Bagshaw began to move the car. Officer Katz asked Bagshaw to stop, opened his door and asked, while stepping out, “[H]ey man, can I check you out for a gun?” Gross ran. Katz gave chase, saw Gross patting his right side, and smelled PCP. Katz apprehended Gross, performed a frisk, and recovered a handgun from Gross’s waistband. Denying a motion to suppress, the court reasoned that no seizure occurred until after Gross fled because nothing would have indicated to a reasonable person that he lacked freedom to disregard the questions and walk away; Gross’s flight and other behavior, provided reasonable grounds to detain him and conduct a pat-down frisk. Gross was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Given the totality of the circumstances and precedents involving comparable interactions, Bagshaw’s questioning did not effect a Fourth Amendment seizure. Once he attempted to flee, officers had authority to stop him and conduct the frisk. View "United States v. Gross" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board dismissed a charge that the Union violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A), by failing to remove derisive and allegedly threatening comments posted on a Facebook page maintained for Union members. The comments, written by Union members without the permission of the Union, appeared while the Union was on strike against Veolia and made disparaging remarks about people who crossed the picket line. The Board held that the Union was not responsible for the Facebook comments because “the 3 individuals who posted the comments were neither alleged nor found to be agents of the [Union].” The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Union should be held responsible for the Facebook entries posted by Union members because a Union officer controlled the Facebook page. The Union’s private Facebook page was not analogous to misconduct on a picket line; it was not accessible or viewable by anyone other than active Union members and the disputed postings were made by persons who acted on their own without the permission of the Union. View "Weigand v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked in the State Department as Diplomatic Security Special Agents and volunteered to serve one-year in Iraq. They arrived in Iraq in February 2004. Initially, their permanent duty station was in Washington, D.C., so they received “locality pay” in addition to base salary intended to equalize federal employees’ compensation with that of non-federal workers in the same geographic area, 5 U.S.C. 5301, 5304. Months later, their permanent duty station changed to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and they no longer received locality pay. Plaintiffs also received compensation for a significant number of overtime hours. In 2005, they returned to the U.S. After the Office of Personnel Management’s new regulations took effect, the plaintiffs received notices of a review of premium pay earnings involving Iraq, that “the rate of the annual premium pay cap that applies to you is $128,200,” that earnings to date “have already or will shortly put you above the cap for the current pay year,” and that the Department would seek collection of any overpayments. Each later received a letter requiring repayment of from $435.94 to $10,514.98. The D.C. Circuit held that the Department permissibly construed the statute and did not act arbitrarily in denying a discretionary waiver of the obligation to repay. View "Lubow v. Dep't of State" on Justia Law

In 2007 Rogers, a U.S. citizen, lived in Hong Kong and worked as a flight attendant for United Airlines. She flew and worked in and over foreign countries and also in and over the United States and over international waters. She and her husband filed a tax return reporting all of her flight attendant earnings as “foreign earned income.” The IRS determined a tax deficiency of $3,428.30 on the portion of Rogers’s earnings attributable to her work outside foreign countries, as well as a 20% penalty. Rogers argued that 26 U.S.C. 911(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) authorized exclusion of Rogers’s flight attendant earnings as “foreign earned income,” because it was received “from sources within a foreign country or countries,” Rogers’s Hong Kong-based job. and that they should not be charged the negligence penalty. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that they could only exclude the portion of Rogers’s earnings that were related to her time spent working in or over foreign countries. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rogers v. Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law