Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 962, passed in 1794, is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation in support of the obligations of neutrality. The Act makes it unlawful to furnish, fit out, or arm a vessel within the U.S. with the intent of having the vessel used in the service of a foreign state or people to commit hostilities against another foreign state or people with whom the U.S. is at peace. Vessels covered by the Act are subject to forfeiture, and persons who give information leading to the seizure of such vessels may recover a bounty. Bauer sought to pursue a claim under the Act, claiming to have informed the government of vessels that had been funded, furnished, and fitted by anti-Israel organizations in the U.S., together with violent and militant anti-Israel organizations from other countries. The complaint alleged that the vessels were to be employed in the service of Hamas, a terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, to commit hostilities against Israel. The district court dismissed, holding that the statute lacks an express private cause of action. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that informers lack standing to sue on their own. View "Bauer v. Mavi Marmara" on Justia Law

Bus driver Bumpass hit the brakes as he approached a stop sign. Robinson, a standing passenger on the bus, fell backward and broke her leg. Robinson sued WMATA, claiming that Bumpass violated WMATA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) and that the “jerk” caused by Bumpass’ application of the brakes was of such extraordinary force that his negligence could be inferred. Bumpass admitted that he did not check his mirror before leaving the stop that morning. He knew there were several open seats up front, he said, and he assumed Robinson had sat down by the time he closed the doors and started driving. Robinson testified that the bus was going “fast, faster than normal buses,” and that it “was jerking and then [there] was an abrupt stop.” The district court rejected a jury award of $404,713.28. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could not have decided in Robinson’s favor. Robinson failed to establish a causal relationship between Bumpass’ deviation from SOPs and her injury; unusual and extraordinary force cannot be inferred from mere descriptive adjectives and conclusions alone. View "Robinson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Brown, a black female law professor at the University of the District of Columbia School of Law (DCSL), had worked for DCSL in various capacities for more than 20 years when she applied for tenure and promotion. The Faculty Evaluation Committee recommended tenure and transmitted her application to Dean Broderick, who initially recommended that the Committee withdraw its approval due to the sparseness and quality of Brown’s legal scholarship. Once Broderick learned that a law journal agreed to publish another of Brown’s articles, she endorsed the recommendation and forwarded her approval to then–Interim Provost Baxter, who rejected the application. President Sessoms agreed that Brown should not be awarded tenure and did not submit Brown’s application to the Board. Around the same time, the administration considered the tenure application of McLain, a white male. Brown alleges that McLain had “no legal publications” but that Broderick did not insist that he satisfy the three-publication requirement, as Broderick had with Brown’s application. The Board awarded him tenure and a promotion to full professor. Brown sued. The district court dismissed. The D.C. Circuit reversed dismissal of Brown’s D.C. Human Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 claims and affirmed dismissal of her other claims. View "Brown v. Sessoms" on Justia Law

“Musical work” and the owner’s exclusive right to perform the work in public are protected by 17 U.S.C. 106(4). Broadcast of a musical work is a performance and requires a license from the copyright owner. Copyright Act amendments afford the copyright owner of a sound recording “the narrow but exclusive right ‘to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.’” The law requires “certain digital music services . . . to pay recording companies and recording artists when they transmit[] sound recordings” and provides for appointment of three Copyright Royalty Judges. If sound recording copyrights owners are unable to negotiate a royalty with digital music services, the Judges may set reasonable rates and terms. The Judges set royalty rates and defined terms for statutorily defined satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS) and preexisting subscription services (PSS). SoundExchange, which collects and distributes royalties to copyright owners, argued that the Judges set rates too low and erred in defining “Gross Revenues” and eligible deductions for SDARS. A PSS that provides music-only television channels appealed, arguing that PSS rates were set too high. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Judges of the Board acted within their broad discretion and on a sufficient record. View "Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd." on Justia Law

Haselwander, an Army veteran, served in Vietnam and was honorably discharged in 1974. During his tour of duty Haselwander was wounded and knocked unconscious when an enemy rocket exploded near his sleeping quarters. He was picked up by medical personnel and treated for shrapnel wounds. He was called back to duty as soon as he had been bandaged. Those who treated his wounds never had a chance to complete paperwork, so Army records do not show that he was wounded in hostile action. In 2007, Haselwander sought to correct his records so that he could receive the Purple Heart, which is awarded to any member of the Armed Forces who is wounded or killed in action. Haselwander provided corroborative references and photographs, showing him with bandages on his face and shoulder and wearing a dispensary-issued scrub top. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records rejected the application, stating that Haselwander failed to show that he had been “treated for a wound that was sustained as the result of enemy action.” Haselwander unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, including a letter from another veteran who was wounded and treated at the same time and official Brigade and Platoon reports, detailing events on the day he was wounded. The district court affirmed. The D.C. Circuit reversed, stating that the: “Board’s decision defies reason and is devoid of any evidentiary support.” View "Haselwander v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BAE had tortiously interfered with his at-will employment arrangement in violation of District of Columbia law. Plaintiff filed a diversity case in federal district court but would like to have the dispositive question he raises on appeal decided by the District Court of Columbia Court of Appeals: whether District of Columbia law recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with at will employment against a third party former employer who procured the plaintiff's discharge from his new employer. Because the question on which plaintiff seeks certification is neither genuinely uncertain nor of sufficient public importance to warrant burdening the D.C. Court of Appeals, the court denied the request. The court affirmed the judgment of that court because plaintiff does not ask this court to independently review the district court's resolution of that question. View "Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech." on Justia Law

Bibeau appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment and order directing it, as a related person to a disabled miner's former employer, to pay health insurance premiums, interest, and liquidated damages to the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan. The court concluded that Bibeau's laches claim was precluded under Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. because each premium installment gives rise to a separate cause of action for legal relief for which Congress has enacted a statute of limitations to govern timeliness. Further, under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. 9701-9722, which incorporates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1451(a)(1), enforcement scheme, the district court did not err in awarding interest and liquidated damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Holland v. Bibeau Construction Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the GPO, alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the GPO. Plaintiff's claims on appeal involve the GPO's alleged discrimination in not promoting him to Second Offset Pressperson and the GPO's alleged retaliation in excluding him from a Georgia training program. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the GPO's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting him - he was not qualified for the position he was seeking - was pretextual. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's exclusion from the training program was sufficiently adverse, he failed to offer evidence demonstrating that the GPO's proffered reason for denying him training - that the decisionmaker thought he did not want it - was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hairston v. Vance-Cooks" on Justia Law

TPI filed a rate complaint with the STB, alleging that numerous CSX common carrier rates were unreasonable and CSX moved for an expedited procedure with respect to questions related to market dominance. The Board granted the motion and bifurcated the adjudication into a market dominance phase and a second rate reasonableness phase. Then the Board issued a decision, concluding that CSX had market dominance over 51 contested rates. The Board rejected requests for reconsideration and CSX sought review of the Board's interlocutory ruling regarding the 51 rates. The court agreed with the Board that the appeal must be dismissed because the contested dominance decision is a non-final order. There is no final order because the Board has yet to inquire into the reasonableness of CSX's rates and has issued no adverse ruling with respect to any rates. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "CSX Transportation v. STB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against his former employer, Harman, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that Harman breached its fiduciary duties by making false and misleading statements to investment firms. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's conversion of defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)(d) and grant of summary judgment to defendants without giving plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to present evidence. The court did not reach the merits of the appeal, concluding that if the district court violated Rule 12(d), the error would be harmless in this case where discovery would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Russell v. Harman Int'l Indus." on Justia Law