Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against three deputy federal marshals, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. Plaintiff, then sixteen-years-old, was pulled into a parking lot of an apartment complex where the officers waited to enforce an eviction order. Fearing for the safety of themselves and bystanders, two of the officers opened fire on plaintiff when he tried to drive off in his car when the officers attempted to speak to him. Plaintiff was charged as a juvenile with three counts of felony assault on a police officer. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the officers violated no clearly established law and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Fenwick v. Pudimott" on Justia Law

EPIC made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request for Standard Operating Procedure 303 (SOP 303), which DHS describes as a protocol for shutting down wireless networks during critical emergencies. On appeal, DHS challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to EPIC. The court held that the plain text of Exemption 7(F) protects law enforcement records the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual," during a critical emergency, without requiring the withholding agency to specifically identify the individuals who would be endangered. In this case, much if not all of SOP 303 is exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether any reasonable segregable portions of SOP 303 can be disclosed. View "Electronic Privacy Info. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Defendant was awarded monetary sanctions for attorney's fees and expenses he accrued in defending a defamation action brought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendant, publisher of a website called Iranianlobby.com, defamed plaintiffs in a series of articles and blog posts claiming that they had secretly lobbied on behalf of the Iranian regime in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's award of sanctions. The court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in sanctioning plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where plaintiffs failed to obey two direct court orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in light of their failure to explain their withholding of so many relevant documents, some of which they misrepresented to the district court that they could not locate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's award of sanctions. The court reversed the award related to defendant's expenses in preparing the portions of his motion related to NIAC's alteration of a document and Trita Parsi's interrogatory responses, as well as the award of post-judgment interest to run from September 13, 2010. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Parsi v. Daioleslam" on Justia Law

After Ozark contested the union's certification as the bargaining representative of company employees, the Board ordered the company to bargain with the union. Mainly at issue on appeal was whether, during a hearing on the validity of the election, the hearing officer erred in revoking Ozark's subpoenas duces tecum, and if so, whether the error prejudiced Ozark. In this case, the hearing officer never attempted to balance the employee interests against the company's need for the documents at issue, and there is no indication that the Board did so either. Had the Board done so, it would have recognized that at least some of the document requests did not implicate an employee's confidentiality interest. Further, the error in quashing the subpoenas caused Ozark prejudice where, among other things, the documents are not part of the administrative record available for judicial review. The court granted the petition for judicial review and denied the cross-petition for enforcement. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded. View "Ozark Auto Distrib. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Maurice McGinnis sought a loan through federal farm credit programs and alleges that he was denied access to such programs by the Department because of his race. This appeal concerns McGinnis' participation in a claims process established by a class action settlement agreement to resolve his and other farmers' discrimination claims. The court concluded that Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree empowers the District Court to correct an error by the facilitator in transmitting a claim to the wrong track. If it is true that McGinnis selected Track B and the facilitator nevertheless sent his claim package to the adjudicator, the district court did no more than enforce the parties' agreement. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that it could review the facilitator's claim processing and vacate the adjudicator's determination. The court concluded that McGinnis' request to change his claim to Track B was sufficiently close in time to his submission of the claim package, and the language of the Consent Decree defining what constitutes a "completed claim package" is sufficiently ambiguous, to justify the district court in granting his petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pigford v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law firm, appealed the district court's dismissal of its implied-in-fact contract and quasi-contract claims against Kraft. The dispute stemmed from the Firm's advice to Kraft regarding an antitrust claim. The court concluded that the Firm's implied-in-fact contract claim failed because the complaint does not plausibly allege that Kraft was "reasonably notified" that the Firm expected to be paid for any work completed before that point. The Firm's quasi-contract claim failed because the Firm's services were rendered simply in order to gain a business advantage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Berry Law v. Kraft Foods Group" on Justia Law

After the FTC voted to hold POM and the associated parties liable for violating the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) and 52(a), and ordered them to cease and desist from making misleading and inadequately supported claims about the health benefits of POM products, POM petitioned for review. The court denied most of petitioners' challenges; the court saw no basis to set aside the Commission's conclusion that many of POM's ads made misleading or false claims about POM products; and the Commission had no obligation to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Further, the court held that the Commission's order is valid to the extent it requires disease claims to be substantiated by at least one randomized and controlled human clinical trial (RCT); the order fails Central Hudson scrutiny because it categorically requires two RCTs for all disease-related claims; the Commission has failed to adequately justify an across-the-board two-RCT requirement for all disease claims by petitioners; and, therefore, Part I of the Commission's order will be modified to require petitioners to possess at least one RCT. The court denied the petition for review in all other respects. View "POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC" on Justia Law

After the FAA suspended petitioner's license as an airplane mechanic, the NTSB vacated the suspension and found that the FAA's position had been unreasonable and not substantially justified. Petitioner filed suit seeking recovery of legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The NTSB denied fee-shifting under the Act because it concluded that petitioner had not "incurred" the fees associated with his legal defense in the license suspension proceedings. The court held that the NTSB's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious where the NTSB should have considered that under the Alabama law of quantum meruit, petitioner was obligated to pay his attorneys for the value of their services. Therefore, petitioner "incurred" fees and may obtain EAJA fee-shifting. The court granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. NTSB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging various claims against the VA after he was escorted from a VA group therapy session for creating a disturbance. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA on all claims. The court reversed as to the assault and battery claim where the affidavits, declarations, pleadings, and other evidence show that there are factual disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit. The court reversed plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to the extent that it was based on his assault and battery claim. The court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "Harris v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

McLaughlin’s friend (Buck) encouraged McLaughin to end a relationship with Taplet. Taplet told Thomas, a stranger he met at a truck stop, that he wished he could “have something seriously done to her.” Thomas responded that he could “take care” of Buck for $7,000 to $10,000. Thomas worked as a paid informant for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. They discussed the murder-for-hire over the phone and in person; Taplet provided Thomas with the address, a photo, and the name of a secluded town where Thomas could kill Buck and dispose of her body. Following Thomas’s instructions, Taplet drove to a D.C. parking lot where and ICE Special Agent, posing as Thomas’s partner, joined them. They agreed to murder Buck in exchange for future payment while Taplet was at work in West Virginia. Charged with murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958, Taplet moved, to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds, but did not seek dismissal on constitutional grounds. The district court denied Taplet’s motions. At trial Taplet argued that there was insufficient evidence of interstate commerce because the government had manufactured jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, the jury found Taplet guilty, and the court sentenced Taplet to 10 years in prison, the statutory maximum. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Taplet “freely participate[d]” in the jurisdictional act and cannot claim manufactured jurisdiction. View "United States v. Taplet" on Justia Law