Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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PIABA filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., request seeking records related to the SEC's audits, inspections, and reviews of FINRA's arbitration program. The Commission argued that Exemption 8 of FOIA allows it to withhold documents it collected while examining FINRA's program for arbitrating disputes between securities brokers and their customers. The district court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the requested records related to the agency's examinations of FINRA and that Exemption 8 therefore protects them from disclosure. The court concluded that the contested records implicated a relevant Commission "examination" and they are related to a particular "report." Because the Commission satisfied both of Exemption 8's requirements and properly withheld the responsive documents, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Public Investors Arbitration v. SEC" on Justia Law

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Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration. View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

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Mathew filed suit challenging the Board's order in this case, raising a Recess Appointments Clause challenge. A panel of three Board members decided Mathew's case and Mathew argues that one of those three members, Craig Becker, was appointed by the President without either Senate consent or compliance with the Clause. President Obama appointed Member Becker by recess appointment during an intra-session Senate recess of 17 days. Based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, the court concluded that the President's appointment of Member Becker was constitutionally valid. The court lifted a prior order withholding issuance of the mandate rejecting Mathew's other challenges and ordered issuance of the mandate. View "Mathew Enterprise, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

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This case concerns Congress's requirement that the FCC establish rules prescribing a Uniform System of Accounts for use by telephone companies. The Commission adopted a new accounting system in 1986 (Part 32) to respond to the introduction of competition and new services. Section 10(a), 47 U.S.C. 160, provided the FCC with the authority to forbear from enforcing provisions of the Communication Act as well as its own regulations. Petitioners, Verizon and AT&T, appealed the FCC's denial of their petition to forbear from applying the requirement that incumbent price cap carriers maintain a Uniform System of Accounts. Petitioners argued that the switch to price cap regulation has rendered Part 32 useless, and section 10 therefore requires the FCC to forebear from applying it to incumbent price cap carriers. The court concluded that the FCC reasonably concluded that it continued to need Part 32 data to ensure that access rates were not discriminatory. Accordingly, the court concluded that the FCC's interpretation and application of section 10 are permissible and denied the petition for review. View "Verizon v. FCC" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to four counts of hostage-taking where he kidnapped 16 civilians in the Philippines. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court should have applied a part of the Sentencing Guidelines that came into effect after the offense, and that the district court should have not applied the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4(a); the district court did not err in applying the enhancement where defendant conceded that he conditioned the hostage release on government policy commitments and such a bargaining stance falls squarely within the statutory language; and the district court did not err in departing downward from the Guidelines based on defendant's incarceration before his extradition to the United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Haipe" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2011, SecurityPoint filed suit against TSA for infringement of a patent covering some equipment and methods used in the Bin Advertising Program. In 2012, TSA modified the Program, amending the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) template to require participating airports to indemnify TSA from all liability for intellectual property claims related to the checkpoint equipment. TSA also changed the template to provide that, on cancellation of an agreement between an airport and a private company, TSA would retain the right to use the checkpoint equipment as well as a license to all intellectual property necessary for such use. SecurityPoint opposed the changes and wrote a cease and desist letter to TSA's Chief Counsel. SecurityPoint then petitioned for review of TSA's changes. The court held that TSA's chief counsel's letter rejecting SecurityPoint's request is a reviewable order and the court has jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a); on the merits, the court concluded that the letter failed to provide any basis upon which the court could conclude that it was the product of reasoned decisionmaking; nor is there anything in the record beyond counsel's letter that would support TSA's decision; and because TSA failed to consider an important aspect of the problem before it, its decision must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Security Point Holdings, Inc. v. TSA" on Justia Law

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Petitioners seek vacatur of OSHA's Final Rule revising its Hazard Communication Standard requiring employers across industries to develop a program for classifying the dangers of workplace chemicals and conveying those dangers to their employees. Petitioners, businesses that handle and process grain and other agricultural products, and others, seek vacatur of the Final Rule as it applies to combustible dust. The court concluded that petitioners had express notice that combustible dust, however labeled, would be subject to the relevant requirements of the Final Rule; there was substantial evidence and an adequate explanation to support OSHA's decision to incorporate an interim definition of "combustible dust" and guidance until a more precise definitions is implemented in another rulemaking; petitioners' facial vagueness challenge is ripe for review; and on the merits, however, the vagueness claim fails because the Final Rule satisfies due process where the term "combustible dust" is clear enough to provide fair warning of enforcement, and OSHA has provided additional guidance on how the revised Hazard Communication Standard will be enforced. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Nat'l Oilseed Processors Assoc. v. OSHA" on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from Fogo de Chao's efforts to bring authentic Brazilian churrasqueiro chefs into its restaurants in the United States by using L-1B visas. L-1B visas permit multinational businesses to temporarily transfer foreign employees possessing "specialized knowledge" into the United States. At issue on appeal is the denial of Fogo de Chao's application for an L-1B visa for Rones Gasparetto, a Brazilian churrasqueiro. The court concluded that, because the relevant provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., does not commit the decision whether to grant an L-1B petition to the independent discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, and because Congress legislated statutory criteria to be applied in deciding such petitions, the district court had jurisdiction to hear Fogo de Chao's challenge and this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal; the Appeals Office erred in adopting a categorical prohibition on any and all culturally acquired knowledge supporting a "specialized knowledge" determination; the Appeals Office's conclusion that Fogo de Chao had failed to establish that Gasparetto completed the company's training program is unsupported by substantial evidence; it is not clear that the Appeals Office would have resolved other challenged aspects of its decision in the same fashion or would have found the other bases for the decision sufficient alone to warrant denial of Fogo de Chao's petition; and, therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to vacate the Appeals Office's order and remand for further proceedings. View "Fogo de Chao (Holdings) Inc. v. Dept. of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Defendant appealed his conviction for attempting to persuade a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). At issue was whether section 2422(b) requires direct communications with a minor. In this case, defendant's conviction was based on Internet and phone conversations with an undercover detective. The court held that a defendant can be convicted under section 2422(b) for communicating with an adult intermediary, if the defendant's communications with the intermediary are aimed at persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing the minor. Here, the court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial nevertheless because the district court erred in instructing the jury and excluding expert testimony crucial to the defense. View "United States v. Hite" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Shieldalloy, manufacturer of metal alloys in New Jersey, petitioned for review of the NRC's order reinstating the transfer of regulatory authority to the State of New Jersey under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021. The order at issue addressed concerns raised by this Court in Shieldalloy II. The court concluded that the NRC's transfer of regulatory authority to New Jersey under section 2021 was not arbitrary or capricious because New Jersey's regulations are compatible with the NRC's regulations and its reading of 10 C.F.R. 20.1403(a). The NRC has rationally addressed concerns when it provided a textual analysis of section 20.1403 and explained how New Jersey's regulatory regime is adequate and compatible with the NRC's regulatory program. The order does not conflict with the NRC's prior interpretations or amount to a convenient, post hoc litigation position. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. NRC" on Justia Law