Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

MVH and Holy Family Communications each applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a noncommercial educational radio station in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York. To do so, the agency used its comparative selection criteria, which it had promulgated through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. By application of those criteria, the Commission found Holy Family had the superior application and awarded it the license. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the criterion upon which the outcome turned--the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations-- either violated the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or was arbitrary and capricious. That criterion is part of a reasonable framework for achieving goals consistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate, and because MVH offered no support for a waiver except that it came close to the threshold it needed to get the license. View "Mary V. Harris Found. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

After issuing an environmental impact statement (EIS), the National Park Service adopted a plan for the management of deer in Rock Creek National Park in Washington, D.C. The plan involved the killing of white-tailed deer. Objectors argued that the plan violated statutes governing management of the Park and was not adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the EIS did not meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Noting that the Organic Act expressly provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may also provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any said parks, monuments, or reservations,” so that the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act is reasonable. Given the impact of deer on plant life and vehicle collisions, the decision is not arbitrary. Finding no violation of NEPA, the court concluded that the EIS was not required to consider the psychological harm that some visitors may suffer from simply knowing that the intentional killing of deer happens at Rock Creek Park. View "Grunewald v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

John and Melissa married in 1984. John enrolled in his employer’s retirement plan and designated Melissa as the beneficiary of a qualified joint and survivor annuity. John retired in 1994. The survivor annuity irrevocably vested in Melissa; John began receiving benefits. In2002, they divorced, agreeing to a decree awarding John all “benefits existing by reason of [John’s] past, present, or future employment.” John remarried and sought to designate his new wife as the survivor annuity beneficiary. The plan advised John that this designation would be permissible if done by qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) that would not require the plan to increase benefits beyond actuarial estimates of John’s and Melissa’s life expectancies, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(D). On John’s motion, a Texas court entered a purported QDRO divesting Melissa of all ownership interests in the survivor annuity. The employer terminated its pension plan. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) became the plan’s statutory trustee and determined that the supposed QDRO was invalid because it would require “a form of benefit, or [an] option, not otherwise provided under the plan” and because, unless waived in accordance with statutory procedures within 90 days, a spouse’s right to the survivor annuity irrevocably vests on the annuity start date. The district court upheld the determination and found John’s contract and unjust enrichment claims against Melissa preempted. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Vanderkam v. Vanderkam" on Justia Law

Petitioner, operator of a commercial printing facility, challenged the Board's determination that petitioner's policy prohibiting employees from wearing baseball caps except for caps bearing the company logo violates the rights of petitioner's employees. The Board's order was premised on its finding that there was no dispute concerning whether petitioner's hat policy facially prohibited employees from wearing hats bearing union insignia. The court concluding that, contrary to the Board's assertion, petitioner did dispute that the hat policy facially prohibits employees from wearing caps bearing union insignia. Because the Board's finding has no basis in the record, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the Board for reconsideration. The court denied the Board's application for enforcement. View "World Color (USA) Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

New York City filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Amtrak was liable for rehabilitation of a bridge carrying a public highway over a parcel of land in the Bronx. In this appeal, the City asserts that a 1996 agreement obligating Amtrak's predecessor to maintain and repair the bridge is a covenant running with the land which survived the land's subsequent Rail Act, 45 U.S.C. 743(b)(2), conveyance made "free and clear of any liens or encumbrances." The City also seeks to recoup payments it made to Amtrak in exchange for Amtrak's removal of electrical equipment attached to the bridge. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak on both claims. The district court held that the Rail Act extinguished the obligation and the City was not entitled to recover its already-incurred costs under the narrow theory of restitution it advanced. The court agreed with the district court that the City's claim against Amtrak for the rehabilitation of the bridge should be rejected. The court rejected the City's reformulated restitution claim as an "unjust enrichment" claim because the City failed to file a Rule 59(e) or 60(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of New York v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District, alleging claims of retaliation under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), D.C. Code 1-615.51. The jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff's testimony before the D.C. Council regarding her department's (APRA) new software program exposed information serious enough to warrant protection under the WPA and awarded her damages. The District appealed. The court concluded that the jury's verdict finds adequate support in the record and affirmed the district court's holding that the notice provision is a procedural requirement that, having been made inapplicable to the WPA, does not limit the claims a plaintiff may bring against the District under that statute, regardless whether the underlying conduct occurred while the notice provision was in effect. View "Williams v. Johnson" on Justia Law

WMATC filed suit against Paul Rodberg and his company, seeking an injunction to shut down Rodberg's illegal limousine operation. After the district court entered a default judgment, Rodberg ignored the default judgment and continued operating his limousine business under a different name. The district court issued another order enjoining all of Rodberg's companies from transporting passengers without a license. Rodberg appealed the default judgment and order. The court affirmed the default judgment where the district court did not abuse its discretion when it entered default judgment against Rodberg as a sanction for his total discovery lapse. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the subsequent order where the order did not modify the previous injunction because Rodberg's company was already bound by the earlier order as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in Case No. 13-7072 and dismissed in Case No. 13-7161. View "Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Reliable Limousine Serv." on Justia Law

Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson appealed the dismissal of their complaint on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the time limits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), does not apply to claims filed pursuant to Title VII as amended to apply to federal employees. Because the district court erred in applying section 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations to appellants' Title VII claims, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the second amended complaint. View "Howard v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

John Tyler and his wife filed suit seeking damages from various companies that manufacture products containing asbestos that he had been exposed. After Tyler died from a form of lung cancer caused by asbestos, Stephen Wannall became the personal representative of Tyler's estate. Honeywell was named in the suit as the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation, which manufactured brake shoes that Tyler used in helping friends, family, and neighbors perform automobile repairs for over 50 years. Honeywell moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish the causal link required under Virginia law between Tyler's exposure to Bendix brakes and his disease. The district court denied the motion. While the parties were preparing for trial, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued Ford Motor Company v. Boomer, which rejected the "substantial" cause standard that the parties had previously understood as controlling, and ruled instead that plaintiffs must demonstrate that "exposure to the defendant's product alone must have been sufficient to have caused the harm." Honeywell moved for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment in light of Boomer. Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not seek leave to file a new declaration of their expert under Rule 26(e). Nor did plaintiff move under Rule 56(d) for permission to take additional discovery in response to Honeywell's motion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Honeywell's motion to strike the new expert declaration and its renewed motion for summary judgment pursuant to Boomer. View "Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and others in Florida state court, alleging that appellees tortured appellant and that appellant continues to suffer the consequences of the torture. Appellant was incarcerated in Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, and endured unlawful incarceration and torture committed by the Cuban government and its codefendants. Appellant obtained a default judgment in state court and now seeks to execute that judgment on patents and trademarks held or managed by appellees in this action, who are allegedly agents and instrumentalities of Cuba. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's request because the Florida state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the default judgment. View "Jerez v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law