Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District bore responsibility for the Board's unconstitutional parole revocation decision after the Board determined that plaintiff's parole was based primarily on unreliable multiple-hearsay testimony. The district court found the District liable and a jury awarded defendant damages. The District appealed. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from having jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim; the court held that the District is not liable under section 1983 for the Board's decision and the District was entitled to summary judgment on the question of its liability; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded. View "Singletary v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Freedom Watch filed suit against OPEC, alleging that OPEC violated federal anti-trust law by fixing the price of gasoline. The district court dismissed based on insufficiency of service of process. The court agreed with the district court that Freedom Watch failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 by serving process on OPEC at its headquarters in Vienna via personal delivery and Austrian mail. However, because the district court invoked Rule 4(h)(1) instead of its discretionary authority under Rule 4(f)(3) - authorization of alternative methods of serving process on OPEC - in rejecting Freedom Watch's request, the court remanded to enable the district court to exercise its discretion under the latter provision. View "Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, APA members, filed a class action suit seeking recovery of all special assessment fees paid after they learned that there was no requirement to pay the special assessment to maintain APA membership. Plaintiffs alleged that the APA intentionally misled members into believing that payment of the special assessment fee was a condition of membership, and that they would not have paid the fee had they known it was optional. The district court dismissed the claims, principally concluding that plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the assessment fee was mandatory rather than optional. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim where their claim is not precluded by an express contract; the court rejected defendant's argument that their retention of the assessment fees was not "unjust"; and there is no reason to conclude that D.C. courts would impose a would-be member any heightened duty to investigate before relying on facially straightforward billing language. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' California statutory claims where the District of Columbia - not California - law governed the dispute. The court denied plaintiffs' request to add a fraudulent inducement claim; affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' request to add claims for rescission and negligent misrepresentation; and, in regards to the negligent misrepresentation claim, reversed to the extent that the dismissal was with prejudice. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: APA Assessment Fee Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former officers who had been medically disqualified from serving as federal court security officers, filed suit against the Marshals Service alleging that the procedures culminating in their dismissals failed to satisfy the Due Process Clause, and that their dismissals had been motivated by discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on the Due Process Clause claims where there was no need to give an officer an oral hearing where an officer was given the opportunity to supply additional medical information responding to specific concerns of the physician charged with making the final decision; the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on the Rehabilitation Act claims where plaintiffs failed to exhaust their claims against the government; but the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend to add the discrimination claims where the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to include the claims of twelve new plaintiffs in the fifth amended complaint. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United Government Security, et al. v. United States Marshals, et al." on Justia Law

The District and two police officers appealed the district court's liability determinations resulting from the grant of partial summary judgment against them. The district court granted partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor because no reasonable officer in their shoes could have found probable cause to arrest any of the plaintiffs. The officers arrested everyone present at a party for unlawful entry because the host of the party had not finalized any rental agreement and so lacked the right to authorize the party. The court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest because it was undisputed at the time that the arresting officers knew plaintiffs had been invited to the house by a woman that they reasonably believed to be its lawful occupant. The court also concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct because the evidence failed to show any disturbance of sufficient magnitude to violate local law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on the ground that the arrests violated their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights and District of Columbia law against false arrest. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the District was liable for negligent supervision because the supervising police sergeant at the scene also overstepped clear law in directing the arrests. View "Wesby, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law

Ronnie Leroy Howard appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking immediate release from parole contending that the procedural irregularities relating to parole revocations in 1985 and 2004 warrant habeas corpus relief. The court rejected Howard's argument that the Commission ordered that the first five years of an intervening state sentence would run concurrently with his federal sentence but failed to treat them as concurrent, because Howard misread the Notice of Action. The court rejected Howard's arguments based on his contention that the Commission did not properly execute, or never executed, a 1982 parole violator warrant, because it was immaterial. Finally, the court rejected Howard's contention that the Commission executed a separate 1998 parole violator warrant in 2000 or 2002, but delayed the associated parole revocation hearing until 2004, because Howard raised no grounds warranting reversal. Because Howard's claims failed on the merits, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Howard v. Caufield, et al." on Justia Law

Sorenson, a leading provider of video relay service (VRS), petitioned for review of the FCC's 2013 Rate Order as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a). The court found no fault with the new rates because the 2013 Rate Order is not arbitrary and capricious for ignoring costs incurred unnecessarily, even when the consequence for the provider that incurred those costs might be ruinous. However, Sorenson has demonstrated that additional consideration by the FCC is necessary in regards to providing service under the more demanding speed-of-answer requirement that the agency adopted as part of the 2013 Rate Order. Therefore, the court vacated the new speed-of-answer requirement and remanded that portion of the Order. In regard to tiered rates, the court held that the FCC adequately justified the 500,000- and 1,000,000-minute cut-offs. The court deferred to the FCC's decision concerning the tiered structure because the task of balancing the goals of setting rates to reflect economies of scale and transitioning the industry from rate regulation to competitive bidding is fairly within the discretion of the agency. View "Sorenson Communications, Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

The Tribe filed claims in 2005 against the Department for unpaid contract support costs that accrued from 1996 through 1998. At issue was whether the Tribe may sue under the doctrine of equitable tolling even though the statute of limitations has lapsed. The court concluded that the Tribe's claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the legal misunderstandings and tactical mistakes the Tribe identified did not amount to extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Relator filed suit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, alleging that the HP products Govplace sold to the federal government originated from non-designated countries, in violation of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), 19 U.S.C. 2501-2581. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Govplace, concluding that the district court properly exercised its discretion in managing discovery and that Govplace reasonably relied on Ingram Micro's certification. The court concluded that a contractor like Govplace is ordinarily entitled to rely on a supplier's certification that the product meets TAA requirements. In this case, Govplace has informed the GSA during multiple Contractor Administrator Visits that it relies on Ingram Micro's Program in representing that the country of origin information for the items listed in its GSA schedule is accurate, and GSA's Administrative Report Cards evaluating Govplace have all concluded that Govplace has complied with the TAA. View "Folliard v. Government Acquisitions, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Kenya in district court for breach of contract based on Kenya's underpayment of rewards owed to him. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, barred plaintiff's suit. In this case, Kenya did not waive its immunity in U.S. courts and Kenya's alleged breach of contract lacks the connection to the United States required by the commercial activity exception to the FSIA. View "Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, et al." on Justia Law