Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel when his appellate counsel failed to seek plain error review of the trial judge's instruction that the jury must find him guilty even if the government failed to prove an element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that petitioner met his burden under Strickland v. Washington and that he was entitled to a new direct appeal at which he may raise this instructional error before the D.C. Court of Appeals for plain error review. View "Payne v. Stansberry" on Justia Law

Section 5000A of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. 5000A, mandates that as of January 2014, non-exempt individuals maintain minimum health care coverage or, with limited exceptions, pay a penalty. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the mandate violated the Commerce Clause and the Origination Clause of the Constitution. The court concluded that plaintiff's contention that the mandate obligating him to buy government-approved health insurance violates the Commerce Clause fails under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the mandate in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius; plaintiff's contention that the mandate's shared responsibility payment was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause fails under Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Clause; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. View "Sissel v. HHS, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, a retired officer of the Navy Reserve, seeks to correct his military record to reflect that he was retired by reason of physical disability. When appellant was discharged from the Selected Reserve and transferred to the Retired Reserve, he was found "Not Physically Qualified" to continue service. Appellant argued, inter alia, that he should have been given a physical disability retirement due to his psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis. The district court dismissed the action because it was barred by an earlier CFC dismissal under the doctrine of res judicata. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellant's claims challenging his 1996 discharge from active duty, his 2002 discharge from the Selected Reserve, and the BCNR decisions issued between 2000 and 2002, because those claims were barred by the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., statute of limitations. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of appellant's challenges to the 2006 and 2007 BCNR decisions and remanded for further proceedings. Res judicata did not bar appellant's suit because the CFC dismissal did not constitute a final, valid judgment on the merits. View "Havens v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

IPG challenged the distribution of royalties from a royalty fund managed by the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress, which provides payments to copyright holders when they are statutorily obligated to license their work to third parties. IPG's former president had signed a settlement agreement that fully disposed of IPG's interest in the royalties at issue concerning religious programming broadcasts on cable television in 1998. In this case, IPG seeks judicial review under an inapposite jurisdictional grant of a decade-old distribution based on the actions of IPG's then-president, on which the Royalty Judges reasonably relied, and indeed, the authority for which has never been challenged. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked statutory jurisdiction over the dispute. View "Independent Producers Group, et al. v. Library of Congress, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of various fraud charges, sentenced to nine years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution. Two years later, the sentencing court held a hearing because defendant paid only a negligible amount toward his fine and restitution. Defendant subsequently paid with a fictitious International Bill of Exchange that he created. In 2007, the district court held a hearing to determine whether defendant should be held in civil contempt until he made the payment. Defendant appeared pro se, asserted no defense, was held in contempt, and remained incarcerated for the next five years. In 2012, the district court ruled that defendant had not met his burden of making out an inability-to-comply defense, and ordered defendant's contempt status continued. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear defendant's various challenges to the district court's 2007 order because defendant failed to timely appeal that order. With regard to the 2012 proceedings, the court held that defendant waived any due process right to counsel he may have had. The court denied defendant's remaining challenges and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Gewin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to two sex offenses. On appeal, defendant mainly asserted that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to tell the Departure Committee the complete "nature and extent" of his cooperation. The court affirmed the judgment because defendant identified no difference between the information he concedes the prosecutor provided to the Committee and what he believes the prosecutor should have provided, and because the prosecutor summarized for the district court both the information that the prosecutor presented to the Committee and the Committee's basis for declining to approve the departure motion. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed two 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) motions with the court seeking certification to file successive motions in the district court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court concluded that petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his Graham v. Florida motion satisfied the necessary requirements for the court's certification. How Graham applies to a case concerning a crime that straddled the age of majority is a question for the district court in the first instance. Further, petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his Miller v. Alabama motion satisfies the necessary requirements for the court's certification. The government's question of whether the new rule in Miller extends to a prisoner like petitioner, who entered a conspiracy in his juvenile years and exited it in adulthood, goes to the merits of the motion and is for the district court. View "In re: Williams" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the IRS's interpretation of 26 U.S.C. 36B, enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). The district court held that the ACA's text, structure, purpose, and legislative history make "clear that Congress intended to make premium tax credits available on both state-run and federally-facilitated Exchanges." The district court held that even if the ACA were ambiguous, the IRS's regulation would represent a permissible construction entitled to Chevron deference. The court concluded, however, that the ACA unambiguously restricts the section 36B subsidy to insurance purchased on Exchanges "established by the State." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the IRS's regulation. View "Halbig v. Burwell" on Justia Law

The Village petitioned for review of the Board's denial of its request to reopen a 2008 proceeding in which the Board approved a railroad's acquisition of a Chicago-area railway company. The Village sought to reopen the proceeding based on a new study on traffic projection, based in part on post-acquisition traffic conditions. The court denied the petition for review because it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Village's claims of material error and because the Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the Village's new evidence did not warrant reopening of the Board's original decision. View "Village of Barrington, IL v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

The SEC sought a court order compelling SIPC to liquidate a member broker-dealer, SGC. SGC played an integral role in a multibillion-dollar financial fraud carried out through a web of companies. At issue was whether SIPC could instead be ordered to proceed against SGC to protect the CD investors' property. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the application to order SIPC to liquidate SGC where, under the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78ccc(a)(1), the CD investors did not qualify as customers of SGC under the operative statutory definition. View "SEC v. Securities Investor Protection Corp." on Justia Law