Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cause of Action submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request to Archives seeking certain Commission records. Archives denied the request, maintaining that because the Commission was established in the legislative branch, Commission records held by the Archives were not agency records subject to FOIA. The district court applied the four-factor Burka v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. control test and concluded that the Commission's records were not agency records subject to FOIA and granted Archives' motion to dismiss. Applying the analysis from the Judicial Watch II test, not the Burka test, the court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Congress did not intend to expose legislative branch materials to FOIA simply because the material has been deposited with the Archives. View "Cause of Action v. NARA" on Justia Law

In this case, the Board addressed a rate dispute between a shipper and two railroads. The railroads contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the shipper and the shipper contended that the Board's decision was too favorable to the railroads. The railroads and the shippers petitioned for review. The court concluded that the Board reasonably interpreted that the prior rates were not reasonable based on a Stand-Alone-Cost test that employs a hypothetical Stand Alone Railroad that is optimally efficient; the Board's calculation of the railroads' variable costs was reasonable and reasonably explained; and Arizona Electric lacked standing where the court could not detect a current injury to Arizona Electric from the Board's decision regarding the switch to proportional rates. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008, ReGen Biologics, manufacturer of the Collagen Scaffold, obtained FDA approval to market the device. After allegations that improper political pressure tainted the clearance process, the FDA conducted an internal investigation and concluded that some procedural irregularities had occurred during the agency's review of the device. Asserting its inherent reconsideration authority, the agency reevaluated the scaffold and concluded that it had erred in allowing the device to be sold. The FDA issued an order rescinding its clearance decision. ReGen immediately pulled the scaffold from the market and subsequently filed for bankruptcy. ReGen and its successor in interest, Ivy, filed suit challenging the FDA's decision to rescind and the district court granted summary judgment for the agency. The court reversed, concluding that the FDA did not follow the proper statutory procedure for reclassifying a device. Rescinding its determination had the effect of putting the device into Class III, and thus required completion of the extensive pre-market approval process before the scaffold could be marketed again. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ivy Sports Medicine, LLC v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

Smith Lake filed suit against FERC and others, alleging claims related to the Commission's issuance of a license order. Alabama Power intervened and moved to dismiss the petition for review based on lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because the appeal was untimely, concluding that Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC and Clifton Power Corp. v. FERC stand for the proposition that the court will not hear a case if the petitioner has a rehearing petition pending before the Commission at the time of filing in this court, whether it was required or not. Consequently, a party must choose whether to seek an optional petition for rehearing before the Commission, or a petition for review to the court; it cannot proceed simultaneously. View "Smith Lake Improvement v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, prisoners who violated D.C. criminal laws before March 3, 1985, filed suit contending that the Parole Commission contravened the Ex Post Facto Clause by retroactively applying parole guidelines that it issued in 2000, instead of the guidelines in place at the time of their offenses. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim because the court concluded that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the application of the 2000 guidelines creates a "significant risk of prolonging [their] incarceration." The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Daniel, et al. v. Fulwood, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District bore responsibility for the Board's unconstitutional parole revocation decision after the Board determined that plaintiff's parole was based primarily on unreliable multiple-hearsay testimony. The district court found the District liable and a jury awarded defendant damages. The District appealed. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from having jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim; the court held that the District is not liable under section 1983 for the Board's decision and the District was entitled to summary judgment on the question of its liability; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded. View "Singletary v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Freedom Watch filed suit against OPEC, alleging that OPEC violated federal anti-trust law by fixing the price of gasoline. The district court dismissed based on insufficiency of service of process. The court agreed with the district court that Freedom Watch failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 by serving process on OPEC at its headquarters in Vienna via personal delivery and Austrian mail. However, because the district court invoked Rule 4(h)(1) instead of its discretionary authority under Rule 4(f)(3) - authorization of alternative methods of serving process on OPEC - in rejecting Freedom Watch's request, the court remanded to enable the district court to exercise its discretion under the latter provision. View "Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, APA members, filed a class action suit seeking recovery of all special assessment fees paid after they learned that there was no requirement to pay the special assessment to maintain APA membership. Plaintiffs alleged that the APA intentionally misled members into believing that payment of the special assessment fee was a condition of membership, and that they would not have paid the fee had they known it was optional. The district court dismissed the claims, principally concluding that plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the assessment fee was mandatory rather than optional. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim where their claim is not precluded by an express contract; the court rejected defendant's argument that their retention of the assessment fees was not "unjust"; and there is no reason to conclude that D.C. courts would impose a would-be member any heightened duty to investigate before relying on facially straightforward billing language. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' California statutory claims where the District of Columbia - not California - law governed the dispute. The court denied plaintiffs' request to add a fraudulent inducement claim; affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' request to add claims for rescission and negligent misrepresentation; and, in regards to the negligent misrepresentation claim, reversed to the extent that the dismissal was with prejudice. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: APA Assessment Fee Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former officers who had been medically disqualified from serving as federal court security officers, filed suit against the Marshals Service alleging that the procedures culminating in their dismissals failed to satisfy the Due Process Clause, and that their dismissals had been motivated by discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on the Due Process Clause claims where there was no need to give an officer an oral hearing where an officer was given the opportunity to supply additional medical information responding to specific concerns of the physician charged with making the final decision; the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on the Rehabilitation Act claims where plaintiffs failed to exhaust their claims against the government; but the court reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend to add the discrimination claims where the district court abused its discretion when it denied leave to include the claims of twelve new plaintiffs in the fifth amended complaint. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United Government Security, et al. v. United States Marshals, et al." on Justia Law

The District and two police officers appealed the district court's liability determinations resulting from the grant of partial summary judgment against them. The district court granted partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor because no reasonable officer in their shoes could have found probable cause to arrest any of the plaintiffs. The officers arrested everyone present at a party for unlawful entry because the host of the party had not finalized any rental agreement and so lacked the right to authorize the party. The court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest because it was undisputed at the time that the arresting officers knew plaintiffs had been invited to the house by a woman that they reasonably believed to be its lawful occupant. The court also concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct because the evidence failed to show any disturbance of sufficient magnitude to violate local law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on the ground that the arrests violated their clearly established Fourth Amendment rights and District of Columbia law against false arrest. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the District was liable for negligent supervision because the supervising police sergeant at the scene also overstepped clear law in directing the arrests. View "Wesby, et al. v. DC, et al." on Justia Law