Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Corporation, asserting its power under section 215(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16U.S.C. 824o, assessed a monetary fine against Southwestern, a federal government entity that markets hydroelectric power. The Commission upheld the penalty. The court held that section 215(b)(1) generally subjects federal government entities to the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce compliance. But to authorize a monetary award against the federal government, the statute must do more than generally bring the government within the Commission's enforcement jurisdiction - it must unequivocally subject the government to monetary liability. Neither section 215(b) nor section 215(e), nor the two consolidated in combination, speaks with the requisite clarity to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from monetary penalties. Therefore, the court vacated the Commission's order. View "Southwestern Power Admin., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Otis Elevator petitioned for review of the Commission's upholding of an OSHA citation for violating safety standards involved in the control of hazardous energy. A service mechanic employed by Otis Elevator injured his hand while unjamming the gate of a freight elevator and the accident spurred the OSHA investigation. The court concluded that the Commission's determinations that the safety standards applied to the mechanic's work and were violated were neither arbitrary nor capricious, and were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Otis Elevator Co. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

This case involves challenges to the most recent forms of electric transmission planning and cost allocation adopted by the Commission under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791 et seq. In Order No. 1000, as reaffirmed and clarified in Order Nos. 1000-A and 1000-B (together, the Final Rule), the Commission required each transmission owning and operating public utility to participate in regional transmission planning that satisfies the specific planning principles designed to prevent undue discrimination and preference in transmission service, and that produces a regional transmission plan. The court held that the Commission had authority under Section 206 of the Act to require transmission providers to provide in a regional planning process; there was substantial evidence of a theoretical threat to support adoption of the reforms in the Final Rule; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require removal of federal rights of first refusal provisions upon determining they were unjust and unreasonable practices affecting rates, and that determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; the Mobile-Sierra objection to the removal is not ripe; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require the ex ante allocation of the costs of new transmission facilities among beneficiaries, and that its decision regarding scope was not arbitrary or capricious; the Commission reasonably determined that regional planning must include consideration of transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and the Commission reasonably relied upon the reciprocity condition to encourage non-public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule. View "South Carolina Public Service v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Department of Agriculture, after it denied her request for a flexible work schedule based on her depression. Plaintiff sought substantial flexibility in her working hours ("maxiflex" schedule) under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., as an accommodation for her disability. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, concluding that the maxiflex work schedule is an unreasonable request. The court also rejected defendant's retaliation claims. The court concluded, however, that nothing in the Rehabilitation Act establishes, as a matter of law, that a maxiflex work schedule is unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the entry of summary judgment on the accommodation claim; reversed the entry of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that revoking her permission to work late was in retaliation for requesting accommodations; and remanded those claims for further proceedings. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's decision. View "Solomon v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former policy director of the House Transportation Committee, appealed his convictions on three counts relating to his receipt of illegal gratuities from Jack Abramoff's lobbying group. The court concluded that, because the indictment alleged that defendant accepted the World Series trip for or because of his official assistance in influencing the language of the federal highway bill, the charge on Count 2 contained the required element, and the district court correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Further, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant on all counts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Verrusio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed as an attorney advisor for the BVA, filed suit against the Secretary of the VA, claiming that the BVA had violated her rights under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., by failing to accommodate her disability. Plaintiff also claimed that she was constructively discharged because the failure to accommodate her disability left her no choice but to resign. In regards to the failure to accommodate claim, no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's accommodation request was denied in light of the BVA's continuing good-faith dialogue with plaintiff to determine an appropriate accommodation, which dialogue was cut short by plaintiff's sudden resignation. Consequently, plaintiff's constructive discharge claim also failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary on both claims. View "Ward v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of multiple counts of defrauding the Washington Teachers Union, appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court concluded that defendant has not stated a Brady claim that "jurists of reason" would find debatable and, therefore, the court denied his request for a certificate of appealability (COA) on this issue; although the court granted a COA on defendant's Skilling claim, he cannot overcome the procedural default that bars the court from considering his claim on the merits; and the court granted a COA on defendant's Adefehinti claim but concluded that he failed to carry his burden of showing the actual innocence required to overcome his untimely filing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Baxter, II" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States, contending that he wants to renounce his United States citizenship. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff's complaint is not moot because the relief he seeks - an exception to the government's in-person interview requirement for renunciation, and official acknowledgement of his renunciation - has not been granted. Further, plaintiff has standing because he remains a citizen against his wishes and allegedly in violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Schnitzler v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441b, sets forth ground rules for the participation of corporations in the electoral process. The Act permits limited corporate participation through separate segregated funds, a type of political action committee. Stop this Insanity and others (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit alleging that the restrictions on the segregated funds were unconstitutional. The court concluded that plaintiffs would like to use its segregated fund to solicit the entire public while concealing its expenses for such solicitation. Even assuming plaintiffs' constitutional analysis is correct under Citizens United v. FEC, it is far from a foregone conclusion that the Act is severable in a way that would eliminate the restrictions but leave intact the partial waiver on disclosure. The court concluded that it need not make this determination because plaintiffs' arguments failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Stop This Insanity, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law