Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Raymone Bain and her firm filed suit against Michael Jackson and his production company, MJJ Productions, Inc., claiming to be owed substantial sums for various services rendered. Defendants moved to dismiss, relying principally on a December 2007 release agreement where Bain broadly relinquished any claims against Jackson and his business entities. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MJJ, holding that the release agreement precluded Bain's claims. Bain moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(2) five months later. The "newly discovered evidence" cited by Bain was an April 2008 letter from Jackson to Bain, in which Jackson stated that he had no awareness of, and had never signed, the release agreement on which the district court had grounded its grant of summary judgment. The district court held that a movant's awareness of evidence automatically precludes relief under Rule 60(b)(2), regardless of the evidence's availability. The court found that to be an unduly constricted understanding of "newly discovered evidence" for purposes of Rule 60(b)(2). The court concluded, however, that the district court committed no abuse of discretion by looking beyond Bain's efforts in searching her own files and considering whether she mentioned the letter to the court or sought its assistance in locating the evidence. Because Bain failed to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking out the letter, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bain, et al. v. MJJ Productions, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, a coal mine operator, filed suit against the Secretary, challenging a Department of the Interior regulation requiring mine operators to pay a reclamation fee when the coal is ultimately sold or used, rather than immediately after the coal is removed from the ground. Appellant argued that the regulation could not be constitutionally applied to coal sold for export because the Export Clause of the Constitution states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any state." U.S. Const. Art. I. 9, cl.5. Section 1276 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1) explicitly provides that all challenges to regulations promulgated under the Act must be brought within sixty days of a rule's promulgation. The court concluded that section 1276 was applicable in this case and the court agreed with the district court that appellant's challenge was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's Final Rule regarding the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 7607(d)(9). The court concluded that the EPA did not fail to request comment on whether to revise the NAAQS where the preamble to the EPA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requested comments on "all issues" related to the agency's proposal to lower the level of the particulate matter NAAQS; the EPA offered reasoned explanations for how it approached and weighed the evidence, and why the scientific evidence supported revision of the NAAQS; and the court rejected petitioners' contention that the EPA did not respond when petitioners' comments cited certain studies that supported retention of the existing particulate matter NAAQS because the EPA acted within its discretion by addressing the more significant comments. The court also concluded that the EPA fulfilled its obligation to reasonably explain its decision not to employ spatial averaging. The court rejected petitioners' challenge to the EPA's new requirement that States place monitors near heavily trafficked roads in large metropolitan areas where the statutory scheme granted the EPA substantial discretion and the EPA's decision and explanation were at least reasonable. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument that the EPA should not have issued, or at least should not require compliance with, the 2013 NAAQS without first providing States and regulated certain implementation guidance. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

26 U.S.C. 4251 imposes an excise tax on amounts paid for toll telephone service. Technological advances changed cost structures and, as a result, telephone companies began charging only by elapsed transmission time. The IRS, however, continued to collect the tax. Five courts of appeals, including this court, held that section 4251 did not permit the Service to tax telephone service with distance-invariant pricing. Around the same time, plaintiffs (Cohen, Sloan, and Gurrola) filed separate putative class-action suits challenging the tax. After Cohen and Sloan filed their complaint, the Service issued without notice and comment Notice 2006-50, declaring that the Service would no longer tax telephone service priced without regard to distance and established a procedure to refund illegally collected excise taxes. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's refusal to direct the Service on remand to issue a refund rule and from its denial of their interim request for fees. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in vacating Notice 2006-50 and remanding, without specifically instructing the Service to promulgate a new refund procedure. Here, the only statutory failure was of notice and comment. Absent a statutory duty to promulgate a new rule, a court cannot order it. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying fees. The district court found the government's position to be substantially justified because several circuit judges agreed with the government and dissented from the Cohen I and Cohen II opinions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: Long-distance Telephone Service Federal Excise Tax Refund" on Justia Law

In ACLU I, the court held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, required the Justice Department to disclose case names and docket numbers for prosecutions in which the government had obtained cell phone tracking data without a warrant and the defendant had ultimately been convicted. At issue in this appeal was whether the Department would also have to disclose docket information for similar prosecutions in which the defendant had been acquitted or had the charges dismissed. The court concluded that the Department properly withheld this information given the substantial privacy interest individuals have in controlling information concerning criminal charges for which they were not convicted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department. View "ACLU, et al. v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) issued under section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o). The court held that Monroe Energy had Article III standing to challenge the Final Rule. On the merits, the court concluded that, in the absence of any express or implied statutory directive to consider particular factors, EPA reasonably concluded that it enjoyed broad discretion regarding whether and in what circumstances to reduce the advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel volumes under the cellulosic biofuel waiver provision. The court rejected Monroe Energy's arguments regarding vacatur of the Final Rule because it was untimely issued. EPA's decision to preserve the 2013 fuel standards while extending the compliance deadline to June 30, 2014 was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellant failed to respond to the court's order to show cause why he should not be compelled to pay a filing fee. The court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. Appellant then moved for reconsideration. Appellant sought to compel the Attorney General to reclassify marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule V, arguing primarily that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 812, requires such action because of the drug's accepted medical uses. The court concluded, however, that the agency to which the Attorney General has delegated its CSA reclassification authority engaged in no abuse of discretion when it refused to reclassify marijuana as appropriate for medical use. Further, mandamus is not warranted in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the motion because the claims appellant raised in his appeal were without merit and the court saw no reason to reinstate his appeal. View "Thomas v. Holder, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

After the Forest Service denied Ark's Emergency Petition seeking "roadless" designation for roughly 1,000 acres on Burnt Mountain and suspension of the Aspen Skiing Company's authorization to cut trees on that land, Ark filed suit against the Service in district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Service and denied reconsideration. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that Ark had Article III standing to challenge the Service's final action denying the Emergency Petition. On the merits, the court concluded that the Service's denial of the Emergency Petition was not arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law, and Ark failed to show an abuse of discretion on reconsideration. View "Ark Initiative, et al. v. Tidwell, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Marine Corps. veteran who was honorably discharged, sought review of the BCNR's denial of an increase in appellant's disability rating. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal where the only claim ever properly placed at issue before the district court was rendered moot by a stipulated remand to the BCNR. The court did not reach the other issues briefed on appeal. View "Schmidt v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's 2013 Rule regarding the emission standards for the cement industry and the EPA's decision to create an affirmative defense for private civil suits in which plaintiffs sue sources of pollution and seek penalties for violations of emission standards. The court concluded that the emissions-related provisions of the EPA's 2013 Rule were permissible but that the affirmative defense for private civil suits exceeded the EPA's statutory authority. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions in part and vacated the portion of the Rule pertaining to the affirmative defenses. The court denied the petitions in all other respects. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law