Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, victims and victims' families and estates, filed suit against Iran and others alleging their liability for the attack on the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment and attempted to collect. Plaintiffs had writs of attachment issued to Bank of America and Wells Fargo, seeking any asset held by the banks in which Iran had interest. The banks conceded that some accounts were potentially subject to attachment and these "uncontested accounts" were the subject of an interpleader action in the district court. The remaining "contested accounts" are the subject of this appeal. The court affirmed the order of the district court denying plaintiffs' motion for a turnover of the funds because plaintiffs could not attach the contested accounts under either section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337, or 28 U.S.C. 1610(g) without an Iranian ownership interest in the accounts and because Iran lacked an ownership interest in the accounts. View "Heiser, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force seeking, inter alia, correction of his military records to reflect promotion to major general, along with active duty back pay and retired pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, vests district courts with concurrent jurisdiction for civil actions or claims against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress. Because the jurisdiction of the district court was based, at least in part, on the Little Tucker Act, the court concluded that the Federal Circuit possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the appeal to that court. View "Schwalier v. Hagel, et al." on Justia Law

Intervenors filed suit challenging the Commission's order approving a negotiated service agreement for the sale of postage between the Postal Service and Valassis Direct Mail. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it need not consider whether Resolution 11-4 violated 39 U.S.C. 402 where the Governors reviewed and approved the agreement before it was submitted to the Commission. On the merits, the court denied the petition for review, concluding that the Commission's order complied with the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, S.Rep.No. 108-318, at 2-4, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. View "Newspaper Assoc. of America v. Postal Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District and others, alleging that strip searching incoming detainees violated the Fourth Amendment and, where men were not similarly strip searched, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The court concluded, under Bame v. Dillard, that the Superior Court Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment right he was accused of violating was not clearly established at the time of any violation. The court agreed with the district court that there was no circumstantial evidence that the Marshal purposefully directed that women and men be searched differently at the Superior Court cellblock. According, the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity because class members have failed to show that he violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnson, et al. v. Government of the District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, an Ohio-based law firm, filed suit against appellee, a Florida resident and SEI, a Florida corporation, after appellee and SEI failed to pay appellant for services rendered. Appellee had hired the law firm to represent him in a matter pending in Oregon. Appellant filed suit in district court but the district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court affirmed the judgment where neither the retainer itself nor anything about the client's dealings with the law firm demonstrated that the client purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the district. View "Thompson Hine LLP v. Taieb, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to possess and distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine. The court concluded that the district court did not violate defendants' rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). However, the court concluded that the district court erroneously admitted evidence obtained pursuant to a "facially insufficient" warrant. Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 2107, an appeal must be filed within 60 days after the entry of judgment, order or decree. At issue was whether "the entry" of the order at issue occurred when the district court's clerk's office posted on its docket a notice that the district court had issued a classified memorandum and order denying a motion for reconsideration of the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that a redacted version would be posted when it became available, or when the redacted opinion and order were subsequently posted on the docket. The court concluded that the first posting qualified as an "entry" under section 2107 and, therefore, the notice of appeal was untimely filed in this case and the court lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hentif, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Pilots appealed the grant of summary judgment to PBGC on their claims regarding pension benefits payable under the terminated Retirement Income Plan for U.S. Airways Pilots. The court concluded that it need not resolve the parties' contentions regarding whether the PBGC was entitled to deference under Chevron when it acts as the trustee in an involuntary retirement plan termination; regardless, Pilots' claims relating to the PBGC's interpretation of 29 U.S.C. 1344 and regulations must fail; the court need not decide the level of deference due to the PBGC's interpretation of the Plan provisions because Pilots have not demonstrated Article III standing for part of one claim and their other claims failed regardless of the standard; and the court need not decide whether the decision in Davis v. PBGC regarding Pilots' request for a preliminary injunction was the law of the case on the standard of review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Davis, et al. v. PBGC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their companies filed suit alleging that the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that, even if the government had a compelling interest - from safeguarding the public health to protecting a woman's compelling interest in autonomy and promoting gender equality, the mandate was not the most restrictive means of furthering that interest. The court concluded that the district court erred in denying a preliminary injunction for plaintiffs on the grounds that their case was unlikely to succeed on the merits; the court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction for the individual owners; because the district court premised its decision entirely on a question of law, the court must remand for consideration of the other preliminary-injunction factors; and the court affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction with respect to the companies. View "Gilardi, et al. v. HHS, et al." on Justia Law

Bell appealed the vacatur of a default judgment as void in connection with the manufacture and marketing by Iran of a helicopter that resembled Bell's Jet Ranger 206 in appearance. The court concluded that Bell's interpretation of Rule 60(b)(4) was contrary to the court's precedent, as well as that of almost every other circuit court of appeals, all of which rejected a time limit that would bar Rule 60(b)(4) motions; because Iran never appeared in the district court proceeding resulting in the default judgment, the district court properly applied the traditional definition of voidness in granting Iran's Rule 60(b)(4) motion; and because Bell's evidence regarding the effect in the United States of Iran's commercial activities abroad was either too remote and attenuated to satisfy the direct effect requirement of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), or too speculative to be considered an effect at all, the district court did not err in ruling the commercial activity exception in the FSIA did not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al." on Justia Law