Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Muwekma petitioned the court to order Interior to recognize it as an Indian tribe. The court agreed with the district court that Interior's Supplemental Explanation adequately explained why Muwekma was not similarly situated to the Ione Band of Miwok or the Lower Lake Rancheria of California and, accordingly, Muwekma's equal protection claim failed; Muwekma's termination claim, although not barred by the statute of limitations, failed on the merits because Interior did not terminate Muwekma's recognition; because Muwekma had no cognizable property interest, its claim under 5 U.S.C. 554(d) failed; and Interior's Final Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Interior. View "Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Colombian national, was extradited for, charged with, and convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine with the knowledge or intent that it would be imported into the United States. On appeal, defendant raised several challenges to his conviction and sentence. Most significantly, defendant maintained that his trial attorney suffered from a conflict of interest that deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation and that excessive trial delays violated his constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights. The court concluded that neither claim had merit. Defendant made a rational and informed decision that, given the stipulation and the limited nature of his attorney's conflict, he wanted to proceed with counsel's representation. The district court's explanation of trial delays was sufficient. As to defendant's remaining claims, the court concluded either that the district court made no error or that any such error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed both the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute one kilogram or more of PCP. On appeal, defendant claimed that his trial and sentencing were defective in several respects. Defendant's ineffective assistance claim turned on two alleged deficiencies in his counsel's performance, both of which related to the "safety valve" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that, in defendant's case, the record supported neither a conclusive determination that his ineffective assistance claim would succeed, nor one that it must fail. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings as to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court concluded that defendant's other claims lacked merit. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

After a three-year rulemaking process, the FWS found that, due to the effects of global climate change, the polar bear was likely to become an endangered species and faced the threat of extinction within the foreseeable future (Listing Rule). The agency thus concluded that the polar bear should be listed as a threatened species. A number of industry groups, environmental organizations, and states challenged the Listing Rule as either overly restrictive or insufficiently protective of the polar bear. After a hearing on the parties' submissions, the district court granted summary judgment to the FWS and rejected all challenges to the Listing Rule. Given the evident thoroughness and care of the agency's explanation for its decision, the court concluded that the challenges to the Listing Rule "amount to nothing more than competing views about policy and science." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FCC's three revisions to the interpretation of Section 224 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 224. Section 224 provided a variety of advantages to certain types of firms seeking to attach their wires, cable, or other network equipment to utility poles. The FCC's Order allowed incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share the benefits of some of Section 224's provisions; reformulated the ceiling on the rate that pole-owning utilities could charge "telecommunications carriers" seeking to make pole attachments; and moved back the date as of which compensatory damages started to accrue in favor of parties filing successful complaints against utilities. The court upheld the FCC's view that ILECs were "providers of telecommunications services" for purposes of section 224(a)(4). Because the FCC's methodology was consistent with the unspecified cost terms contained in section 224(e), and the FCC's justifications were reasonable, the telecom rate revision warranted judicial deference. Petitioners' arguments regarding the refund period had no serious statutory basis. The court considered petitioners' many subsidiary arguments and found them all to be without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "American Electric Power Serv. Corp., et al v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law

Appellants, almond producers, claimed that the Secretary of Agriculture, seeking to prevent the spread of salmonella, exceeded his authority in requiring California almonds sold domestically to be treated with heat or chemicals. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary. The court affirmed, finding that appellants have waived their claims by failing to raise them during the rulemaking process. View "Koretoff, et al v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the interaction between the NRC's regular decommissioning process of a licensed nuclear facility and a statutory provision (section 2021 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021) authorizing the NRC to transfer regulatory authority over classes of nuclear materials located within a state to the government of that state. In regards to the basic standards for decommissioning, the court's inability to understand the key regulatory materials purportedly guiding the agency exercise of control over decommissioning required a remand. The court found no legal error in the remainder of the Commission's Order. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., et al" on Justia Law

In this case, FERC reviewed rates resulting from an auction process and concluded that though the rates were not contract rates, they warranted the Mobile-Sierra doctrine presumption anyway. The NEPGA and State Petitioners petitioned for review. Because the NEPGA lacked standing, the court dismissed its petition for review. The court rejected the merits of the State Petitioners' arguments where FERC did not exceed the bounds of its considerable discretion by adopting the public interest standard for deciding whether a given Forward Capacity Auction rate was just and reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the State Petitioners' petition for review. View "New England Power Generators Assoc., Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellees sued the District, their employer, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The District argued on appeal, inter alia, that it was entitled to a new trial because of improper closing arguments. Appellees' counsel made four inappropriate arguments: three after the district court had sustained objections. The first three arguments were "golden rule" arguments and the fourth argument was a "send a message" argument. As the district court's efforts to cure the resulting prejudice were insufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caudle, et al v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Prior to Freeman v. United States, the district court denied defendant's 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduction of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) sentence. The court held that it had jurisdiction of defendant's appeal notwithstanding his release from incarceration and the commencement of his term of supervised release; defendant's appeal was not moot because applying the amended version of the supervisory release provision would be impermissibly retroactive and, in not applying this amended provision, it becomes likely that defendant's term of supervisory release could be impacted by the outcome of this appeal; it remained for the district court to address the pre-amendment inter-circuit conflict as to which of two provisions on supervisory release applied to defendant in considering his pending motion to reduce his supervisory term; in the absence of necessary overlap between the reasoning of the plurality and concurring opinions in the Supreme Court's decision in Freeman to discern a narrower opinion that constituted binding precedent, defendant qualified for relief under section 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Epps" on Justia Law