Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon, possession of a firearm during dangerous offenses, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant contended that the district court's self-defense instruction erroneously diluted the government's burden of proof. The court held that the jury instruction did not contradict any precedent of the court or the Supreme Court. Nor did it contravene any clear legal norm. Therefore, the court concluded that the instruction was not plainly erroneous and there was no need to consider the remaining elements of the plain error standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Purvis" on Justia Law

In Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, juror officer Suzanne Bailey-Jones unceremoniously removed Peter James Atherton from grand jury service after an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) reported the complaints of other members of the grand jury. The district court concluded that appellees, Bailey-Jones and the AUSA, were entitled to qualified immunity and granted their respective motions to dismiss. The court affirmed the judgment because Atherton failed to convince the court that he had a clearly established constitutional entitlement to a more comprehensive termination process when he was excluded from jury service. View "Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners, HPBA and NPGA, sought review of two recently promulgated rules that they believed expanded the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6201 et seq., to include decorative fireplaces. The court agreed with the HPBA that the DOE's interpretation of decorative fireplaces as "Direct heating equipment," a specifically enumerated class of covered products under the Act, contravened the EPCA's statutory scheme and, in turn, clear congressional intent. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Assoc. v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the closure of the Franklin Shelter, an overnight facility for homeless men in downtown Washington D.C. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the closure violated federal and D.C. antidiscrimination statutes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds because plaintiffs could have raised these claims in two prior Superior Court cases. View "Sheptock v. Fenty" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' suit against the government after the government alleged that plaintiffs failed to file adequate tax returns. The court understood plaintiffs' pro se appeal to contend that the government had waived the limitations defense by failing to raise it in its first dispositive motion. The court expressed no opinion on the government's jurisdictional argument and concluded instead that the government had not forfeited its limitations defense. The court also found plaintiffs' argument that the statute of limitations should have been tolled was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. View "Kim, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Code 2-1404.01 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a, against the City, alleging that she had suffered sexual harassment during the course of her employment with the DCFEMS. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim with prejudice because she had not filed a timely Charge with the EEOC, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C. Human Rights Act claim. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff neither pursued her rights diligently nor proved that some extraordinary circumstance prevented her from satisfying the statute of limitations. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dyson v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341, and was sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release, as well as ordered to pay restitution to his victims. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence. The court held that defendant's appeal was not barred; rehabilitation was not the only factor the district court considered in determining defendant's prison time; the court found no support for the claim that defendant's prison term was longer than a wealthy person's term would have been for a similar crime; and because the government conceded at oral argument that defendant could not be ordered to enroll in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, the court modified his sentence to reflect the fact that enrollment was voluntary. As modified, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Godoy" on Justia Law

Appellee Sue Reisinger requested access to reports made by an independent consultant to evaluate AIG's internal policies and past transactions, asserting both common law and First Amendment rights of access. The district court concluded, over the opposition of the SEC and AIG, that Reisinger had a common law right of access and ordered public disclosure of redacted copies of the reports. AIG appealed. The court held that the reports were neither judicial records nor public records. Even assuming the First Amendment right of access applied, the reports were not "aspects of court proceedings" and have no bearing on monitoring judicial conduct. Accordingly, there was no common law or First Amendment right of access to the reports and the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "SEC v. American Int'l Group" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the OCC and the Board's authority to issue cease-and-desist orders pursuant to Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C. 1829, as well as their respective conclusions that petitioner's agreement with the prosecutor triggered Section 19. Section 19 restricted who could participate in the affairs of insured depository institutions and bank and savings and loan holding companies. Because the agencies applied an improper definition of "pretrial diversion or similar program" and failed to adequately justify their positions on petitioner's expunction, the court granted petitioner's petitions for review in part, vacated the agencies' orders, and remanded for the agencies to determine whether the Agreement at issue fell within the parameters the court identified. The court denied the petition in all other respects. View "DeNaples v. Office of the Comptroller of Currency" on Justia Law

In 1986, appellee personally guaranteed a loan made by Petra to AEGIS. Appellee subsequently sued Petra in district court in late 2008, seeking a declaratory judgment that he did not have any obligations under a Guaranty Agreement. Petra counter-sued in early 2009, seeking to enforce the Guaranty Agreement. The court concluded that Petra's claim was time-barred where the limitations period began in 1987 when AEGIS declared bankruptcy and appellee was obligated to pay Petra under the Guaranty Agreement, and the limitations period expired in 1999. The court also concluded that Petra should have the opportunity to produce evidence sufficient to create a substantial question of material fact to the governing issues of the case. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Farouki v. Petra Int'l. Banking Corp., et al" on Justia Law