Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, Section 602(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)). He argued that intervening changes in law, in combination with other factors, warrant that his motion be granted.   The DC Circuit affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion for compassionate release. The government maintains that Appellant failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as to these additional grounds such that the court may not consider Appellant’s contentions on the merits. The court held that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional because Congress did not use express language to make it so. The court explained that Appellant’s change in law arguments cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, whether alone or in combination with other factors. View "USA v. Louis Wilson" on Justia Law

This case concerns how PJM, the manager of a large, multi-state electrical grid, prices the flow of electricity to utilities in times of congestion. Such congestion arises when energy is scarce in a particular location on the grid due to, for example, extreme weather conditions or a fire at a transmission station. That scarcity causes the dispatch of more expensive generation and can trigger the Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor (“Penalty Factor”) when such alternative generation is unavailable. The Penalty Factor imposes an upper bound on the costs PJM will incur to control a transmission constraint, and it is designed to send transparent price signals to the market and incentivize investment that will resolve the congestion and prevent it from recurring. Petitioner Citadel FNGE Ltd. is an energy trading firm. It challenged the Commission’s suspension of the Penalty Factor as arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s decision that the Penalty Factor, as applied to the unique Northern Neck circumstances, could not work as designed because it increased costs without incentivizing supply or demand responses. Because application of the Penalty Factor increased costs for consumers without a commensurate benefit, the Commission reasonably found that its application in this context was unjust and unreasonable. View "Citadel FNGE Ltd. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellant and her d her family sued Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most terrorism-related claims against Sudan. Appellants argued that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional and therefore, that their claims against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a constitutional right to access the courts. The court wrote that Appellants challenged Congress’ restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. Moreover, Appellants’ claims are in tension with the government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse the claims of its citizens. However, the court modified the district court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan" on Justia Law

The federal government funds certain expenses incurred by presidential candidates at specific times during their primary campaigns. Jill Stein, who ran for President in 2016, contends that a temporal limit on this funding unconstitutionally discriminates against minor-party candidates. Stein also contests an administrative ruling that she forfeited the right to document certain costs of winding down her campaign, which could have offset a repayment obligation that she owed the government.   The DC Circuit denied her petition. The court explained that FEC regulations required her to reassert the issue in her written submission for administrative review. Further, Stein argued that the Commission should be estopped from claiming forfeiture because its audit report stated that the winding down costs “estimated” for the period between September 2018 and July 2019 “will be compared to actual winding down costs and will be adjusted accordingly.” The court wrote that it does not read this statement to relieve Stein of her duty to address winding down costs in her request for administrative review, which was filed near the end of that period. The court explained that it recognizes that Stein could not predict the exact amount of future winding down costs. But she could have done much more to alert the FEC that she expected those costs to exceed the estimates in the audit report—and to do so by a substantial amount. View "Jill Stein v. FEC" on Justia Law

Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, review of orders issued by the Environmental Protection Agency after a “public hearing” lies exclusively in the courts of appeals. 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). For orders issued without a public hearing, review lies in the district courts. Petitioners in this case challenged EPA orders regulating the use of a pesticide named dicamba.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the 2020 Registrations unconditionally approve the dicamba products, whereas the previous orders had granted conditional registrations. And EPA needed to make additional findings to issue an unconditional registration, including that use of the products would “not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” For those reasons, the 2020 and 2022 Registrations, unlike the actions in Costle and National Family Farm Coalition, did not follow a “public hearing” within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). View "American Soybean Association v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

The United States and the French Republic agreed to establish a fund for compensating non-French nationals who were deported from France to concentration camps during the Holocaust. The Department of State, which administers the fund, denied compensation to the plaintiffs here. They sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.   The DC Circuit concluded that the district courts in Schieber and Faktor correctly concluded that the plaintiffs there failed to state a claim. The district courts in Gutrejman, Schneider, and Bywalski erred in dismissing the claims at issue on jurisdictional grounds, but the court affirmed on the alternative ground that these plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The court explained that the plaintiffs object that Article 8 governs only disputes between the United States and France, as opposed to disputes between individual claimants and the State Department. But by its terms, Article 8 applies to “any dispute arising out of the interpretation or performance of this Agreement. View "Jenny Schieber v. USA" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the issue is whether overlapping statutes that affect more than two million acres of federally owned forest land in southwestern Oregon are reconcilable and, therefore, operative. The appeals arise from three sets of cases filed by an association of fifteen Oregon counties and various trade associations and timber companies. Two of the cases challenge Proclamation 9564, through which the President expanded the boundaries of the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument. Two others challenged resource management plans that the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a bureau within the United States Department of the Interior (Interior), developed to govern the use of the forest land. The final case seeks an order compelling the Interior Secretary to offer a certain amount of the forest’s timber for sale each year. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs in all five cases.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that the O & C Act provides the Secretary three layers of discretion: first, discretion to decide how land should be classified, which includes the discretion to classify land as timberland or not; second, discretion to decide how to balance the Act’s multiple objectives, and third, discretion to decide how to carry out the mandate that the land classified as timberland be managed “for permanent forest production.” Further, the court held that the 2016 RMPs are well within the Secretary’s discretion under the O & C Act and are consistent with the Secretary’s other statutory obligations. View "American Forest Resource Council v. USA" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard Program codified in the Clean Air Act requires all transportation fuel sold in the United States to contain an annually determined volume of renewable fuel. As part of its role in implementing the Program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues renewable fuel standards announcing the annual quantity of renewables that must be sold into United States commerce. EPA failed to meet its deadlines to publish the 2020-2022 renewable fuel standards. As part of its mitigation, EPA issued a rule extending the corresponding compliance reporting deadlines. The leeway provided in that Extension Rule ensures that obligated parties will not have to file compliance reports for 2020-2022 until after EPA has published the standards for those years. In these consolidated petitions, a group of fuel refineries (the Refineries) challenged the Extension Rule. They argue that the Rule violates the Clean Air Act, or is at least arbitrary and capricious, insofar as it provides obligated parties less than 13 months’ compliance lead time and compliance intervals shorter than 12 months.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court explained that when EPA fails to timely issue renewable fuel standards, the Clean Air Act does not bind the agency to provide obligated parties a minimum of 13 months’ compliance lead time, nor does it require compliance intervals of at least 12 months. The court likewise rejected the Refineries’ claim that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting the compliance schedule in the Rule. Rather, the agency reasonably exercised its authority to establish the compliance timeframe for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program under the circumstances. View "Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellees worked as non-emergency medical transportation drivers. In July 2017, they brought a putative class action and Fair Labor Standards Act collective action against Medical Transportation Management, Inc. (“MTM”). Their complaint alleged that MTM is their employer and had failed to pay them and its other drivers their full wages as required by both federal and District of Columbia law. MTM appealed the district court’s certification of an “issue class” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) and its denial of MTM’s motion to decertify plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act collective action.   The DC Circuit remanded the district court’s certification of the issue class because the court failed to ensure that it satisfies the class-action criteria specified in Rules 23(a) and (b). The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s separate decision on the Fair Labor Standards Act collective action. The court explained that because the resolution of the action will bind absent class members, basic principles of due process require that they be notified that their individual claims are being resolved and that they may opt out of the action if they so choose. So if the district court certifies the issue class under Rule 23(b)(3) on remand, it must direct “the best notice that is practicable” as part of any certification order. View "Isaac Harris v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc." on Justia Law

This petition challenges several interrelated orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) that permitted the creation of a new energy transmission service across several states in the Southeast region of the United States, entitled the Southeast Energy Exchange Market (“SEEM”). FERC adopted the first order (“Deadlock Order”) by operation of law when its four Commissioners deadlocked 2-2 on whether the overall proposal was “just and reasonable” and otherwise met the requirements of the Federal Power Act (“FPA” or “Act”), and related FERC regulations. In a later order by majority vote, the Commission accepted tariff revisions by transmission service providers within SEEM to enable the new transmission service. Petitioners challenged these orders throughout the initial proceedings, on rehearing at the Commission, and now in this petition.   The DC Circuit granted the petition in part, denied the petition in part, and remanded it to the Commission for further proceedings. The court explained that since SEEM “began operations in November 2022” and only provides energy transactions for non-firm service, it follows that vacatur would not be disruptive, and the parties offer no arguments to the contrary in their briefing. Accordingly, vacatur of the Tariff Order is appropriate. The court wrote that the Commission’s orders finding Petitioners’ rehearing requests of the Deadlock Order untimely are vacated, and the petition—as it relates to review of the Deadlock Order and the associated orders accepting amendments to the SEEM Proposal—is remanded without vacatur of the related orders. View "Advanced Energy United, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law