Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While providing security for a U.S. State Department convoy in the Gaza Strip, Mark Parsons was killed by a roadside bomb. Parsons's estate and his family sued the Palestinian Authority under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. 2333, alleging that the Authority had provided material support for and conspired with the terrorist or terrorists who detonated the bomb. The court held that, although it agreed with the district court that the family's conspiracy claim theories were too speculative to survive summary judgment, the court believed a reasonable juror could conclude that Authority employees provided material support to the bomber. Accordingly, the court affirmed with respect to the conspiracy claim but reversed as to material support.

This case arose when the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), division of the Department of Homeland Security, changed local work assignments for its inspectors without first negotiating with their union. CBP petitioned for review of the Federal Labor Relations Authority's (Authority) affirmance of an arbitrator's conclusion that this was an unfair labor practice. The court denied the petition for review and rejected CBP's argument that it had no duty to bargain over the disputed changes in work assignment policies because the changes were "covered by" the Revised National Inspectional Assignment Policy (RNIAP) and that, in the alternative, that CBP had no duty to bargain over the changes it made pursuant to the RNIAP because they did not alter inspectors' "conditions" of employment. Accordingly, the court deferred to the Authority's reasonable determination that the RNIAP was not a collective bargaining agreement subject to the "covered by" doctrine and the Authority's reasonable conclusion that the cases CBP cited did not govern the dispute here. Therefore, the court held that the Authority adequately explained its conclusion.

Petitioner was incarcerated when he petitioned the court for writs of mandamus to prevent the district court from transferring two of his civil cases to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The court had recently held that the filing fee provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 38 U.S.C. 1915(b), applied to a prisoner who filed a petition for writ of mandamus in connection with an underlying civil case. At issue was whether the PLRA's three-strikes provision, section 1915(g), likewise applied to a mandamus petition in an underlying civil case. The court held that petitioner's mandamus petitions were subject to the PLRA's three-strikes provision and consequently, petitioner was barred from proceeding in forma pauperis where the underlying actions, which the district court ordered to be transferred to Maryland, were civil in nature. Therefore, the court denied the motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered petitioner to pay the full fee in each case before the court would consider his petitions.

Petitioner petitioned the court on July 14, 2010, for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant him in forma pauperis status and permit him to file his civil rights damages suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. At issue was whether a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim based on Heck v. Humphrey counted as a "strike" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 38 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that it did and joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in holding that in the absence of proof "that the conviction or sentence ha[d] been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus," the petitioner failed to state a claim for purposes of section 1915(g). Accordingly, because petitioner, while incarcerated, had filed at least three civil actions that were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, and he had neither offered any valid reason as to why he should not be required to pay in full the appellate filing fee before the court would consider his mandamus petition, nor claimed he was in imminent danger within the meaning of the exception under section 1915(g) of the PLRA's three-strikes provision, the court denied petitioner's motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and ordered him to pay the full fee before the court would consider his petition.

Bally's Park Place, Inc. (Bally's) petitioned for review of a decision and order of the NLRB which found that Bally's committed unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1),(3), when it discharged an employee because of his support for the United Auto Workers. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's view of the disputed events and that the court would not disturb the NLRB's conclusion that the employee's termination was unlawful. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement.

This case concerned petitioner's handling of accounts belonging to seven Wachovia Securities, Inc. (Wachovia) customers. Petitioner, a registered representative associated with Wachovia, a member of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), petitioned for review of an order of the SEC sustaining a disciplinary action against her by the NYSE. The court denied the petition for review and affirmed the SEC order because the court concluded that the SEC's decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

Judicial Watch filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), asking the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to disclose records of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that showed how much money they gave to political campaigns. At issue was whether the requested documents were "agency records" for purposes of FOIA. The court held that the FHFA's unexercised right to use and dispose of the records requested in this case was not enough to subject those records to FOIA where the FHFA had not read or relied on the records in any way. The court held that because it held that FHFA did not control the records, it need not reach FHFA's alternative argument.

Appellant challenged a judgment of the district court affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of his application for disability benefits. Appellant contended that the ALJ did not properly apply the "treating physician rule" in evaluating his application and further argued that new evidence had come to light that warranted a remand to the agency. The court held that the ALJ did not, as required by the treating physician rule, explain his reasons for rejecting the opinion of appellant's treating physician. The court also held that a letter from the Board of Medicine validating appellant's complaint, as well as a judicial determination that a physician's report contained a false representation, qualified as new evidence within the meaning of 42. U.S.C. 405(g). Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Spectrum Health -- Kent Community Campus (Spectrum) withdrew recognition from its employees' union after receiving a petition indicating that the union no longer had majority support. The NLRB found this action unlawful because it occurred within the first three years of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, during which time a union enjoyed a conclusive presumption of majority support. The court held that the NLRB properly interpreted the term of the collective bargaining agreement and that Spectrum waived its objections to the bargaining order by failing to raise them in a timely manner before the NLRB. Accordingly, the court denied Spectrum's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement.

Appellants challenged a plan to manage the elk and bison populations in the National Elk Refuge and Grand Teton National Park pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act (Improvement Act), 15 U.S.C. 668dd-668ee. At issue was whether the plan's failure to commit to a deadline for ending supplemental feeding was arbitrary and capricious under the Improvement Act. Also at issue was whether the plan unlawfully gave the Wyoming Fish and Game Department a veto over whether supplemental feeding would end. The court held that the record amply demonstrated that the agencies collected the relevant data, identified the dangers posed by supplemental feeding, and adopted a plan to mitigate those dangers. They also determined that the many objectives of the Improvement Act, including conservation, would be best met without implementation of a fixed deadline for stopping supplemental feeding was not arbitrary or capricious. The court took the Secretary at his word that Wyoming had no veto over the Secretary's duty to end a practice that was concededly at odds with the long-term health of the elk and bison in the refuge. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.