Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to one count of identity theft as part of a plea agreement where defendant had treated hundreds of patients while falsely representing that he was a licensed physician. In determining defendant's sentence, the district court increased his sentence under U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1) because some of his patients were children with serious mental health conditions. On appeal, defendant disputed the increase in his offense level, contending that section 3A1.1(b)(1)'s 2-level adjustment for vulnerable victims applied only to victims of defendant's offense of conviction, who in this case would include only those victims who suffered financial loss. The court disagreed and held that the adjustment applied not only to victims of the offense of conviction, but also to victims of defendant's relevant conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The United States detained Nazul Gul and Adel Hamad for several years at the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and during that time, each filed with the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to any hearing on the merits of their petitions, the United States transferred the detainees to the custody of foreign sovereigns and did not then rescind their designation as "enemy combatants." Gul and Hamad wanted to continue litigating their habeas petitions but the district court dismissed their petitions as moot because they were no longer held by the United States. Gul and Hamad subsequently appealed, arguing among other things, that their petitions were not moot because they continued to be burdened by the collateral consequences of their prior detention and continuing designation. The court held that, having determined that Gul and Hamad identified no injury sufficient to bring their cases within the court's jurisdiction under Article III, the court affirmed the order of the district court.

Oceana, Inc. brought this suit against the National Marine Fisheries Service challenging as unlawful the methodology it used to track bycatch in the fisheries of the Northeastern coast of the United States. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that the methodology satisfied applicable law and properly entered summary judgment for the Fisheries Service. The court held that because the Fisheries Service had merely described but had not, as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, required, "established" a "standardized reporting methodology" to assess bycatch in the Northeastern fisheries, the court reversed the judgment and instructed the district court to vacate the ruling adopting the methodology and to remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.

Appellee alleged that six U.S. Postal Inspectors wrongly caused him to be criminally prosecuted in retaliation for his public criticism of the United States Postal Service (USPS) and its personnel. The Postal Inspectors appealed the district court's qualified immunity, on appellee's claim of retaliatory inducement to prosecution in violation of his right to free speech under the First Amendment. Insofar as the appeal challenged the district court's determination that there were genuine issues of material fact, the court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Insofar as the district court declined to find the Postal Inspectors protected by qualified immunity based on "arguable probable cause," the court affirmed. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for trial on the merits.

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession of a firearm during a trafficking offense. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's finding that he consented to the search of his car, and the district court's refusal at sentencing to consider all of the proffered facts concerning his relevant history and characteristics. The court held that defendant failed to show that the district court's credibility finding with regard to the police officers' testimony that he gave consent was based on "exceedingly improbable testimony" and thus clearly erroneous. A review of the record indicated that the inconsistencies between the suppression testimony and one of the officers' prior statements were not so glaring as to render incredible the officers' testimony that defendant consented to the search of his car. Nor did apparent violations of departmental protocols unrelated to defendant's consent so undermined the officers' credibility that it was clear error for the district court to credit their testimony regarding defendant's consent. A remand for resentencing, however, was required because the district court must take into account all relevant facts related to a defendant's "history and characteristics," where the sentencing record reflected that the district court appeared to have "misunderstood its sentencing authority" to consider certain proffered facts, even though the government agreed defendant properly requested the court to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction with regard to defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress and vacate the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

After injuring her back in a car accident, plaintiff filed for and received long-term disability benefits from the insurance plan sponsored by her employer. Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 42 U.S. C. 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., against her employer and the administrators and underwriters of her employer-sponsored long-term benefit disability insurance policy after the claims administrator of that plan determined that she no longer qualified for benefits. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no violation of law. The court held that because defendants acted reasonably, the court concluded that defendants' termination of plaintiff's benefits complied with federal law. The court found none of plaintiff's procedural claims persuasive and held that the district court did not err when it held that defendants did not violate plaintiff's right to a full and fair review of her adverse eligibility determination. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court violated local rule 7(h) where plaintiff failed to make this argument before the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs, retired U.S. Airways pilots, each received pensions from the U.S. Airways pension plan (the plan) and each opted to receive his pension in a single lump sum rather than as an annuity. Plaintiffs subsequently sued U.S. Airways claiming that the plan owed them interest for its 45-day delay. The court reversed the judgment of the district court with respect to plaintiffs' actuarial equivalence claim where the amount of plaintiffs' lump sum benefit was equal to the actuarial present value of the annuity payments plaintiffs would have received under the plan's default payment option. Even so, U.S. Airway's 45-day delay in paying plaintiffs was unrelated to the calculation of plaintiffs' benefits and therefore, not reasonable under existing IRS regulations. The court remanded to the district court to calculate the appropriate amounts due to plaintiffs and affirmed the judgment of the district court that plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees.

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and two individuals petitioned for review of a decision by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to screen airline passengers by using advanced imaging technology (AIT) instead of magnetometers. EPIC argued that the use of AIT violated various federal statutes and the Fourth Amendment and, in any event, should have been the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking before being adopted. The court granted the petition for review with respect to claims that the TSA had not justified its failure to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking before announcing it would use AIT scanners for primary screening at airports. None of the exceptions urged by the TSA justified its failure to give notice of and receive comment upon such a rule, which was legislative and not merely interpretive, procedural, or a general statement of policy. The court denied the petition with respect to EPIC's statutory arguments and their claim under the Fourth Amendment, except their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., which the court dismissed for lack of standing. Finally, due to the obvious need for the TSA to continue its airport security operations without interruption, the court remanded the rule to the TSA but did not vacate it.

Plaintiffs, Americans taken hostage in Iran in November 1979, and their families brought a new complaint, five years after the dismissal of their suit, in the district court relying on Congress's 2008 amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891. At issue was whether the 2008 amendments to the FSIA reneged on the promise of the United States in the Algiers Accords to bar plaintiffs' suit. The court held that because the ambiguity in section 1083(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a), regarding whether plaintiffs, whose case was not pending at the time of enactment, could file under the new terrorism cause of action, the court was required again to conclude that Congress had not abrogated the Algiers Accords. The court also rejected plaintiffs' alternative argument that the reenactment and partially revised jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA abrogated the Algiers Accord where these provisions were not meaningfully different than they were when presented to the court in plaintiffs' original suit. Accordingly, the order of the district court was affirmed.

Petitioner appealed a final decision and order of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) requiring him to bear the costs of his own defense in an underlying administrative proceeding in which he prevailed. In the underlying lawsuit, petitioner and his law firm were retained by Hamilton Bank (Bank) to conduct an independent investigation of fraud at the Bank and the Comptroller's Enforcement and Compliance Division subsequently alleged that petitioner had breached his fiduciary duties to the Bank. The court held that the Comptroller was not "substantially justified" in bringing the underlying administrative proceeding against petitioner and therefore, petitioner was entitled to attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504. Accordingly, the court remanded for the Comptroller to calculate the amount of those fees.