Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a contract between the Indonesian government and the Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), a United States corporation, and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries where Exxon operated a large natural gas extraction and processing facility in the Aceh province. Plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers. Eleven villagers filed a complaint in 2001 alleging that Exxon's security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and various common law torts. Four villagers alleged that in 2007, Exxon committed various common law torts. All plaintiffs alleged that Exxon took actions both in the United States and at its facility in the Aceh province that resulted in their injuries. Plaintiffs challenged the subsequent dismissal of their claims and Exxon filed a cross-appeal, inter alia, raising corporate immunity for the first time. The court concluded that aiding and abetting liability was well established under the ATS. The court further concluded that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supported corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations. The court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPA claims in view of recent precedent of the court. The court concluded, however, that Exxon's objections to justiciability were unpersuasive and that the district court erred in ruling that plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to bring their non-federal tort claims and in the choice of law determination. The court finally concluded that Exxon's challenge to the diversity of parties in the complaint at issue was to be resolved initially by the district court. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' TVPA claims, reversed the dismissal of the ATS claims at issue, along with plaintiffs' non-federal tort claims, and remanded the cases to the district court.

This case stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement executed in 1998 by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the American Federation of Government Employees, Council of Prison Locals No. 33. The Bureau petitioned for a review of a decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority holding that the Bureau had a duty to bargain over its implementation of a "mission critical" standard for staffing federal correctional institutions. The court held that because the Authority unreasonably concluded the mission critical standard was not "covered by" the collective bargaining agreement between the Bureau and its employees' union, the court granted the petition and vacated the Authority's decision.

The citizens of Kinston, North Carolina, approved a referendum switching city elections from partisan to nonpartisan. Because Kinston was located in a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 42 U.S.C. 1973(c)(a), the city council had no authority to implement the referendum until precleared by federal authorities, and preclearance had not occurred. A candidate for public office claiming a state-law entitlement to run under the suspended nonpartisan system, together with other plaintiffs, filed suit seeking to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing section 5 against Kinston. Count one of plaintiffs' complaint contended that section 5, as reauthorized in 2006, exceeded Congress' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Count two contended that amendments made to section 5 in 2006 erected a facially unconstitutional racial-preference scheme. The court held that one of the plaintiffs, the candidate for public office, had both standing and a cause of action to pursue count one and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of that claim. The court held that, because plaintiffs' standing with respect to count two raised complex questions unaddressed by the district court and the parties' briefs, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of that claim and remanded for further consideration.

Appellant filed suit in the district court when the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application for disability benefits. At issue was whether the district court had authority to permit additional evidence to be taken on remand where the SSA asked the district court to remand the case so the agency could supplement the record and the district court obliged. The court held that because the district court misunderstood the full reach of its remedial authority, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the district court to consider the issue anew.

Appellant sued her former employer alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on appellant's interference claim and entered a judgment as a matter of law on her retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the interference claim where appellant's allegations "focus[ed] on precisely the sorts of de minimis, intangible, and unmeasurable aspects of a job that the regulations specifically exclude[d]" pursuant to Montgomery v. Maryland. The court also agreed with the district court that no reasonable jury, relying on the evidence presented at trial, could conclude that the 2005 realignment proximately caused appellant's termination in 2008. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim.

Appellant charged his former employer, the Small Business Administration (SBA), with discrimination and the parties subsequently entered a settlement agreement where one of the terms of the settlement agreement required the SBA to provide neutral references when potential employers inquired about appellant. Appellant claimed that the SBA materially breached that requirement and sued the SBA in district court. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the SBA, concluding that there was no material breach of the settlement agreement. The court held that, although the SBA employee's comment at issue could have constituted a breach because he did not simply refer the potential employer to Human Resources, the court agreed with the district court that the breach was not material because the employee's description of appellant was positive, or at worst, neutral. Accordingly, summary judgment for the SBA was affirmed.

Defendant appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to five counts of filing a false tax return. At issue was whether the district court erred in applying the Guidelines by increasing his base offense level and by denying him credit for acceptance of responsibility. Also at issue was whether the district court erred by varying upward from the Guidelines range pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court held that the district court did not err by increasing defendant's base offense level because he significantly disrupted a governmental function. The court held, however, that it was unable to determine whether in denying his credit for acceptance of responsibility and varying upward from the Guidelines range, the district court relied solely upon constitutionally permissible factors. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded his case for resentencing.

After illegally collecting a three percent excise tax, the IRS created a refund procedure for taxpayers to recoup their money. Appellants argued that the procedure was unlawful. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction and whether appellants stated a valid claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that it had federal question jurisdiction and neither the Anti Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), nor the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), provided a limitation on the court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Therefore, because appellants had no other adequate remedy at law, the district court should consider the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., claim on remand.

This case stemmed from a challenge to the EPA's regulation of ozone under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409(a). At issue was an EPA "guidance document" addressing obligations of regions still in nonattainment of a now-revoked ozone air quality standard. The court held that the Guidance qualified as a legislative rule that the EPA was required to issue through notice and comment rulemaking and that one of its features, the so-called attainment alternative, violated the Clean Air Act's plain language. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Guidance.

This case stemmed from petitioner's rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for its Michigan oil pipeline where petitioner agreed with two of its three shippers to restrict rate increases for a three-year moratorium period. At issue was the initial rate petitioner must use to calculate its new annual ceiling levels. Petitioner argued that after the end of the moratorium period, its ceiling levels should be calculated as if its maximum rates had been set under FERC's indexing methodology all along. In contrast, FERC would simply pick up the rates where the settlement agreement left off, using the last rate under the agreement as the initial rate for the period after the agreement. The court held that neither the agreement nor the relevant regulations clearly laid out how to determine the rates petitioner could charge now that the three-year period had past. Therefore, finding both the agreement and the regulations ambiguous, the court deferred to the reasonable views of FERC and denied petitioner's petition for review.