Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a petition with the court, purporting to challenge the NRC's decision to reinstate the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) construction permits for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. Petitioner stated that it was not challenging the NRC order, but rather, petitioner asserted that its petitions for review challenged only a compilation of "Response Sheets" filed by individual Commissioners in December 2008 and January 2009. Petitioner contended that this compilation of Commissioners' views resulted in a final order on January 27, 2009. Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342(4), the court had jurisdiction to review only "final orders" of the NRC. The court held that the petitions at issue did not seek review of final NRC orders and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed. View "Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League v. NRC, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal focused on two Decisions and Orders issued by the Board. Allied petitioned for review to challenge certain aspects of the Board's actions and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. The principal issue on appeal was whether the relationship between Allied and the Union - which had extended over two decades - was governed by section 8(f), 29 U.S.C. 158(f), or section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court held that substantial evidence in the record, reasoned decisionmaking, and established case law supported the Board's finding that Allied and the Union were parties to a 9(a) bargaining relationship. Therefore, the Board's decision was eminently reasonable. The court found no merit in Allied's petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Allied Mechanical Services, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Chapour Bakhtiar's family members, asserted that Iran was responsible for Bakhtiar's murder and filed suit in U.S. District Court against Iran and an Iranian government agency. Plaintiffs brought claims under California tort law. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1604, foreign nations were generally immune from suit in U.S. courts, but plaintiffs were able to maintain their case under the Act's exception for state-sponsored terrorism under section 1605(a)(7). At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs could obtain punitive damages in their state-law tort suit against Iran without complying with the congressionally specified procedures for seeking punitive damages against a foreign nation. The court concluded that, for plaintiffs with suits pending against foreign nations as of January 28, 2008, Congress provided three options for obtaining the benefits of section 1605A and seeking punitive damages: a motion to convert the action, a refiling of the action or the filing of a related action. Because plaintiffs did not pursue any of these statutorily provided options, plaintiffs could not obtain punitive damages from Iran. The court considered all of plaintiffs' arguments and found them without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bakhtiar, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for charges related to a premeditated murder while armed. At issue was whether defendant's statements, which the government conceded the police obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, were nonetheless admissible for purposes of impeachment should he testify at trial. The court held that the government met its burden in demonstrating that defendant's statements were voluntary where, although it was possible that the police could subtly overcome the will of a 33-year-old man even if he was provided water, had no apparent mental impairment, and generally answered questions intelligently, nothing in this case undermined the record evidence of voluntariness. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Murdock" on Justia Law

Braintree, and other municipally owned utilities in southeastern Massachusetts, petitioned for review of four orders of the Commission. The orders denied petitioners' claim that they were being unjustly charged in order to ensure system reliability on Cape Code. The dispute was first addressed in a FERC-approved settlement agreement that reserved certain litigation rights to the petitioners. Because the Commission reasonably resolved the claims that were reserved, and reasonably construed the settlement agreement to foreclose petitioners' additional claims, the court affirmed the Commission's orders and denied the petitions for review. View "Braintree Electric Light Dept., et al. v. FERC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Government, seeking to disclaim their legal entitlement to Medicare Part A benefits for hospitalization costs. Plaintiffs wanted to disclaim their legal entitlement to such benefits because their private insurers limited coverage for patients who were entitled to Medicare Part A benefits. Plaintiffs preferred to receive coverage from their private insurers rather than from the Government. The district court granted summary judgment for the Government because there was no statutory authority for those who were over 65 or older and receiving Social Security benefits to disclaim their legal entitlement to Medicare Part A benefits. The court understood plaintiffs' frustration with their insurance coverage. But based on the law, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hall, et al. v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

The Department petitioned for review of a decision of the Authority that adopted a new standard to determine when a negotiated contract provision was an "appropriate arrangement" under 5 U.S.C. 7106(b)(3) and an agency head's disapproval thereof would therefore be set aside. Because the Department failed to move for reconsideration objecting to the Authority's use of the abrogation standard to review the agency head's disapproval of the negotiated agreement, the court dismissed the Department's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 7123(c). View "Dept. of Treasury v. FLRA" on Justia Law

This case arose when Conrail sold its Harsimus Embankment in Jersey City to developers. The City, together with others interested in the historic and environmental value of the Embankment, sued Conrail alleging that the sale was unlawful because Conrail failed to obtain authority from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the property. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the City enjoyed Article III standing where Conrail's refusal to invoke STB proceedings injured the City by depriving it of the benefits of those proceedings and the City's injury could be redressed by a district court ruling that the Embankment qualified as "railroad line" that Conrail could not abandon without STB approval. View "City of Jersey City, et al. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff contended that his supervisor at the Department of State gave him negative performance reviews in retaliation for his opposition to discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court held that because plaintiff failed to offer evidence from which a jury could conclude that he opposed a practice that could "reasonably be thought" to violate Title VII, he failed to satisfy the first element of his cause of action. Plaintiff also failed to establish the third element of a Title VII retaliation claim: that the employer took a materially adverse action against the employee "because" the employee opposed a protected practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. View "McGrath v. Clinton" on Justia Law

This case was before the court on appeal and cross-appeal from the judgment of the district court ordering attorney Leonard Suchanek to pay his former client, Kevin So, an amount representing a portion of the legal fees Suchanek collected from So, plus interest. Suchanek began representing So and So's agent, Lucy Yan Lu, in July 2006 despite the fact that he was already representing Land Base, a California entity that had entered into an agreement with So that was signed by Lu, to make investments on So's behalf. The court concluded that Suchanek violated Rule 1.7 by simultaneously representing So and Land Base in July and August of 2006; the district court's analysis of the second conflict period, between August 2007 and January 2008, was also sound; and the district court's order requiring Suchanek to deposit the trust funds in the registry was proper in light of Suchanek's history of moving So's money, without authorization, into other bank accounts - sometimes spending it rather than returning it to So or to So's trust account. Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings as they pertained to Suchanek's appeal. In regard to So's contention that the district court erred in ordering disgorgement of only some of the fees Suchanek collected, the court concluded that the district court's error in assessing the conflict between Lu and So influenced the scope of the remedy it selected. The district court should have awarded a larger sum if it had correctly found a conflict during other parts of the representation. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further review and issuance of a supplemental remedy, greater than the amount already ordered. View "So v. Suchanek" on Justia Law