Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Commissioner of the IRS appealed a decision of the Tax Court holding taxpayer was entitled to claim deductions in 2003 and 2004 for donating to the L'Enfant Trust, Inc. conservation easements on the facades of two buildings located in an historic district. At issue was whether taxpayer could take such deductions where the Commissioner argued that her contribution was not "exclusively for conservation purposes," as required by 26 U.S.C. 170(h)(1)(C), and where she failed to obtain "qualified appraisals" meeting the standards of Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii). The court held that the Tax Court did not clearly err in concluding the factual circumstances supporting taxpayer's deductions met the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements where the donated easements would prevent in perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes and where taxpayer provided the Commissioner with "qualified appraisals." Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court that taxpayer was entitled to claim the deductions at issue was affirmed.

The Commissioner of the IRS and appellees disagreed about appellees' 1999 gross income where the disagreement stemmed from appellees' sale of assets and centered primarily on the Commissioner's conclusion that appellees inflated its basis in those assets. At issue was whether the Commissioner waited too long to adjust appellees' gross income pursuant to sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2) of the Internal Tax Code. The court held that the Commissioner's regulations were validly promulgated, applied to the case, qualified for Chevron deference, and passed muster under the traditional Chevron two-step framework. Because the Tax Court concluded otherwise and failed to apply the Commissioner's interpretation of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2), the court reversed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment. The court remanded for the Tax Court to consider appellees' alternative argument made in the tax court but unaddressed there, that appellees avoided triggering the extended statute of limitations by "adequately disclos[ing] to the IRS the basis amount it applied in connection with the transaction at issue."

Since 2005, appellant, a dual citizen of Jordan and the United States, had pursued a habeas corpus petition to block his transfer to Iraq's government where the United States military had detained him in Iraq based on evidence that he participated in al Qaeda's terrorist activities there. Appellant argued that he could not be transferred to the custody of Iraqi officials because he was likely to be tortured after his transfer. At issue was whether the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ("FARR"), 8 U.S.C. 1231, which had been supplemented by the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(4), gave him a right to judicial review of conditions in the receiving country before he could be transferred. Also at issue was whether appellant was entitled under the Constitution's habeas corpus guarantee to judicial review of his likely treatment in the receiving country. The court held that the FARR Act and the REAL ID Act did not give military transferees such as appellant a right to judicial review of their likely treatment in the receiving country. The court also held that the Supreme Court had already ruled when considering appellant's case in Munaf v. Geren, that the Constitution's guarantee of habeas corpus did not encompass a guarantee to judicial review. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and in so doing, recognized that the policy arguments supporting appellant's position were not insubstantial. The court noted that Congress remained free to provide military transferees such as appellant with a right to judicial review of conditions in the receiving country before they were transferred.

Appellant alleged that he was transferred to a position of less responsibility within the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health ("District") in retaliation for his statements corroborating a claim of racial discrimination against a District official. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the District on the ground that appellant failed to show that his transfer was a materially adverse action. The court held that appellant had provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he suffered a materially adverse employment action and to conclude that the District's proffered reasons for transferring him were pretextual and that he was transferred in retalaition for supporting his direct supervisor's complaint. Accordingly, the court erred in granting summary judgment for the District and the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act ("FTEPA"), 49 U.S.C. 44729, which allowed some pilots, but not him, to take advantage of Congress's decision to raise the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 65. Plaintiff also alleged that his former employer and former union violated a state law banning age discrimination in employment by failing to place him in a position at work that would have allowed him the benefit of the new retirement age. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's state age discrimination claims. The court concluded that plaintiff did not make clear in his complaint that he was suing his former employer for its failure to demote him to a status that might help him take advantage of the new age limit in the FTEPA and his complaint never alleged that he requested a demotion, that he was qualified for such a position, or that such positions were available, all facts he would need to prove to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination for failure to demote under the state discrimination statute. Accordingly, the court declined to pass on the merits of an argument the district court had no chance to consider and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit.

This appeal concerned whether the court or the district court had jurisdiction over matters relating to a citizen petition filed pursuant to FDA regulations promulgated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("Act"), 21 U.S.C. 301, et seq. Because its citizen petition to revoke regulations permitting Bisphenol A ("BPA") to be used as a food additive had been pending since October 21, 2008, the NRDC sought what amounted to be a writ of mandamus directing the FDA to issue a final decision on its petition. The court held that exclusive jurisdiction over citizen petitions was with the district court and accordingly, dismissed the petition.

Plaintiff sued the Government Printing Office ("GPO") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., alleging race and gender discrimination when the GPO filled two positions with white men, without interviewing any candidates. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the GPO. The court concluded that the district court erred by requiring plaintiff to show not only that the GPO's nondiscriminatory reason was pretext, but also that discrimination was the actual reason plaintiff was passed over for the positions. Consequently, the court held that a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff's favor and reversed the district court's order of summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

This case involved cost-saving tools that Congress had devised for Medicare payments to cancer hospitals and specifically concerned Medicare reimbursements paid to one cancer hospital, appellant, in 2000 and 2001. The first issue on appeal related to the cancer hospitals' inpatient costs where appellant requested an increase to its target amount in 2000 and 2001 due to the high cost of certain new cancer drugs and where the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") denied that request. Appellant argued that it did not receive proper notice of the new net financial impact requirement and thus did not have a fair opportunity to satisfy the requirement at the administrative hearing. The court agreed and held that appellant did not receive timely notice of the requirement and, on remand to HHS, must be given an opportunity to satisfy it. The second issued on appeal concerned cancer hospitals' outpatient costs where appellant contended that HHS misapplied the statutory formula that provided hospitals a fraction of their reasonable costs and undercompensated appellant. The court rejected appellant's arguments and affirmed summary judgment in favor of HHS.

NMSA, a trade association representing marine terminal operators, petitioned for review of OSHA's vertical tandem lifts ("VTLs") Standard. At issue was whether OSHA failed to demonstrate that VTLs posed a significant risk of worker safety; whether two of the Standard's requirements were not technologically feasible; whether the Standard was not reasonably necessary or appropriate in light of the "safe work zone" requirement; whether OSHA's authority was limited to requiring, not prohibiting, workplace practices; and if the Standard was otherwise valid, whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("Act"), 29 U.S.C. 651-678, had made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to OSHA. The court denied NMSA's petition for review in large part, granted the petition in part, vacating and remanding only that portion of the VTL Standard providing for the inspection requirement for ship-to-shore VTLs and the total ban on platform container VTLs.

Two businesses with nearly identical names, John C. Flood, Inc. ("1996 Flood") and John C. Flood of Virginia, Inc. ("Virginia Flood"), brought suit against each other over which company had the right to use two trademarks: JOHN C. FLOOD and its abridged form FLOOD. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 1996 Flood was the proper owner of the two trademarks and that Virginia Flood, as the licensee of the marks, was estopped from challenging 1996 Flood's ownership. The court affirmed the district court's order granting 1996 Flood's motion for partial summary judgment and held that 1996 Flood was the proper successor-in-interest to John C. Flood, Inc. ("1984 Flood"), and that Virginia Flood was barred by the doctrine of licensee estoppel from challenging 1996 Flood's ownership of those marks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment but remanded the case back to the district court for clarification regarding whether Virginia Flood's use of the mark JOHN C. FLOOD OF VIRGINIA was prohibited by the court's decision.