Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners petitioned for review of a regulation promulgated by the EPA setting performance standards for new and existing hospital/medical/infection waste incinerators ("HMIWI"). Petitioners argued that the data set EPA used to establish these standards was flawed, that the agency's pollutant-by-pollutant approach to setting target emissions levels was impermissible, and that the agency acted arbitrarily when it removed a provision exempting HMIWI from complying with the standards during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. The court held that the EPA's decision to use emissions data from the HMIWI units remaining in operation after the implementation of the 1997 standards, once it determined that the data set upon which it had relied in 1997 was flawed, was reasonable. The court held, however, that it did not have jurisdiction to review the challenges to the EPA's long-standing practice of setting emissions floors based on emissions levels achieved by the best performing unit or units for each individual pollutant, and to the agency's removal of an exemption from compliance with emissions limitations during periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction. Accordingly, the petitioned was dismissed in part and denied in part.

Bondholders of the failed Washington Mutual Bank ("WAMU") alleged that JPMorgan Chase ("Chase"), through a series of improper acts, pressured the federal government to seize WAMU and then sell to it the bank's most valuable assets, without any accompanying liabilities, for a drastically undervalued price. The bondholders asserted three Texas state law claims in Texas state court, but after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") intervened in the lawsuit, the case was removed to federal district court. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint, finding that 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) jurisdictionally barred appellants from obtaining judicial review of their claims because they had not exhausted their administrative remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). The court held that the suit fell outside the scope of the jurisdictional bar of section 1821(d)(13)(D) because the complaint neither asserted a claim under FIRREA nor constituted an action for payment from, or seeking a determination with respect to, the assets of a depository institution for which the FDIC was receiver. Consequently, the court did not reach alternative arguments and therefore, reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from the discovery in an unrelated case that the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") had paid hospitals less than they were due because it had miscalculated the disproportionate share hospital ("DSH") payment. Appellants, a group of hospitals that received DSH payments, filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board ("PRRB") seeking full payments for the fiscal years 1987-1994. At issue was whether the district court lacked jurisdiction in the matter and whether the Medicare statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(a), allowed for equitable tolling. The court held that a decision by the PRRB denying jurisdiction was a final decision subject to judicial review by the district court. The court also held that, given the factors emphasized in United States v. Brockamp did not apply to the facts presented, and without any other reasons for rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling, the court found that equitable tolling was available under 1395oo(a). The court noted that whether tolling was appropriate in this particular case, however, was a different question for the district court to answer on remand. The court also rejected appellants' alternative arguments and therefore, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant, a pimp who prostituted underage girls, was convicted of various federal sexual abuse crimes and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Defendant appealed the denial of his request to unseal the records of two material witnesses, claiming that the First Amendment guaranteed a right of access to material witness proceedings. The court assumed arguendo that the qualified First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings extended to material witness proceedings. The court held that, even so, under the First Amendment access precedents, the public was not entitled to the records here, which contained "substantial amounts of material of an especially personal and private nature relating to the medical, educational, and mental health progress" of the victims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the orders of the district court.

This appeal stemmed from a short sale transaction that raised UTA Management's outside basis in the UTAM partnership. On October 13, 2006, more than six years after the filing of UTAM's 1999 partnership return, but less than six years from the filing of the individual partner's 1999 individual return, the IRS mailed a notice of final partnershp administrative adjustment to DDM Management, UTAM's "tax matters" partner, pertaining to UTAM's 1999 tax year. At issue was whether the mailing of a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment by the IRS tolled an individual partner's limitation period under I.R.C. 6501. The court held that the six-year limitations period applied with regard to the individual partner's 1999 return and that the assessment period, suspended pursuant to I.R.C. 6229(d), was the partner's open assessment period under section 6501. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court on the statute of limitations issue was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant sued the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") and the District of Columbia (collectively, "District"), requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to keep the District from preventing appellant's chalking demonstration in front of the White House pursuant to a Defacement Statute, D.C. Code 22-3312.01. Appellant claimed that the Defacement Statute was unconstitutional on its face, unconstitutional as applied to his efforts to chalk the street in front of the White House, and violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. The court held that the Defacement Statute was content neutral, and substantially justified by the District's esthetic interest in combating the very problem appellant's proposed chalking entailed, the defacement of public property. Because the District did not curtail appellant's means of expression altogether, and allowed him to protest in front of the White House in other ways, the Defacement Statute was not unconstitutionally applied. The court also held that appellant's overbreadth challenge failed because he could not show any "realistic danger" that the Defacement Statute actually chilled constitutionally protected speech. The court further rejected appellant's RFRA claims in light of Henderson v. Kennedy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing the case.

Plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens captured and subsequently held in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, by the United States military sued defendants, seeking damages and declaratory relief as the result of their treatment while in U.S. custody. Each plaintiff asserted two Bivens claims, namely, defendants tortured him in violation of his due process right under the Fifth Amendment and defendants' conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the ATS based on defendants' alleged infliction of "prolonged arbitrary detention," "torture," and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their constitutional claims and ATS claims. The court held that defendants were protected from plaintiffs' constitutional claims by qualified immunity. The court also held that, even if defendants were not shielded by qualified immunity and plaintiffs could claim the protections of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the court would decline to sanction a Bivens cause of action because special factors counseled against doing so. The court further held that plaintiffs' claim under the ATS alleged a violation of the law of nations, not of the ATS, and therefore, did not violate a statute of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(B). The court finally held that because plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable cause of action, they have no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiff ("appellant"), a former official of the District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), was fired after five years on the job purportedly for poor performance. Appellant sued the OIG and alleged that defendants conspired to deter his testimony in a subordinate's employment discrimination trial and ultimately fired him in retaliation for his refusal to help sabotage his fellow employee. At issue was whether the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of defendants on appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) conspiracy claim, a related claim under 42 U.S.C. 1986 for failure to prevent the conspiracy, and his First Amendment retaliation claim. After a trial on appellant's Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., retaliation claim, the jury found in favor of defendants. The court vacated the dismissal of appellant's sections 1985(2) and 1986 conspiracy claims because the district court erroneously required an invidious, class-based motive for the alleged conspiracy and because the district court concluded, without support, that Title VII was the exclusive remedy for this type of retaliation. Accordingly, the court vacated these claims and remanded for further proceedings and affirmed in all other respects.

The Commissioner of the IRS appealed a decision of the Tax Court holding taxpayer was entitled to claim deductions in 2003 and 2004 for donating to the L'Enfant Trust, Inc. conservation easements on the facades of two buildings located in an historic district. At issue was whether taxpayer could take such deductions where the Commissioner argued that her contribution was not "exclusively for conservation purposes," as required by 26 U.S.C. 170(h)(1)(C), and where she failed to obtain "qualified appraisals" meeting the standards of Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii). The court held that the Tax Court did not clearly err in concluding the factual circumstances supporting taxpayer's deductions met the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements where the donated easements would prevent in perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes and where taxpayer provided the Commissioner with "qualified appraisals." Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court that taxpayer was entitled to claim the deductions at issue was affirmed.

The Commissioner of the IRS and appellees disagreed about appellees' 1999 gross income where the disagreement stemmed from appellees' sale of assets and centered primarily on the Commissioner's conclusion that appellees inflated its basis in those assets. At issue was whether the Commissioner waited too long to adjust appellees' gross income pursuant to sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2) of the Internal Tax Code. The court held that the Commissioner's regulations were validly promulgated, applied to the case, qualified for Chevron deference, and passed muster under the traditional Chevron two-step framework. Because the Tax Court concluded otherwise and failed to apply the Commissioner's interpretation of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2), the court reversed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment. The court remanded for the Tax Court to consider appellees' alternative argument made in the tax court but unaddressed there, that appellees avoided triggering the extended statute of limitations by "adequately disclos[ing] to the IRS the basis amount it applied in connection with the transaction at issue."