Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a shareholder and former chief executive officer of Tama Broadcasting, Inc. ("Tama"), filed an application for review with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") challenging the FCC Media Bureau's approval of the assignment applications made by Tama's receiver after a judicial foreclosure action was brought against Tama. At issue was whether appellant had standing under Article III to file an application for review. The court held that appellant lacked standing where his injuries could not be traced to the FCC's approval of the license assignments and where the alleged injuries were caused by Tama's default on its loan payments, the foreclosure action against Tama, and the New York court's appointment of a receiver.

Plaintiffs, two fair housing organizations in New Orleans and five African-American homeowners, claimed that a program to help homeowners rebuild after hurricanes Katrina and Rita employed a grant formula that violated the anti-discriminatory provisions of the Fair Housing Act. At issue was whether the district court properly denied plaintiffs' first motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and injunction to enjoin defendants' actions related to the Louisiana Recovery Authority's Road Home Homeowner Assistance program. Also at issue was whether the district court properly granted plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction where the district court denied the initial request for a TRO and injunction. The court held that the district court properly denied the initially requested TRO and injunction where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also held that the district court's grant of plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction was improper where the second motion also failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

Appellant appealed a denial of his habeas corpus petition after he was captured by Northern Alliance forces in December 2001 and transferred to American custody in January of the following year and detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that statements appellant made to American interrogators in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay were voluntary and relying on those statements despite the government's failure to provide sufficient evidence corroborating their content. The court held that there was no need to consider these issues where the record contained sufficient facts, which were neither affected by the alleged coercion nor by the lack of corroboration, to support the district court's conclusion that appellant was "part of" al Qaeda at the time of his capture.

Plaintiffs petitioned for review of a National Labor Relations Board ("Board") finding where a union employee, with a traveler permit from plaintiffs, reported to his employer that a piece of machinery was not properly deployed. At issue was whether a union violated section 8(b)(1)(A)of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") if a union disciplined a union member who complied with an employer's safety rules. The court granted the petition for review and held that it could not find any support in sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act for the Board's decision where the board rejected the administrative law judge's effort to find a concerted activity out of the facts of the case, where the Board relied on its broad per se policy, and where it would be improper to remand to the Board to consider an alternative ground that it had explicitly declined to do.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit for damages against defendant, a former United States Marshal, claiming that they were unconstitutionally strip searched by Deputy U.S. Marshals under defendant's direction after plaintiffs were arrested during a demonstration in September 2002. At issue was whether it was clearly established in September 2002 that strip searching an arrestee before placing him in a detention facility without individualized reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. The court held that it need not consider whether defendant had individual suspicion as to each of the plaintiffs where there was no clearly established constitutional prohibition in 2002 of strip searching arrestees without individualized, reasonable suspicion and therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment.

Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that he was not part of al Qaeda and therefore was not properly detained at the United States naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba under the Authorization of Use of Military Force ("AUMF"). At issue was whether a "command structure" test should be used to determine whether an individual was part of al Qaeda. The court held that the facts found by the district court and on the record demonstrated that defendant was more likely than not part of al Qaeda where the determination of whether an individual was part of al Qaeda must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the United States Agency for International Development ("USAID"), alleged claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At issue was whether the district court failed to evaluate plaintiff's evidence in its totality and failed to assume the truth of the facts and draw inferences in her favor. The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted regarding plaintiff's June 2004 non-promotion plan where plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of disputed fact regarding USAID's explanation for her non-promotion was pre-textual and from which a reasonable jury could find unlawful gender discrimination. The court also held that summary judgment was properly granted for the remainder of plaintiff's claims where the district court properly ruled and considered the remaining evidence.

Plaintiff, a Cuban corporation, sued the United States Department of Treasury when plaintiff's renewal of its trademark, which had previously been permitted as an exception under the Trading with the Enemy Act ("Act"), was barred by the 1998 law that modified the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and subsequently barred renewals of certain trademarks. At issue was whether plaintiffs had invoked the presumption against retroactivity and the 1998 law should be interpreted to bar only new trademark registrations, not renewals of previously registered trademarks, and if the 1998 law did bar the renewal of previously registered trademarks, then would it violate the substantive due process doctrine. The court held that the presumption against retroactivity did not apply to plaintiff where plaintiff did not possess a vested right to renewal of its trademark. The court also held that the 1998 law did not violate the substantive due process doctrine where it was rationally related to the legitimate government goals of isolating Cuba's Communist government and hastening a transition to democracy in Cuba.

Plaintiffs challenged a decision of the Surface Transportation Board ("STB") alleging that the purchase by the Massachusetts Department of Transportation ("MassDOT") of railroad track and other rail assets from CSX Transportation reserved a permanent, exclusive freight easement over the track. At issue was whether MassDOT's purchase was a "railroad line" that required STB authorization or exemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 ("ICCTA"). The court upheld STB's decision where STB's decision reflects a reasonable interpretation of the ICCTA and the term "railroad line" as used therein.

Petitioner, CSI Aviation Services, Inc. ("CSI"), petitioned for review of an order where the Department of Transportation ("DOT") ordered CSI to cease and desist from acting as a broker of air-charter services for the federal government. At issue was whether DOT properly concluded that the air charter brokers that operate under a General Services Administration ("GSA") contract engaged in indirect air transportation and so required certification from DOT despite the statutory provision that required certification only for those who provide air transportation as a common carrier. The court held that the petition for review was granted where the court could not conclude that the agency's cease and desist order was anything other than arbitrary and capricious when DOT failed to explain its reading of the statute. The court also held that the proper course of action was to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.