Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) implementation of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standards Program. The program requires the petroleum industry to introduce increasing volumes of renewable fuel into the nation's transportation fuel supply each year. However, Congress overestimated the speed at which domestic production of renewable fuel could expand, leading the EPA to reduce the statutorily required renewable fuel requirements annually.The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by two sets of petitioners. The first set, the Biofuel Petitioners, produce cellulosic biofuels and argue that the EPA's standards are set too low. The second set, the Refiner Petitioners, are fossil fuel refiners and retailers subject to the volume requirements and contend that the standards are too high.The court held that the EPA complied with the law and reasonably exercised its discretion in setting the renewable fuel requirements for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022. The court therefore denied the petitions for review. The court found that the EPA had the statutory authority to impose a supplemental volume for 2022 to make up for volume that should have been satisfied in 2016. The court also concluded that the EPA's new formula for calculating the annual percentage standards was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria Esparraguera, a career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (SES), who was removed from her position by the Department of the Army. Esparraguera claimed that her constitutional due process rights were violated by the Army. The district court dismissed her suit, stating that she failed to show that the removal implicated a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.Previously, the district court had dismissed Esparraguera’s due process claim, finding that she had no constitutionally protected property interest in her SES status. The court did not address whether the process Esparraguera received (or the absence thereof) complied with the Due Process Clause. Esparraguera appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Esparraguera had a protected property interest in her SES status. The court reasoned that the statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to her case gave Esparraguera a property interest in her SES status. The court also concluded that the government was required to provide her, at a minimum, some form of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before removing her from the SES. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Esparraguera v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

In September 2021, the House Select Committee investigating the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol issued a subpoena to Stephen Bannon, a former advisor to President Donald Trump, to testify and provide documents. Bannon did not comply with the subpoena, leading to his conviction for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192, which criminalizes willfully failing to respond to a congressional subpoena. Bannon appealed his conviction, arguing that "willfully" should be interpreted to require bad faith and that his noncompliance was justified because his lawyer advised him not to respond to the subpoena.The District Court had previously rejected Bannon's argument, holding that "willfully" in Section 192 only requires that the defendant deliberately and intentionally refused to comply with a congressional subpoena. The court also dismissed Bannon's claim that his noncompliance was authorized by government officials and that the Select Committee's subpoena was invalid. Bannon was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to four months' incarceration for each count to run concurrently, with a $6,500 fine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Bannon's interpretation of "willfully" was incorrect and that his "advice of counsel" defense was not a valid defense under Section 192. The court also rejected Bannon's arguments that his conduct was authorized by government officials and that the Select Committee's subpoena was invalid. The court concluded that Bannon's refusal to comply with the subpoena was a deliberate and intentional violation of the contempt of Congress statute, and his conviction was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Bannon" on Justia Law

Dr. Jennifer Seed, a former employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), filed a lawsuit against the EPA and the United States, alleging age discrimination. Seed claimed that she was involuntarily demoted to a junior position as older managers were replaced with younger employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA, concluding that Seed had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim of age discrimination.The district court's decision was based on its finding that Seed had not provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent that would entitle her to a trial, nor had she provided indirect evidence that would give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court also found that Seed had not shown that she was treated less favorably than younger employees after her reassignment or that her treatment was based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed Seed's appeal, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of her reassignment claims because she lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. The court found that Seed had not demonstrated that a favorable court decision would likely redress her claimed injuries. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the grant of summary judgment and to dismiss the reassignment claim for lack of standing. View "Seed v. EPA" on Justia Law

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers planned to dredge San Juan Harbor to facilitate the movement of large ships. The Corps published an Environmental Assessment, concluding that the project would not significantly impact the environment. The National Marine Fisheries Service also determined that the project was not likely to adversely affect certain threatened and endangered species, including seven types of coral. Three environmental groups sued the agencies, asserting that they had failed to adequately consider the project’s environmental toll. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant agencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Corps and the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out their responsibilities to evaluate environmental concerns. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the Corps failed to adequately consider the breadth of the project’s impacts, erred in analyzing how the project would affect minority and low-income communities, and failed to use the best available science in assessing the project’s detrimental effect on corals. The court also found that the Corps's decision not to translate all materials into Spanish and not to extend the comment period for the Environmental Assessment when Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck Puerto Rico was not arbitrary or capricious. View "El Puente v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alon Farhy, a U.S. permanent resident who failed to report his ownership of Belizean corporations to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), violating Section 6038(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Farhy acknowledged his violation and the resulting penalties of nearly $500,000 under Section 6038(b). However, he disputed the IRS's method of collecting the penalties, arguing that the IRS lacked statutory authority to assess and administratively collect Section 6038(b) penalties. Instead, he contended that the government must sue him in federal district court to collect what he owes under Section 6038(b).The Tax Court agreed with Farhy, concluding that the Code does not empower the IRS to assess and administratively collect Section 6038(b) penalties. The court held that the IRS could only collect Section 6038(b) penalties through a civil suit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, not through the administrative collection methods that it had used for over forty years.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court disagreed with the Tax Court's interpretation. It held that the text, structure, and function of Section 6038 demonstrate that Congress authorized the assessment of penalties imposed under subsection (b). The court reversed the Tax Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter a decision in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. View "Farhy v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

A small business, Concert Investor LLC, applied for a Shuttered Venue Operators Grant from the Small Business Administration (SBA) after its revenue fell 94% due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The company, which helps mount concert tours for performing artists, applied for a grant of nearly $5 million, or 44.6% of its 2019 revenue. Concert Investor asserted eligibility for a Grant as a “live performing arts organization operator,” claiming that it “produces” live music concerts. However, the SBA denied the application, stating that Concert Investor did not meet the principal business activity standard for the entity type under which it had applied.Concert Investor appealed the SBA's decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act. The SBA rescinded its denial during the lawsuit, but later issued a final denial, stating that Concert Investor did not create, perform, or present live performances, nor did it organize or host live concerts. The district court denied Concert Investor’s motion for summary judgment and granted the SBA’s, agreeing with the SBA that substantial evidence showed that Concert Investor was not a producer.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo and vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the SBA. The court found that the SBA's definition of a "producer" was too narrow and inconsistent with the statutory language. The court also found that the SBA failed to consider relevant record evidence supporting Concert Investor’s eligibility for a Grant. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Concert Investor, LLC v. Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

The case revolves around James Hutchings, Jr., who was convicted of conspiracy to unlawfully traffic and transport firearms. The conviction was based on evidence obtained from Hutchings's iPhone, which was seized during the arrest of suspected firearms and narcotics trafficker Linwood Thorne. The phone was found in Thorne's apartment, and a separate warrant was obtained to search the phone based on its association with Thorne. It was only after the search began that the agents realized the phone belonged to Hutchings.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where Hutchings moved to suppress the evidence from his phone, arguing that the search was unsupported by the warrant because the probable cause finding depended on the phone's association with Thorne. The district court denied Hutchings's motion, stating that the phone was indeed associated with Thorne, regardless of its ownership. Hutchings was found guilty and sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Hutchings argued that the officers reviewing the report were required to discontinue their search after seeing the notation on its first page that the phone was "James's iPhone." The court disagreed, stating that the validity of the warrant did not depend on who owned the phones, but on their association with Thorne. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, stating that the label "James's iPhone" did not contradict the facts that supported the warrant application. View "USA v. Hutchings" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) certification of the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project, a series of expanded pipelines, compression facilities, and meter stations in the Southeastern United States. Environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and Healthy Gulf, challenged the certification, alleging that FERC improperly applied the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the Alabama Municipal Distributors Group, a municipal customer of Southern Natural Gas Company, argued that a new lease from Southern to Tennessee Gas may mean more profits for Southern, so Alabama Municipal should receive a portion of those profits.Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC had unanimously issued a Certificate Order to Tennessee Gas and Southern, denying all objections. FERC reaffirmed its determination on rehearing. The Sierra Club and Alabama Municipal timely petitioned for review.The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld FERC's certification of the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project. The court found that FERC's certification was reasonable and reasonably explained, as was its decision to deny a windfall to a pipeline owner's existing customers. The court rejected the Sierra Club's arguments that FERC failed to consider the full scope of environmental effects of the project, erred by failing to account for the environmental impact of two ongoing authorizations to export gas, and was required to use the "social cost of carbon" tool. The court also rejected Alabama Municipal's argument that it should receive a future credit on the existing rates it pays. The court concluded that all of FERC's decisions in this case were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions for review. View "Alabama Municipal Distributors Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2020, seven victims of a 2016 terrorist bombing in Afghanistan obtained multi-million-dollar default judgments against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, the victims, suing as John Doe plaintiffs, sought to attach assets held by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the “World Bank”). The plaintiffs argued that these assets belonged to the Afghan government or the central bank of Afghanistan, and that the Taliban had become the de facto Afghan government and the Afghan central bank its “instrumentality.”The district court granted the World Bank’s and Fund’s motions to quash the plaintiffs' writs of execution. The court found the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) inapplicable in this case. It expressed doubt that the funds the plaintiffs sought to recover belonged to Afghanistan, and it could not recognize an ownership claim by the Taliban to Afghan assets since the United States had not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The plaintiffs failed to show that the assets at issue fell under the TRIA, and so they had not shown that an exception to the Fund and the World Bank’s immunity applied. On that basis, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction in the case and granted the motions to quash.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the TRIA does not abrogate the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court concluded that the TRIA applies only to foreign states and international organizations once jurisdiction has been established over them. Because the TRIA leaves the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity intact, the district court could not entertain the plaintiffs' garnishment action. View "John Does 1-7 v. Taliban" on Justia Law