Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking certain information in Cultural Property Advisory Committee reports from the State Department ("State") related to import restrictions imposed on cultural artifacts from China, Italy, and Cyprus under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the State where the State withheld certain documents pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 5. Also at issue was whether the State made an adequate search in response to the FOIA requests. The court held that the State's invocation of Exemptions 1 and 5 was proper, as was part of its withholding under Exemption 3. However, the court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims as to one document withheld under Exemption 3. Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment as to the sufficiency of the State's search for responsive emails and as to its withholding of parts of a document under 19 U.S.C. 2605(i)(1) and remanded for further clarification about backups and about the seeming gaps in the State's discussion of archived materials.

Defendant appealed jury convictions of four drug and firearm offenses when defendant was found with heroin worth about $30,000, two loaded guns, and $27, 730 in cash. At issue was whether the admission of the state court clerk's letters violated defendant's rights to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause; whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agent's testimony about the meaning of slang was improperly admitted as lay testimony; whether the FBI agent's overview testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay; whether the judge should have instructed the jury to disregard a police officer's reference to the "two large bundles" near the gun; and whether the judge's finding that defendant had a prior drug conviction and reliance on that prior conviction to double defendant's mandatory minimum sentence violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right. The court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment right was violated where the clerk's letters were testimonial but he was not subject to cross-examination. The court also held that the FBI agent's interpretation of slang was admissible only as expert testimony but that the error was harmless. The court further held that the FBI agent's objected-to testimony at the beginning of trial was not based on hearsay; the district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard the reference to the "bundles;" and the judge's finding about defendant's prior drug conviction did not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Plaintiff, an American citizen who resides in Canada, along with the Second Amendment Foundation, challenged 18 U.S.C. 922 and related regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives which made it impossible for a person who lived outside the United States lawfully to purchase a firearm in the United States. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's suit for lack of standing where plaintiff attempted to purchase a firearm in the United States while living in Canada. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's suit for lack of standing where plaintiff's injury was present and continuing when plaintiff intended to return regularly to the United States to visit friends and relatives and when plaintiff intended to purchase firearms for the purposes of sporting and self defense and to store the firearms with his relatives in Ohio.

Plaintiffs sued defendants alleging that defendants submitted fraudulent petitions to the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC") and thereby induced the ITC to impose unwarranted duties on plaintiffs' products. At issue was whether defendants' petitions to the ITC established personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia when none of the defendants was located or incorporated in the District of Columbia. Also at issue was whether jurisdiction was proper where defendants had conspired with a trade association that was located within the District of Columbia. The court held that plaintiffs' allegation that defendants conspired with a trade association was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. The court then certified the following question to the D.C. Court of Appeals, "Under District of Columbia law, does a petition sent to a federal government agency in the District provide a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over the petitioner when the plaintiff has alleged that the petition fraudulently induced unwarranted government action against the plaintiff?"

Plaintiff, acting pro se, sued defendant for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act when defendant declined to hire her. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint where plaintiff failed to appear from a single motions hearing when she believed that motions she had previously filed for a change of venue and for the magistrate judge's recusal remained pending and operated to suspend all proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint where the district court's dismissal was inconsistent with precedent when it had not previously found plaintiff disobedient or dilatory, did not attempt lesser sanctions, and failed to explain why the case-ending sanctions of dismissal was necessary.

Appellant, a shareholder and former chief executive officer of Tama Broadcasting, Inc. ("Tama"), filed an application for review with the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") challenging the FCC Media Bureau's approval of the assignment applications made by Tama's receiver after a judicial foreclosure action was brought against Tama. At issue was whether appellant had standing under Article III to file an application for review. The court held that appellant lacked standing where his injuries could not be traced to the FCC's approval of the license assignments and where the alleged injuries were caused by Tama's default on its loan payments, the foreclosure action against Tama, and the New York court's appointment of a receiver.

Plaintiffs, two fair housing organizations in New Orleans and five African-American homeowners, claimed that a program to help homeowners rebuild after hurricanes Katrina and Rita employed a grant formula that violated the anti-discriminatory provisions of the Fair Housing Act. At issue was whether the district court properly denied plaintiffs' first motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and injunction to enjoin defendants' actions related to the Louisiana Recovery Authority's Road Home Homeowner Assistance program. Also at issue was whether the district court properly granted plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction where the district court denied the initial request for a TRO and injunction. The court held that the district court properly denied the initially requested TRO and injunction where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also held that the district court's grant of plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction was improper where the second motion also failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

Appellant appealed a denial of his habeas corpus petition after he was captured by Northern Alliance forces in December 2001 and transferred to American custody in January of the following year and detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that statements appellant made to American interrogators in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay were voluntary and relying on those statements despite the government's failure to provide sufficient evidence corroborating their content. The court held that there was no need to consider these issues where the record contained sufficient facts, which were neither affected by the alleged coercion nor by the lack of corroboration, to support the district court's conclusion that appellant was "part of" al Qaeda at the time of his capture.

Plaintiffs petitioned for review of a National Labor Relations Board ("Board") finding where a union employee, with a traveler permit from plaintiffs, reported to his employer that a piece of machinery was not properly deployed. At issue was whether a union violated section 8(b)(1)(A)of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act") if a union disciplined a union member who complied with an employer's safety rules. The court granted the petition for review and held that it could not find any support in sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act for the Board's decision where the board rejected the administrative law judge's effort to find a concerted activity out of the facts of the case, where the Board relied on its broad per se policy, and where it would be improper to remand to the Board to consider an alternative ground that it had explicitly declined to do.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit for damages against defendant, a former United States Marshal, claiming that they were unconstitutionally strip searched by Deputy U.S. Marshals under defendant's direction after plaintiffs were arrested during a demonstration in September 2002. At issue was whether it was clearly established in September 2002 that strip searching an arrestee before placing him in a detention facility without individualized reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. The court held that it need not consider whether defendant had individual suspicion as to each of the plaintiffs where there was no clearly established constitutional prohibition in 2002 of strip searching arrestees without individualized, reasonable suspicion and therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment.