Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An individual who had lived in the United States since 1993 became the subject of removal proceedings after overstaying his visa. During these proceedings, he sought various forms of relief, while the government opposed his applications by presenting evidence and testimony linking him to high-level terrorists. The individual subsequently submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for his file. The FBI located a substantial volume of potentially responsive records but withheld most of them, citing law enforcement concerns. The requester then filed suit to compel disclosure.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied the FBI’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice, requiring updated information on whether enforcement proceedings were still pending or reasonably anticipated, and more detail regarding the segregability of non-exempt information. After the FBI submitted updated public and ex parte declarations confirming that investigations remained ongoing and providing further explanation about segregability, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI. The court found that the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing or anticipated enforcement proceedings, and that no meaningful non-exempt information was reasonably segregable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the FBI met its burden under FOIA Exemption 7(A) by showing the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with pending or reasonably anticipated enforcement proceedings. The court also affirmed the district court’s finding that no reasonably segregable non-exempt information existed. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Farahi v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation manufactures Entresto, a drug used to treat chronic heart failure. MSN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of Entresto by submitting an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). MSN’s application excluded certain methods of use protected by Novartis’s patents and claimed that the generic drug contained the same active ingredients as Entresto. The FDA approved MSN’s application, prompting Novartis to challenge the approval, arguing that the generic’s labeling and composition were unlawfully different from Entresto.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Novartis’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. Novartis argued that the FDA’s approval of MSN’s ANDA and denial of Novartis’s citizen petitions were arbitrary and capricious, particularly regarding the omission of patented dosing regimens and indications from the generic’s label, and the determination that the generic contained the same active ingredients as Entresto. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA, finding that the agency’s actions were reasonable and consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements. Novartis appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the FDA reasonably concluded the generic drug’s labeling changes were permissible to avoid patent infringement and did not render the generic less safe or effective for non-patented uses. The court also found that the FDA’s determination that the generic and Entresto shared the same active ingredients was supported by scientific evidence and regulatory guidance. The court applied de novo review to legal questions and deferred to the FDA’s scientific expertise, ultimately upholding the agency’s approval of MSN’s ANDA. View "Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Two individuals brought a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that a telecommunications company, through a controlled shell entity, fraudulently obtained nearly $113 million in bidding credits during a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum license auction. The core claim was that the shell entity misrepresented its independence and concealed its relationship with the larger company, which, if disclosed, would have disqualified it from receiving small business credits. The relators asserted that the shell entity never operated as a genuine business and had an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses to the larger company after a regulatory waiting period.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia twice dismissed the case, first without prejudice and then with prejudice, finding that the public-disclosure bar of the False Claims Act applied. The court concluded that the alleged fraud had already been publicly disclosed through the shell entity’s FCC filings, and that the relators’ complaint did not materially add to the information already available.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that, even assuming the prior FCC filings constituted public disclosures of substantially the same fraud, the relators qualified as “original sources” because their allegations materially added to the publicly disclosed information. Specifically, the relators provided new evidence that the shell entity never functioned as an independent business and plausibly alleged an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses, both of which were not revealed in the public filings. The court found that these additions were significant enough to potentially influence the government’s decision to pursue the case. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. U.S. Cellular Corp." on Justia Law

Several electricity generators challenged a change in how they are compensated for producing reactive power, a component of electricity necessary for grid stability but not directly consumed by end users. For many years, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) provided generators with cost-based compensation for reactive power, in addition to market-based payments for real power. In 2022, MISO amended its tariff to eliminate separate compensation for reactive power, meaning neither transmission owners nor independent generators would receive payment for producing it within a standard range. This change was approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and given immediate effect, despite objections from generators who argued they had made investments and entered contracts in reliance on the prior compensation structure.FERC approved MISO’s tariff amendment and denied requests for rehearing, concluding that the comparability standard justified the change and that generators’ reliance interests were either unsupported or outweighed by other considerations. FERC reasoned that generators should not have expected compensation for reactive power to continue indefinitely, especially since prior orders had made such compensation contingent on similar treatment for transmission owners. Generators petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC failed to adequately consider their short-term financial reliance on the previous compensation scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately consider the generators’ short-term reliance interests before allowing the tariff change to take immediate effect. The court did not address the substantive validity of the tariff amendment itself but found that FERC’s explanation was insufficient regarding the abrupt elimination of compensation. The court granted the petitions for review, set aside FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Capital Power Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerns a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission in 2024 to address concerns about demurrage and detention charges in maritime shipping. These charges are imposed by ocean carriers and marine terminal operators on shippers, truckers, and other entities for delays in the movement or return of shipping containers. The rule sought to clarify which parties could be billed for these charges, limiting invoices to those in a contractual relationship with the billing party—typically shippers or consignees. However, the rule categorically excluded motor carriers from being billed, even when they had a direct contract with the ocean carrier.Prior to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Federal Maritime Commission promulgated the rule and responded to public comments. Initially, the Commission suggested that motor carriers in contractual privity could be billed, but later issued a correction stating that motor carriers could not be billed under any circumstances, regardless of contractual relationship. The World Shipping Council, representing ocean carriers, petitioned for review, arguing that the rule was arbitrary and capricious, among other challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Commission’s rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the Commission failed to reasonably explain its exclusion of motor carriers from the set of billable parties, despite its stated rationale of limiting billing to those in contractual privity. The court granted the petition for review, severed and set aside the portion of the rule (46 C.F.R. § 541.4) that confined billing to shippers or consignees, and left the remainder of the rule intact. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

A Swiss healthcare company entered into a contract with the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to modernize and operate a medical clinic. After the relationship deteriorated, with Equatorial Guinea refusing to allow the company to run the clinic, the company initiated arbitration in Switzerland and was awarded damages. The parties settled the first arbitration, but the company later sought further damages in a second arbitration. Equatorial Guinea challenged the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, arguing that the contract’s dispute-resolution clause required the company to first seek relief in Equatoguinean courts before pursuing international arbitration. The arbitral panel found the clause ambiguous but ultimately concluded that exhaustion of local remedies was not required and awarded the company over $9 million.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the company’s petition to confirm the arbitral award. The court found it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception. On the merits, the court deferred to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, and confirmed the award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but disagreed with its deferential approach to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. The appellate court held that, in this context, the question of whether exhaustion of local remedies was required is a substantive arbitrability issue for courts, not arbitrators, to decide. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the proper interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. View "Marseille-Kliniken AG v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea" on Justia Law

NFEnergía LLC operates a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facility in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which was constructed and operated without prior authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). After a series of hurricanes severely damaged Puerto Rico’s electrical grid, NFEnergía sought to expand its operations by building a new pipeline to supply emergency generators operated by the Army Corps of Engineers. FERC asserted jurisdiction over the facility and instructed NFEnergía to apply for the necessary authorization but declined to require the facility to cease operations. When NFEnergía applied for authorization to build the new pipeline, FERC stated it would not take action to prevent construction and operation pending its review, citing the urgent need to stabilize Puerto Rico’s grid and the involvement of multiple federal agencies.Previously, FERC had issued orders asserting jurisdiction over the import facility and requiring NFEnergía to seek authorization, but allowed continued operation due to the emergency circumstances. After NFEnergía applied for authorization for the new pipeline, FERC issued further orders clarifying that it would not prevent immediate construction and operation, and that both the facility and pipeline applications would be reviewed together. FERC denied rehearing and continued processing the applications in a consolidated proceeding. Environmental organizations petitioned for review of these orders, arguing that FERC’s actions amounted to de facto authorization without proper statutory or environmental review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC’s orders reflected an unreviewable exercise of enforcement discretion, rather than a substantive authorization of the pipeline’s construction and operation. The court found that the Natural Gas Act does not provide guidelines that would rebut the presumption against judicial review of agency non-enforcement decisions. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "El Puente de Williamsburg, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

A brewing and bottling company in Puerto Rico sought to expand its operations and required a continuous, 24/7 work schedule. However, its existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union representing its employees limited work to five days and forty hours per week, generally excluding weekends. During negotiations for a successor CBA, the employer attempted to impose a six-day work schedule, contrary to the active CBA, and later placed the union president on unpaid leave after he exceeded his annual paid union leave hours. The union president had not requested additional unpaid leave, and the employer had not previously enforced this provision in a similar situation. The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employer committed three unfair labor practices: retaliating against the union president for protected activities, unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of bargaining by placing him on unpaid leave without a request, and implementing its final offer on work schedules without reaching a good-faith impasse. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The employer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, while the NLRB sought enforcement of its order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and not reversible error. The court denied the employer’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The main holdings were that the employer’s actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by anti-union animus, that the employer unlawfully changed a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that it improperly implemented its final offer without a good-faith impasse or an overall breakdown in negotiations. View "Compania Cervecera de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

An employee of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), represented by her union, was the subject of two union grievances: one alleging improper performance evaluations and another alleging bullying by her supervisor. While these grievances were pending, the employee also filed a separate lawsuit in federal district court, asserting claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, based on some of the same underlying events.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to WMATA, holding that the settlement agreement reached between WMATA and the union in the grievance process barred the employee’s Title VII lawsuit. The district court interpreted the settlement as an unambiguous release of all claims related to the grievances, including those raised in the federal lawsuit, and therefore did not address the merits of the Title VII claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the settlement agreement resolved only the union’s contractual grievance claims under the collective bargaining agreement and did not extend to the employee’s independent statutory claims under Title VII. The court emphasized that the agreement’s language was limited to the union grievances and did not reference the pending Title VII lawsuit or purport to waive those claims. The court also noted that any waiver of Title VII rights would require clear and unmistakable language, which was absent here. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. WMATA" on Justia Law