Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A brewing and bottling company in Puerto Rico sought to expand its operations and required a continuous, 24/7 work schedule. However, its existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union representing its employees limited work to five days and forty hours per week, generally excluding weekends. During negotiations for a successor CBA, the employer attempted to impose a six-day work schedule, contrary to the active CBA, and later placed the union president on unpaid leave after he exceeded his annual paid union leave hours. The union president had not requested additional unpaid leave, and the employer had not previously enforced this provision in a similar situation. The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employer committed three unfair labor practices: retaliating against the union president for protected activities, unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of bargaining by placing him on unpaid leave without a request, and implementing its final offer on work schedules without reaching a good-faith impasse. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. The employer then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, while the NLRB sought enforcement of its order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and not reversible error. The court denied the employer’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The main holdings were that the employer’s actions constituted adverse employment actions motivated by anti-union animus, that the employer unlawfully changed a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that it improperly implemented its final offer without a good-faith impasse or an overall breakdown in negotiations. View "Compania Cervecera de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

An employee of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), represented by her union, was the subject of two union grievances: one alleging improper performance evaluations and another alleging bullying by her supervisor. While these grievances were pending, the employee also filed a separate lawsuit in federal district court, asserting claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, based on some of the same underlying events.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to WMATA, holding that the settlement agreement reached between WMATA and the union in the grievance process barred the employee’s Title VII lawsuit. The district court interpreted the settlement as an unambiguous release of all claims related to the grievances, including those raised in the federal lawsuit, and therefore did not address the merits of the Title VII claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the settlement agreement resolved only the union’s contractual grievance claims under the collective bargaining agreement and did not extend to the employee’s independent statutory claims under Title VII. The court emphasized that the agreement’s language was limited to the union grievances and did not reference the pending Title VII lawsuit or purport to waive those claims. The court also noted that any waiver of Title VII rights would require clear and unmistakable language, which was absent here. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. WMATA" on Justia Law

A coalition of trade associations, whose members operate stationary sources of air pollution and hold Title V permits under the Clean Air Act, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2023 rescission of a longstanding affirmative defense. This defense had protected permit holders from liability for exceeding emission limits during emergency events, provided certain conditions were met. The EPA rescinded the defense, arguing it was unlawful because it encroached on the judiciary’s authority to impose civil penalties and rendered emission standards non-continuous, allegedly violating the Clean Air Act.The SSM Litigation Group petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The EPA and environmental intervenors contested the group’s standing, but the court found that SSM had associational standing, as its members were directly regulated and injured by the rescission. SSM’s standing was supported by the administrative record and further confirmed by declarations submitted in its reply brief, which the court accepted.On the merits, the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act’s standard, which mirrors the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious review. The court held that EPA’s rescission was based entirely on erroneous legal grounds. First, the court found that the affirmative defense was a complete defense to liability, not a limitation on judicial remedies, and thus did not encroach on the judiciary’s authority. Second, the court determined that the defense did not render emission limitations non-continuous, as it did not suspend the underlying standards. The court concluded that EPA’s rescission was not reasonably explained and not in accordance with law, granted the petition, and reversed the rescission. View "SSM Litigation Group v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded $16 billion in grants to five nonprofit organizations to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as part of a larger $27 billion congressional appropriation under the Inflation Reduction Act. The grants were structured through agreements between the nonprofits and EPA, with Citibank acting as a financial agent to hold and disburse the funds. After concerns arose regarding conflicts of interest, lack of oversight, and last-minute amendments to the grant agreements, EPA terminated the grants in early 2025. Citibank, following an FBI recommendation, froze the accounts associated with the grants. The nonprofits sued, seeking to prevent the termination and to restore access to the funds.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, ordering EPA and Citibank to continue funding the grants. The district court found it had jurisdiction, concluding the plaintiffs’ claims were not essentially contractual and thus did not need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The court determined the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional, regulatory, and arbitrary and capricious claims, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored the injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ regulatory and arbitrary and capricious claims were essentially contractual, meaning jurisdiction lay exclusively in the Court of Federal Claims, not the district court. The court also held that the constitutional claim was meritless. The equities and public interest, the appellate court concluded, favored the government’s need for oversight and management of public funds. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Ngozi Pole, who served as office manager for Senator Edward Kennedy from 1998 to 2007, was responsible for overseeing the office budget and handling staff bonuses. Between 2003 and 2007, Pole awarded himself substantial, unauthorized bonuses without approval from the Senator or his chief of staff. The scheme was discovered in late 2006 when Pole sought a departure bonus, which he also awarded himself without authorization. After an internal inquiry, the matter was referred to the FBI, leading to Pole’s indictment on five counts of wire fraud and one count of theft of government property.Following a three-week trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the jury found Pole guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to 20 months in prison and ordered restitution of $75,042.37, representing the total unauthorized bonuses minus a small recovered amount. On his initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider Pole’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and vacated the restitution order for lack of factual findings. On remand, the district court rejected the ineffective assistance claim and reinstated the restitution order after making the necessary findings.On renewed appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Pole failed to show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the limited impact of the alleged errors. The court also held that, under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, restitution could include all losses from the fraudulent scheme, not just those tied to the specific counts of conviction, and found the restitution amount supported by the evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pole" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the United States Department of the Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region. Environmental organizations argued that the Department failed to adequately assess the risks to vulnerable coastal communities, did not properly consider the endangered Rice’s whale in its environmental sensitivity analysis, overlooked potential conflicts with other ocean uses, and did not sufficiently balance the program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs. The Department, in coordination with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, had developed the program through a multi-year process involving public comment and environmental review.After the Department finalized the program, the environmental groups and the American Petroleum Institute (API) each petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. API later withdrew its petition but remained as an intervenor. The environmental petitioners sought to have the program remanded for further consideration, arguing violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Department and API contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the environmental petitioners had associational standing to pursue their claims. On the merits, the court found that the Department of the Interior had satisfied OCSLA’s requirements by reasonably evaluating environmental justice concerns, the selection of representative species for environmental sensitivity analysis, and potential conflicts with other uses of the Gulf. The court concluded that the Department’s decision-making process was reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, leaving the 2024–2029 leasing program in effect. View "Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Aaron Thorpe and a co-defendant were arrested and charged with multiple offenses related to an armed kidnapping in the District of Columbia. The government offered both defendants a joint plea deal, but the co-defendant rejected it based on his counsel’s advice, causing the offer to be withdrawn. Both were subsequently convicted by a jury on ten counts, and Thorpe received a 300-month sentence. On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that only the co-defendant’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective, so Thorpe’s convictions were affirmed, while the co-defendant’s case was remanded for resentencing under the original plea offer.After the co-defendant was released, Thorpe sought postconviction relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The government opposed his motion but separately moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss all but one of Thorpe’s convictions, aiming to address the sentencing disparity. Thorpe consented to this motion. The district court denied the government’s request, reasoning that Rule 48(a) does not permit dismissal of convictions after judgment is final and that such a dismissal would infringe on the judiciary’s authority and the public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court held that Rule 48(a) does not authorize the government to dismiss criminal convictions after a final judgment has been entered and appellate review is complete. The court explained that the rule only allows dismissal of charges while a prosecution is pending, not after judgment is final. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the government’s Rule 48(a) motion. View "USA v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

Police officers in Washington, D.C., approached a car that was illegally parked and had windows tinted beyond legal limits. When the officers tapped on the window, the driver, Ronnard Williams, lowered it only slightly, making it difficult for the officers to see inside. The officers then ordered Williams to lower the windows further. After he complied, the officers saw a firearm at the feet of a backseat passenger. The officers opened the door, seized the gun, and arrested Williams and the passenger. A subsequent search revealed another gun, marijuana, and cash. Williams, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the order to lower the windows constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Williams. He was sentenced to three years and five months in prison, with credit for time served.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the police order to lower the windows during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, police may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful stop due to officer safety concerns, and that the same reasoning applies to ordering a driver to lower tinted windows. The court found that the minimal intrusion of lowering a window is outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in officer safety. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Williams’s conviction. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law