Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between the American Forest Resource Council and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over the designation of critical habitat for an endangered species of spotted owl. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service originally issued a proposed rule reducing the amount of land designated as critical habitat for the owl in the Pacific Northwest. However, after a change in presidential administrations, the Service reversed its decision and twice issued rules delaying the effective date of the proposed rule.The Council challenged the validity of the delay rules, but after the rules had expired, the district court determined the plaintiffs’ claims had become moot and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision, affirming the judgment of the district court.The court concluded that the Council’s lawsuit against the Service was moot because both delay rules had expired and had no continuing effect. The court also rejected the Council’s claim that their case fell under the exception to mootness for matters “capable of repetition yet evading review,” as they failed to provide evidence that they would be subjected to another Service delay rule in the future. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding the case to be moot. View "American Forest Resource Council v. Williams" on Justia Law

In a case involving cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the plaintiffs, former cobalt miners injured in mining accidents and their representatives, have standing to pursue damages claims, but not injunctive relief, against five American technology companies under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA).Plaintiffs argued that the technology companies participated in a venture with their cobalt suppliers by purchasing the metal through the global supply chain, which allegedly involves forced labor. The court ruled that merely purchasing an unspecified amount of cobalt through the global supply chain does not amount to "participation in a venture" within the meaning of the TVPRA, and hence, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief.The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' common law claims for unjust enrichment, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as they failed to demonstrate that the technology companies participated in a venture with anyone engaged in forced labor. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Doe v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Clark Calloway Jr., a former U.S. Marine convicted of several firearms offenses. Calloway had acquired a fully automatic AK-47, which was inoperable, from an FBI source after expressing violent intentions on social media, advocating for ISIS, and pledging to commit violence against non-Muslims. He was arrested upon possession of the firearm and was later convicted on three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and § 924.At sentencing, the district court calculated Calloway's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and found that he posed a serious risk to public safety, which justified an upward departure in his sentence. Calloway appealed this decision, arguing that the inoperability of the gun he received negated significant public endangerment, and that the upward departure was duplicative of a separate sentencing enhancement applied by the court.The Court of Appeals disagreed with Calloway's arguments. It held that the district court was correct in its findings of fact that Calloway was dangerous at the time of the offense, and that his possession of the firearm and his intent to use it for violent purposes posed a serious risk to public safety. The court also rejected Calloway's argument that the upward departure was duplicative of the sentencing enhancement, as the latter was applied due to Calloway's intent to use the firearm for another felony offense, while the former was due to the risk he posed to public safety. View "USA v. Calloway" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined a dispute over Final Amendment 53 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico. Commercial fishers challenged the amendment, which modified the allocation of red grouper between commercial and recreational sectors, for relying on inconsistent economic analyses and failing to comply with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.The commercial fishers argued that the Final Amendment 53 arbitrarily relied on an economic analysis that the Fisheries Service had previously rejected and that it lacked the required catch limits and accountability measures. They also claimed that the amendment violated National Standards 4 and 9 of the Act.The court agreed with the commercial fishers in part, affirming that the Fisheries Service had failed to adequately explain its reliance on the disputed economic analysis and that further analysis was needed to determine how this influenced the application of National Standards 4 and 9. However, it also affirmed that Final Amendment 53 complied with the Act's requirement to establish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits.As a result, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of Commerce. It remanded the case, without vacating the Final Rule implementing Final Amendment 53, so the Fisheries Service could further explain its economic methodology and the implications for National Standards 4 and 9. View "A.P. Bell Fish Company, Inc. v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

In 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit presided over a case involving an appellant, Larry Brock, who had been convicted for his participation in the January 6th riot at the United States Capitol. Brock was convicted of six crimes, including obstructing Congress’s certification of the electoral count under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The district court applied a three-level sentencing enhancement to Brock’s conviction, arguing his conduct resulted in “substantial interference with the administration of justice[.]” Brock challenged the interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2)’s elements and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.The Court of Appeals affirmed Brock’s conviction, agreeing with the district court’s interpretation of the elements of Section 1512(c)(2) and finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. However, the court concluded that the three-level sentencing enhancement for interfering with the “administration of justice” was inapplicable to interference with the legislative process of certifying electoral votes. As a result, the court vacated Brock’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing without the application of the sentencing enhancement. View "USA v. Brock" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to consider an appeal brought by BuzzFeed, Inc. and one of its journalists, Jason Leopold, against a decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The appellants sought the release of a partially redacted report on HSBC Bank's conduct under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The District Court had ruled that the report was entirely exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 8 which protects reports related to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.The Court of Appeals held that the case must be remanded to the District Court to determine whether the DOJ can demonstrate that the release of any part of the report could foreseeably harm an interest protected by Exemption 8. The Court stressed the requirement for a sequential inquiry: first, whether an exemption applies to a document; and second, whether releasing the information would foreseeably harm an interest protected by the exemption. The Court found that the District Court had not sufficiently conducted this sequential inquiry, and the DOJ had not adequately demonstrated how the release of the report would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected by Exemption 8.The Court noted that the FOIA requires agencies to release any reasonably segregable portion of a record, even if an exemption covers an entire agency record. The Court determined that the DOJ had not satisfactorily explained why the release of a redacted version of the report would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected by Exemption 8. Therefore, the Court vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the DOJ and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Leopold v. DOJ" on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision against NCRNC, LLC, which operates the Northeast Center for Rehabilitation and Brain Injury. The NLRB found Northeast guilty of several unfair labor practices, including unlawful surveillance of its employees.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition to review the NLRB's decision and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, but found one exception. The court ruled that the NLRB erred in concluding that the distribution of informational flyers by Northeast to its employees constituted unlawful surveillance. The court held that this act was an exercise of free speech protected by Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act.However, the court did find substantial evidence to uphold the NLRB's finding of unlawful surveillance based on Northeast implementing its Manager on Duty program. The program led to an increased presence of managers in the facility during a union drive, with the objective of monitoring employees and looking for "suspicious activities" to uncover which employees were "for the Union". The court deemed this behavior a significant departure from prior practice and a violation of employees' rights. View "NCRNC, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case pertains to J.G. Kern Enterprises, Inc. ("Company") and the National Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB"). After the Board certified a union to represent the Company's employees, the Company failed to engage in good faith bargaining for almost three months. When negotiations commenced, the Company refused to provide requested information about employee benefit plans. Two months after the certification year ended, the Company withdrew recognition from the Union, alleging the Union had lost its majority status.The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company. The Board found that the Company had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act by delaying bargaining, refusing to consider a Union-administered benefit plan, refusing to provide requested information, and withdrawing recognition from the Union during the extended certification year.The Company petitioned for review, arguing that the Board erred in finding an unlawful withdrawal of Union recognition based on a retroactive extension of the original certification year, and that the Board had no legal basis to order the Company to bargain with the Union for an additional six months.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the Company committed the alleged unfair labor practices. The court concluded that the Board was free to choose which legal theory to rely on in addressing the unfair labor practice charges and that the Board acted within its discretion when it ordered an extension of the certification year and required the parties to bargain to remedy the Company’s unfair labor practices. The court, therefore, denied the Company’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order. View "J.G. Kern Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to call for revisions to State Implementation Plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act because of the SIPs' inclusion of certain provisions related to emissions during startup, shutdown, and malfunction (SSM) periods. Two sets of petitioners, a group of states and a set of companies, challenged the EPA's decision. The court granted their petitions in part and denied them in part.The court ruled that EPA could not call the SIPs for including automatic exemptions and director’s discretion provisions without finding that it was necessary or appropriate for these restrictions to qualify as emission limitations under the Clean Air Act. The EPA had failed to make such a necessary or appropriate finding.As for affirmative defense provisions, the court agreed with petitioners as to certain types of affirmative defense provisions but rejected petitioners’ challenge as to other types.The court upheld EPA's call of overbroad enforcement discretion provisions on the grounds that they could be read to allow state officials to foreclose EPA enforcement actions and citizen suits.The court concluded that when EPA calls a SIP for a substantial legal inadequacy, it need only identify the deficiency and explain why it is substantial. The Act does not categorically require EPA to assess costs and benefits when calling SIPs for failure to comply with the Act’s legal requirements. View "Environ Comm FL Elec Power v. EPA" on Justia Law

Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. (Petitioner) purchased Hospital San Lucas Guayama (Hospital San Lucas) and became a successor employer. Hospital San Lucas had previously recognized five distinct bargaining units of employees represented by Unidad Laboral de Enfermeras (OS) y Empleados de la Salud (Union). However, after acquiring Hospital San Lucas, Petitioner first failed to bargain in good faith with the Union, then serially withdrew recognition from the Union as the collective bargaining agent for each of the five units. As a result, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) filed a complaint against the Petitioner, alleging violations of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Board's decision. The court found that the Board had correctly applied the "successor bar" rule, which holds that an incumbent union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for a reasonable period of time following the successor employer's voluntary recognition of the union. The court concluded that, on the facts presented, the Board’s application of the successor bar rule was consistent with established Board precedent, permissible, and reasonable. The Board's conclusion that Petitioner refused to bargain in good faith with the Union and engaged in multiple unfair labor practices followed directly from established Board precedent. The court also rejected Petitioner's request to overturn the successor bar rule. View "Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law