Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thrifty Payless, Inc., doing business as Rite Aid, seeks judicial review of the National Labor Relations Board’s decision that Rite Aid committed unfair labor practices. The Board has cross-applied for enforcement of its order. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that Rite Aid had committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act when it unilaterally implemented its proposal. The ALJ determined that Rite Aid violated its duty to bargain in good faith because it took unilateral action even though the parties had not yet reached an impasse. The main issue here is whether Rite Aid was entitled to implement its own proposal instead of continuing negotiations with the union.   The DC Circuit denied Rite Aid’s petition for review. The court denied the Board’s cross-application for enforcement and remanded the order. The court found that the record contains enough evidence to support the Board’s finding that the parties were not at an impasse. An impasse arises when neither side is open to compromise. Further, the court explained that any reasonable consideration of exigency must consider “an employer’s need to run its business” and the inherently uncertain task of making corporate decisions in the face of a potential crisis. Here, the Board acknowledged that it was “impossible” for Rite Aid “to predict what claims might come in and how that would impact the reserves.” Rite Aid asserts without contest that the reserves as of November 2019 could only cover a few weeks’ worth of healthcare coverage for Rite Aid employees. So Rite Aid’s concern that inaction could have had damaging consequences is understandable. View "Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant participated in the riot that took place on January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol. The riot interrupted and delayed Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote that determined the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. A jury convicted Appellant of obstructing the vote certification in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted “corruptly,” as Section 1512(c)(2) requires. He also challenged his 87-month sentence, making new arguments on appeal that the district court erred in applying two specific offense characteristics for obstruction of the “administration of justice.”   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Robertson acted “corruptly,” and the district court did not plainly err in applying the specific offense characteristics. The court explained that the interpretations of “corruptly” posited by Appellant and the Fischer concurrence appear to confuse sufficiency with necessity: Their proposed definitions of “corruptly” may be sufficient to prove corrupt intent, but neither dishonesty nor seeking a benefit for oneself or another is necessary to demonstrate “wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil” behavior within the meaning of Section 1512(c). The court wrote that it declined to adopt the limited constructions of “corruptly” proffered by Appellant and the Fischer concurrence, which each insist that the broad concept of “corrupt” intent must be proved in only one way. View "USA v. Thomas Robertson" on Justia Law

Representative Scott Perry’s cell phone, which was seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a warrant. In a district court motion, Representative Perry argued the Clause bars the government from reviewing many of the messages stored on the phone. As to communications with Executive Branch officials and parties outside of Congress, Representative Perry argued that his messages are necessarily privileged because they constitute “informal factfinding”—a capacious category he asserts is always privileged and includes a Member’s attempts to obtain information related to topics of upcoming votes without express House authorization. The district court held none of these communications were privileged because they were “political” or not fact-finding at all. The DC Circuit stayed the district court’s order pending appeal and expedited the case.   The DC Circuit vacated the judgment in part and remanded. The court explained that as o Representative Perry’s communications with individuals outside the federal government, communications with members of the Executive Branch, and communications with other Members of Congress regarding alleged election fraud during the period before Congress’s vote certifying the 2020 election and before its vote on H.R. 1, the district court failed to apply the fact-specific privilege inquiry under Gravel. The court affirmed with respect to the remaining privilege determinations about Representative Perry’s communications with Members of Congress. View "In re: Sealed Case (PUBLIC REISSUED OPINION)" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Commission promulgated a rule that set stringent safety standards for the operating cords on custom-made window coverings based on a finding that such cords pose a strangulation risk to young children. The rule sought to eliminate the risk of injury by essentially prohibiting corded window products, and it set an aggressive timeline for industry compliance with the new standards. The Window Covering Manufacturers Association (“WCMA”) filed a petition in this court challenging the rule and its compliance deadline.   The DC Circuit granted WCMA’s petition for review and vacated the rule. The court held that the Commission breached notice-and-comment requirements, erroneously relied on certain data in its cost-benefit analysis, and selected an arbitrary effective date for the rule. The court reasoned that the Commission did not explain why it chose to credit the opinion of Safe T Shade’s company president over the contrary feedback that it received from 401 other commenters, the Small Business Association, and its own staff.  The court explained that if the Commission wishes to extend a safety standard’s effective date, it must find good cause to do so, and regardless of such an extension, the Commission must find that the effective date. View "Window Covering Manufacturers Association v. CPSC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are three standard-developing organizations: the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), and the NFPA. Defendant, Public.Resource.Org, is a non-profit group that disseminates legal and other materials. It has posted on its website copies of hundreds of incorporated standards. Plaintiffs sued Public Resource for copyright infringement. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims as to nine of the disputed standards. The district court granted the motion and enjoined Public Resource from posting these standards. The DC Circuit reversed and remanded for further factual development. On remand, the district court held that the non-commercial posting of standards incorporated by reference into law is fair use.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s reasonable exercise of discretion in declining to award injunctive relief. The court explained that the first three factors under section 107 strongly favor fair use, and the fourth is equivocal. The court concluded that Public Resource’s non-commercial posting of incorporated standards is fair use. Further, the court found that the district court reasonably declined to enter an injunction. Public Resource promptly removed from its website the 32 standards found not to have been incorporated into law. The court explained that Plaintiffs give the court no reason to think that Public Resource will post unincorporated standards again absent an injunction View "American Society for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc." on Justia Law

Hospitals treating Medicare beneficiaries receive greater reimbursements to the extent that the beneficiaries are also entitled to supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Secretary of Health and Human Services understands this population to include only patients receiving cash payments during the month in question. Various hospitals contend that this population also includes patients receiving a subsidy under Medicare Part D and vocational training. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the hospitals argued that Empire compels their construction of the phrase “entitled to supplementary security income benefits.” The court wrote that this s argument misses key distinctions between the Part A and SSI schemes. First, Part A benefits extend well beyond payment for specific services at specific times. Moreover, the court explained that age or chronic disability makes a person eligible for Part A benefits “without an application or anything more,” and individuals rarely, if ever lose this eligibility over time.   Moreover, the court explained that the hospitals contend that HHS arbitrarily excluded patients whose SSI benefits were withheld under the so-called “cross-program recovery” scheme. The court reasoned that this assertion is mistaken. Next, the court explained that the hospitals contend that HHS unreasonably focused on whether patients receive SSI payments when hospitalized because the payments depend on income and resource levels from earlier months. But “eligibility” for the SSI benefit “for a month” depends on the individual’s income, resources, and other characteristics “in such month.” View "Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Hospitals receive greater payment if their Medicare patients are disproportionately low-income individuals entitled to federal supplemental security income benefits. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center contends that the Department of Health and Human Services undercounted the number of its Medicare patients who were entitled to SSI benefits and thus undercompensated the hospital for treating them. Pomona sought to prove the undercount through data from state benefit programs that piggyback on SSI. In an administrative proceeding, Pomona introduced expert testimony explaining how the state data derives from and overlaps with the federal SSI data. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board held that Pomona failed to prove the undercount, but the district court set aside its decision and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that using statewide statistics, Pomona estimated that fewer than 10 such patients would likely show up in its SSI-fraction calculations in any given year. And neither the Board nor the Contractor countered these estimates. Given the lack of contrary evidence in the record, such discrepancies appear immaterial and suggest no substantial flaw in Pomona’s methodology. Further, the court explained that Pomona provided uncontroverted evidence that two potential difficulties with its approach amounted to little more than rounding errors. It proffered creditable testimony from two experts indicating that the only explanation for the discrepancy was some error in CMS’s collection or matching of data. By contrast, the Contractor remained silent. Given the strength of the hospital’s showing, and the absence of any countervailing evidence, the Board’s conclusion that Pomona had failed to prove an undercount was unreasonable View "Pomona Valley Hospital Med v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Ascendium Education Solutions (“Ascendium”) is a Program guarantor that previously charged debt-collection costs to defaulting Program borrowers who entered loan rehabilitation agreements. Ascendium challenged the Department of Education’s Rule, 34 C.F.R. Section 682.410(b)(2)(i), under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing that the Department of Education and its Secretary (collectively, the “Department”) did not have statutory authority to promulgate the Rule because the Rule conflicts with the Act. The district court ruled that Ascendium lacked standing to challenge the Rule as it applies to borrowers who enter repayment agreements. But the district court held that the Rule exceeded the Department’s authority under the Act with respect to borrowers who enter rehabilitation agreements. Both Ascendium and the Department appealed.   The DC Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court concluded that Ascendium has standing to challenge the entirety of the Rule, that the Rule is consistent with the Act and therefore is lawful, and that the Rule is not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the Rule prohibits a guarantor from charging collection costs to a borrower who enters a repayment plan or a rehabilitation agreement during the initial default period: It implicitly deems such costs “unreasonable” under the circumstances. The court concluded that the Rule is consistent with the Act’s requirement that “reasonable” collection costs must be passed on to borrowers. Further, the court explained that the Department’s response to Ascendium’s comment adequately refuted Ascendium’s assumption that the purpose of the Rule should be to incentivize guarantors to enter rehabilitation agreements by allowing them to charge collection costs. View "Ascendium Education Solutions, Inc. v. Miguel Cardona" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently approved the trading of two bitcoin futures funds on national exchanges but denied approval of Grayscale’s bitcoin fund. Petitioning for review of the Commission’s denial order, Grayscale maintains its proposed bitcoin exchange-traded product is materially similar to the bitcoin futures exchange-traded products and should have been approved to trade on NYSE Arca.   The DC Circuit vacated the order and granted Grayscale’s petition. The court explained that the denial of Grayscale’s proposal was arbitrary and capricious because the Commission failed to explain its different treatment of similar products. The court explained that to avoid arbitrariness and caprice, administrative adjudication must be consistent and predictable, following the basic principle that similar cases should be treated similarly. The court wrote that NYSE Arca presented substantial evidence that Grayscale is similar, across the relevant regulatory factors, to bitcoin futures ETPs. As such, the court found that the Commission failed to adequately explain why it approved the listing of two bitcoin futures ETPs but not Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP. Accordingly, the court explained that in the absence of a coherent explanation, this, unlike regulatory treatment of like products, is unlawful. View "Grayscale Investments, LLC v. SEC" on Justia Law

After the FDA promulgated regulations applying the Act to vaping products, Fontem US, LLC, submitted numerous applications to market its flavored and unflavored vaping products. The FDA denied all of them, concluding Fontem had not shown its products were “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” Fontem petitioned for review, arguing the denial was unlawful.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review as to Fontem’s flavored products and granted the petition for review with respect to the unflavored products. The court explained that as to Fontem’s flavored products, the FDA reasonably found a lack of evidence that the benefits of such products to adult smokers sufficiently outweighed the potential risks to young non-smokers. The court wrote that as to Fontem’s unflavored products, however, the FDA acted unlawfully by failing to engage in the holistic public health analysis required by the statute. The court concluded that the agency did not take into account the potential benefits of unflavored products or weigh those benefits against risks to public health. Instead, the agency identified highly granular deficiencies but failed to evaluate the potential effects of such deficiencies on public health or to weigh these deficiencies against the potential benefits of Fontem’s products. View "Fontem US, LLC v. FDA" on Justia Law