Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ascendium Education Solutions (“Ascendium”) is a Program guarantor that previously charged debt-collection costs to defaulting Program borrowers who entered loan rehabilitation agreements. Ascendium challenged the Department of Education’s Rule, 34 C.F.R. Section 682.410(b)(2)(i), under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing that the Department of Education and its Secretary (collectively, the “Department”) did not have statutory authority to promulgate the Rule because the Rule conflicts with the Act. The district court ruled that Ascendium lacked standing to challenge the Rule as it applies to borrowers who enter repayment agreements. But the district court held that the Rule exceeded the Department’s authority under the Act with respect to borrowers who enter rehabilitation agreements. Both Ascendium and the Department appealed.   The DC Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court concluded that Ascendium has standing to challenge the entirety of the Rule, that the Rule is consistent with the Act and therefore is lawful, and that the Rule is not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the Rule prohibits a guarantor from charging collection costs to a borrower who enters a repayment plan or a rehabilitation agreement during the initial default period: It implicitly deems such costs “unreasonable” under the circumstances. The court concluded that the Rule is consistent with the Act’s requirement that “reasonable” collection costs must be passed on to borrowers. Further, the court explained that the Department’s response to Ascendium’s comment adequately refuted Ascendium’s assumption that the purpose of the Rule should be to incentivize guarantors to enter rehabilitation agreements by allowing them to charge collection costs. View "Ascendium Education Solutions, Inc. v. Miguel Cardona" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently approved the trading of two bitcoin futures funds on national exchanges but denied approval of Grayscale’s bitcoin fund. Petitioning for review of the Commission’s denial order, Grayscale maintains its proposed bitcoin exchange-traded product is materially similar to the bitcoin futures exchange-traded products and should have been approved to trade on NYSE Arca.   The DC Circuit vacated the order and granted Grayscale’s petition. The court explained that the denial of Grayscale’s proposal was arbitrary and capricious because the Commission failed to explain its different treatment of similar products. The court explained that to avoid arbitrariness and caprice, administrative adjudication must be consistent and predictable, following the basic principle that similar cases should be treated similarly. The court wrote that NYSE Arca presented substantial evidence that Grayscale is similar, across the relevant regulatory factors, to bitcoin futures ETPs. As such, the court found that the Commission failed to adequately explain why it approved the listing of two bitcoin futures ETPs but not Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP. Accordingly, the court explained that in the absence of a coherent explanation, this, unlike regulatory treatment of like products, is unlawful. View "Grayscale Investments, LLC v. SEC" on Justia Law

After the FDA promulgated regulations applying the Act to vaping products, Fontem US, LLC, submitted numerous applications to market its flavored and unflavored vaping products. The FDA denied all of them, concluding Fontem had not shown its products were “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” Fontem petitioned for review, arguing the denial was unlawful.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review as to Fontem’s flavored products and granted the petition for review with respect to the unflavored products. The court explained that as to Fontem’s flavored products, the FDA reasonably found a lack of evidence that the benefits of such products to adult smokers sufficiently outweighed the potential risks to young non-smokers. The court wrote that as to Fontem’s unflavored products, however, the FDA acted unlawfully by failing to engage in the holistic public health analysis required by the statute. The court concluded that the agency did not take into account the potential benefits of unflavored products or weigh those benefits against risks to public health. Instead, the agency identified highly granular deficiencies but failed to evaluate the potential effects of such deficiencies on public health or to weigh these deficiencies against the potential benefits of Fontem’s products. View "Fontem US, LLC v. FDA" on Justia Law

The Copyright Office sent a letter to Valancourt Books, LLC, an independent press based in Richmond, Virginia, demanding physical copies of Valancourt’s published books on the pain of fines. Valancourt protested that it could not afford to deposit physical copies and that much of what it published was in the public domain. In response, the Office narrowed the list of demanded works but continued to demand that Valancourt deposit copies of its books with the Library of Congress or otherwise face a fine. Valancourt then brought this action against the Register of Copyrights and the Attorney General. Valancourt challenged the application of Section 407’s deposit requirement against it as an unconstitutional taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment and an invalid burden on its speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on both claims.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the government’s favor and remanded for the entry of judgment to Valancourt and the award of relief. The court concluded that Section 407, as applied by the Copyright Office in this case, worked an unconstitutional taking of Valancourt’s property. The court explained that the Office demanded that Valancourt relinquish property (physical copies of copyrighted books) on the pain of fines. And because the requirement to turn over copies of the works is not a condition of attaining (or retaining) copyright protection in them, the demand to forfeit property cannot be justified as the conferral of a benefit in exchange for property. View "Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the Federal Trade Commission appeals the district court’s dismissal of claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed the action against Appellees Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Endo), its parent, Endo International plc (Endo International), Impax Laboratories, LLC (Impax), and its parent, Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Amneal) (collectively Appellees) for failure to state a claim because a single patentee granting an exclusive license is conduct protected and allowed under the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. 261;The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Commission’s claims. The court concluded that the resolution of the case came down to the following question: Does a valid patent holder’s grant of a nearly exclusive license to a single potential competitor in exchange for royalty payments violate antitrust law when that nearly exclusive license restrains trade only to an extent traditionally recognized by patent law as reasonable? The court answered the question in the negative, holding that under FTC v. Actavis, Inc., when a complaint alleges that a patent holder has violated the antitrust laws, courts must strike a balance “between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.” The Court must defer to Congress’ judgment, as outlined in the Patent Act. View "FTC v. Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

Noncitizens can qualify for employment-based U.S. visas by investing in designated commercial enterprises that create jobs in the United States. After making a qualifying investment, a noncitizen must petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for the visa. In these two consolidated appeals, investors who have waited several years for USCIS to approve their petitions sue the agency for what they see as unreasonably delayed action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district courts in both cases granted USCIS’s motions to dismiss, holding that the investors’ allegations do not show USCIS’s delay to be unreasonable under the circumstances.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not state a claim of unreasonable delay. The availability-screened queue is a rule of reason, and the complaints do not allege that USCIS follows a process other than its officially stated policy. Ruling in favor of Plaintiffs would require USCIS to process Plaintiffs’ petitions ahead of those of other petitioners who have been waiting as long or longer for their EB-5 petitions to be adjudicated. Congress did not set a deadline for agency action, Plaintiffs allege primarily financial harm, and the allegations do not point to government impropriety. View "Adrian Da Costa v. Immigration Investor Program Office" on Justia Law

Defendant committed a petty offense. The district court sentenced him to prison, followed by probation. The only question on appeal is whether that sentence is authorized by statute.   The DC Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that probation and imprisonment are alternative sentences that cannot generally be combined. So the district court could not impose both for Defendant’s petty offense. The court explained that the government’s reading conflicts with the statutory scheme of Section 3561. Congress made probation and imprisonment separate options for separate offenses, length of post-confinement monitoring to the severity of an offense. The Government’s reading subverts those choices. View "USA v. James Little" on Justia Law

The consolidated petitions in this case concern an order of the Surface Transportation Board (“the Board”) authorizing the construction and operation of a new rail line in the Uinta Basin in Utah (“Railway”). The Board exercised its authority to exempt the Railway from the Board’s more extensive application requirements in a two-part process. The first addressed the “transportation benefits” of the Railway, and the second concerned the project’s environmental impacts. As part of its environmental process, the Board created an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) outlining the various environmental impacts associated with the Railway’s construction and operation. The EIS was informed by the Board’s consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”), which led to the development of a Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) concerning the Railway’s potential impacts on endangered species and critical habitats.Petitioners include various environmental organizations and a Colorado county that alleges it will be impacted by the Railway even though it is located “downline” of the proposed rail line’s construction area.The D.C. Circuit granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, vacated the underlying order as well as the EIS and the BiOp in part, and remand to the Board for further proceedings. View "Eagle County, Colorado v. STB" on Justia Law

Appellant Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC, submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act to various federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Watkins sought records concerning the process by which the names of certain veterans and other VA beneficiaries are added to a background check system that identifies persons barred from possessing firearms for having been adjudicated as “mental defective[s].” Watkins initiated this FOIA action in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the agencies on almost all claims (and to Watkins on the remaining claims, none of which are at issue here). Watkins appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the FBI and DOJ on the adequacy of their searches and to the VA on its withholding of documents based on the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and DOJ. But we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA and remand for further proceedings. The VA did not satisfy its burden to show that the withheld documents are exempt from disclosure. The court concluded that the VA failed to adequately set out its basis for asserting the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges as to the withheld documents. The court wrote that because the VA offers no arguments about specific documents other than the eight that Watkins highlighted as illustrations, a blanket remand is appropriate. View "Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff acting on behalf of her son, a student who qualifies for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), appealed an order of the district court denying her motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision. The stay-put provision provides that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree,” a student “shall remain” in the student’s “then-current educational placement.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, a private residential treatment center in Maryland, and its affiliated school, the Community School of Maryland’s (together, CSAAC) unilateral decision to discharge Plaintiff’s son did not trigger the IDEA’s stay-put mandate because the District did not refuse to provide a similar available placement. Neither the text of Section 1415(j) nor the court’s previous decisions applying the provision impose an affirmative duty on the District to provide an alternative residential environment when a student’s then-current placement becomes unavailable for reasons outside the District’s control. The court explained that Plaintiff’s attempt to bring a substantive challenge on behalf of her son by invoking the stay-put mandate is procedurally improper because Section 1415(j) is not intended to afford parties affirmative relief, on the merits, in the form of an automatic injunction. View "Anne Davis v. DC" on Justia Law