Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ngozi Pole, who served as office manager for Senator Edward Kennedy from 1998 to 2007, was responsible for overseeing the office budget and handling staff bonuses. Between 2003 and 2007, Pole awarded himself substantial, unauthorized bonuses without approval from the Senator or his chief of staff. The scheme was discovered in late 2006 when Pole sought a departure bonus, which he also awarded himself without authorization. After an internal inquiry, the matter was referred to the FBI, leading to Pole’s indictment on five counts of wire fraud and one count of theft of government property.Following a three-week trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the jury found Pole guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to 20 months in prison and ordered restitution of $75,042.37, representing the total unauthorized bonuses minus a small recovered amount. On his initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider Pole’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and vacated the restitution order for lack of factual findings. On remand, the district court rejected the ineffective assistance claim and reinstated the restitution order after making the necessary findings.On renewed appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Pole failed to show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the limited impact of the alleged errors. The court also held that, under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, restitution could include all losses from the fraudulent scheme, not just those tied to the specific counts of conviction, and found the restitution amount supported by the evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pole" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the United States Department of the Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region. Environmental organizations argued that the Department failed to adequately assess the risks to vulnerable coastal communities, did not properly consider the endangered Rice’s whale in its environmental sensitivity analysis, overlooked potential conflicts with other ocean uses, and did not sufficiently balance the program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs. The Department, in coordination with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, had developed the program through a multi-year process involving public comment and environmental review.After the Department finalized the program, the environmental groups and the American Petroleum Institute (API) each petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. API later withdrew its petition but remained as an intervenor. The environmental petitioners sought to have the program remanded for further consideration, arguing violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Department and API contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the environmental petitioners had associational standing to pursue their claims. On the merits, the court found that the Department of the Interior had satisfied OCSLA’s requirements by reasonably evaluating environmental justice concerns, the selection of representative species for environmental sensitivity analysis, and potential conflicts with other uses of the Gulf. The court concluded that the Department’s decision-making process was reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, leaving the 2024–2029 leasing program in effect. View "Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Aaron Thorpe and a co-defendant were arrested and charged with multiple offenses related to an armed kidnapping in the District of Columbia. The government offered both defendants a joint plea deal, but the co-defendant rejected it based on his counsel’s advice, causing the offer to be withdrawn. Both were subsequently convicted by a jury on ten counts, and Thorpe received a 300-month sentence. On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that only the co-defendant’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective, so Thorpe’s convictions were affirmed, while the co-defendant’s case was remanded for resentencing under the original plea offer.After the co-defendant was released, Thorpe sought postconviction relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The government opposed his motion but separately moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss all but one of Thorpe’s convictions, aiming to address the sentencing disparity. Thorpe consented to this motion. The district court denied the government’s request, reasoning that Rule 48(a) does not permit dismissal of convictions after judgment is final and that such a dismissal would infringe on the judiciary’s authority and the public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court held that Rule 48(a) does not authorize the government to dismiss criminal convictions after a final judgment has been entered and appellate review is complete. The court explained that the rule only allows dismissal of charges while a prosecution is pending, not after judgment is final. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the government’s Rule 48(a) motion. View "USA v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

Police officers in Washington, D.C., approached a car that was illegally parked and had windows tinted beyond legal limits. When the officers tapped on the window, the driver, Ronnard Williams, lowered it only slightly, making it difficult for the officers to see inside. The officers then ordered Williams to lower the windows further. After he complied, the officers saw a firearm at the feet of a backseat passenger. The officers opened the door, seized the gun, and arrested Williams and the passenger. A subsequent search revealed another gun, marijuana, and cash. Williams, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the order to lower the windows constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Williams. He was sentenced to three years and five months in prison, with credit for time served.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the police order to lower the windows during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, police may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful stop due to officer safety concerns, and that the same reasoning applies to ordering a driver to lower tinted windows. The court found that the minimal intrusion of lowering a window is outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in officer safety. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Williams’s conviction. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Judge Pauline Newman, a sitting judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, was investigated by a Special Committee of her circuit under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. The investigation was initiated after the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit raised concerns about Judge Newman’s ability to manage her workload due to alleged health and age-related impairments. The Special Committee requested that Judge Newman undergo medical examinations and provide medical records, which she refused, arguing the requests and investigation were unlawful. As a result, the Federal Circuit’s Judicial Council suspended Judge Newman from receiving new case assignments for one year, with the suspension subsequently renewed.Judge Newman filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging her suspension on statutory and constitutional grounds. She argued that the Judicial Council exceeded its statutory authority, violated her due process rights by not transferring the matter to another circuit, and that the Act’s case-suspension provision was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The district court dismissed her statutory and as-applied constitutional claims for lack of jurisdiction, relying on circuit precedent, and rejected her facial constitutional challenge on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, under binding precedent from McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States, it lacked jurisdiction to review Judge Newman’s statutory and as-applied constitutional claims. The court further held that Judge Newman’s facial constitutional challenge to the Act’s case-suspension provision failed because the provision has many constitutional applications. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Newman v. Moore" on Justia Law

The case centers on the southwestern willow flycatcher, a bird listed as an endangered subspecies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service since 1995. The New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association petitioned the Service to remove the bird from the endangered species list, arguing that it is not a valid subspecies and thus does not qualify for protection under the Endangered Species Act. Their petition relied heavily on a 2015 scientific article by Robert Zink, which critiqued previous studies supporting the subspecies classification. The Service conducted a thorough review, including public comment and expert consultation, and ultimately reaffirmed the subspecies designation, finding that the best available scientific evidence supported its continued listing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Service’s decision after the Cattle Growers filed suit, claiming the agency’s determination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Service and its intervenors, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Maricopa Audubon Society, finding that the Service had reasonably explained its reliance on scientific studies and its application of the non-clinal geographic variation standard to determine subspecies validity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Service’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, as it was based on a reasonable and well-explained evaluation of scientific evidence. The court rejected the Cattle Growers’ arguments regarding the indeterminacy of the non-clinal geographic variation standard and found no merit in claims of constitutional or procedural deficiencies. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "New Mexico Cattle Growers' Association v. FWS" on Justia Law

A group of hospitals challenged the calculation of their Medicare fractions for fiscal year 2007, which is a key component in determining eligibility and payment amounts under the Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) adjustment. The DSH adjustment provides increased reimbursement to hospitals serving a high number of low-income patients. The hospitals disputed the inclusion of Medicare Part C beneficiaries in the Medicare fraction, arguing that this reduced their payments. After the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) published the Medicare fractions, the hospitals appealed to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, seeking review of the calculation before the final DSH adjustment was determined.The Provider Reimbursement Review Board dismissed the hospitals’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that a challenge could only be brought after the final determination of the DSH adjustment was made and reflected in the Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR). The Board concluded that publication of the Medicare fraction alone did not constitute a “final determination” as required by statute. The hospitals then sought review in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which disagreed with the Board and held that the hospitals’ challenge could proceed, interpreting precedent to allow appeals at the stage of Medicare fraction publication.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the hospitals’ challenge prior to the issuance of the NPR, because only the NPR constitutes the Secretary’s “final determination as to the amount of the payment” under the relevant statutory provision. The court clarified that while some prospective payment system components may be appealed before the NPR, retrospective adjustments like the DSH adjustment require final settlement before an appeal is ripe. View "Battle Creek Health System v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) proposed a rule to address insider threats in airports, specifically targeting the risk that aviation workers with unescorted access to secured areas could facilitate the introduction of weapons or dangerous items onto aircraft. Instead of following the usual public notice-and-comment procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), TSA provided notice and an opportunity to comment only to airport operators. The finalized rule, known as the National Amendment, required major airports to physically screen aviation workers entering certain secured areas and to acquire explosives-detection equipment. Noncompliance could result in civil enforcement actions by TSA.After TSA finalized the National Amendment in April 2023, various municipalities operating airports and a trade organization, Airport Council International-North America (ACI-NA), submitted timely requests for reconsideration, arguing that TSA lacked statutory authority, that the APA required public notice and comment, and that the rule unlawfully compelled local officials to implement a federal scheme. TSA denied all reconsideration requests, maintaining that its own regulations permitted it to amend airport security programs by providing notice and comment only to affected operators. The petitioners then sought review of TSA’s denial in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the National Amendment is a legislative rule subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, which TSA failed to follow. The court vacated the National Amendment but withheld its mandate, allowing TSA time to promulgate a procedurally proper rule or inform the court if no rule is needed. The court required TSA to submit periodic status reports until a final resolution. View "City of Billings v. TSA" on Justia Law

Eugene Hudson, a long-time member and leader within the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), was twice removed from his position as National Secretary-Treasurer after he criticized the union’s leadership and use of resources while campaigning for union president. Hudson’s communications, including a letter and an email sent to union officers using union resources, led to internal disciplinary proceedings. The AFGE’s National Executive Council found that Hudson’s actions violated the union’s constitution, resulting in his removal in August 2017. After a preliminary injunction reinstated him, a second investigation led to his removal again in February 2018. Hudson amended his lawsuit to challenge both removals, alleging they were acts of retaliation for his protected speech under section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over a jury trial, where the jury found that AFGE unlawfully retaliated against Hudson in the first removal but not the second, awarding no damages. Hudson moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions misstated the causation standard and the burden of proof. The district court denied the motion, holding that Hudson had not properly preserved his objections and that the instructions were not plainly erroneous.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a retaliation claim under LMRDA section 101(a)(2) requires proof of but-for causation, not merely that protected speech was a motivating factor. The court also found that Hudson could not challenge the burden of proof instruction because he had proposed the language used. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, denying Hudson’s request for a new trial. View "Hudson v. American Federation of Government Employees" on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law