Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, the issue is whether overlapping statutes that affect more than two million acres of federally owned forest land in southwestern Oregon are reconcilable and, therefore, operative. The appeals arise from three sets of cases filed by an association of fifteen Oregon counties and various trade associations and timber companies. Two of the cases challenge Proclamation 9564, through which the President expanded the boundaries of the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument. Two others challenged resource management plans that the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a bureau within the United States Department of the Interior (Interior), developed to govern the use of the forest land. The final case seeks an order compelling the Interior Secretary to offer a certain amount of the forest’s timber for sale each year. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs in all five cases.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that the O & C Act provides the Secretary three layers of discretion: first, discretion to decide how land should be classified, which includes the discretion to classify land as timberland or not; second, discretion to decide how to balance the Act’s multiple objectives, and third, discretion to decide how to carry out the mandate that the land classified as timberland be managed “for permanent forest production.” Further, the court held that the 2016 RMPs are well within the Secretary’s discretion under the O & C Act and are consistent with the Secretary’s other statutory obligations. View "American Forest Resource Council v. USA" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard Program codified in the Clean Air Act requires all transportation fuel sold in the United States to contain an annually determined volume of renewable fuel. As part of its role in implementing the Program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues renewable fuel standards announcing the annual quantity of renewables that must be sold into United States commerce. EPA failed to meet its deadlines to publish the 2020-2022 renewable fuel standards. As part of its mitigation, EPA issued a rule extending the corresponding compliance reporting deadlines. The leeway provided in that Extension Rule ensures that obligated parties will not have to file compliance reports for 2020-2022 until after EPA has published the standards for those years. In these consolidated petitions, a group of fuel refineries (the Refineries) challenged the Extension Rule. They argue that the Rule violates the Clean Air Act, or is at least arbitrary and capricious, insofar as it provides obligated parties less than 13 months’ compliance lead time and compliance intervals shorter than 12 months.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court explained that when EPA fails to timely issue renewable fuel standards, the Clean Air Act does not bind the agency to provide obligated parties a minimum of 13 months’ compliance lead time, nor does it require compliance intervals of at least 12 months. The court likewise rejected the Refineries’ claim that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting the compliance schedule in the Rule. Rather, the agency reasonably exercised its authority to establish the compliance timeframe for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program under the circumstances. View "Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellees worked as non-emergency medical transportation drivers. In July 2017, they brought a putative class action and Fair Labor Standards Act collective action against Medical Transportation Management, Inc. (“MTM”). Their complaint alleged that MTM is their employer and had failed to pay them and its other drivers their full wages as required by both federal and District of Columbia law. MTM appealed the district court’s certification of an “issue class” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) and its denial of MTM’s motion to decertify plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act collective action.   The DC Circuit remanded the district court’s certification of the issue class because the court failed to ensure that it satisfies the class-action criteria specified in Rules 23(a) and (b). The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s separate decision on the Fair Labor Standards Act collective action. The court explained that because the resolution of the action will bind absent class members, basic principles of due process require that they be notified that their individual claims are being resolved and that they may opt out of the action if they so choose. So if the district court certifies the issue class under Rule 23(b)(3) on remand, it must direct “the best notice that is practicable” as part of any certification order. View "Isaac Harris v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc." on Justia Law

This petition challenges several interrelated orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) that permitted the creation of a new energy transmission service across several states in the Southeast region of the United States, entitled the Southeast Energy Exchange Market (“SEEM”). FERC adopted the first order (“Deadlock Order”) by operation of law when its four Commissioners deadlocked 2-2 on whether the overall proposal was “just and reasonable” and otherwise met the requirements of the Federal Power Act (“FPA” or “Act”), and related FERC regulations. In a later order by majority vote, the Commission accepted tariff revisions by transmission service providers within SEEM to enable the new transmission service. Petitioners challenged these orders throughout the initial proceedings, on rehearing at the Commission, and now in this petition.   The DC Circuit granted the petition in part, denied the petition in part, and remanded it to the Commission for further proceedings. The court explained that since SEEM “began operations in November 2022” and only provides energy transactions for non-firm service, it follows that vacatur would not be disruptive, and the parties offer no arguments to the contrary in their briefing. Accordingly, vacatur of the Tariff Order is appropriate. The court wrote that the Commission’s orders finding Petitioners’ rehearing requests of the Deadlock Order untimely are vacated, and the petition—as it relates to review of the Deadlock Order and the associated orders accepting amendments to the SEEM Proposal—is remanded without vacatur of the related orders. View "Advanced Energy United, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

XO Energy petitioned for a review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approval of filings implementing a regional transmission organization’s (“RTO”) revised Forfeiture Rule for Financial Transmission Rights (“FTRs”). It contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law in declining to issue refunds to market participants who incurred forfeitures under the unapproved interim Rule. It further contends that the Commission’s approval of the revised 2021 Rule was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit granted the petition in part and denied it in part. The court affirmed the Commission’s denial of refunds and remands without vacating the 2021 Rule for further explanation of the Commission’s decision to exclude consideration of leverage as a required element of the Rule. The court explained that although the Commission acknowledges that leverage might be one way to determine cross-product manipulation, it states that it opted to allow PJM to employ other means to detect this conduct rather than require exemptions based on leverage. That is the extent of the Commission’s explanation. It does not address XO Energy’s position that market manipulation cannot occur when the net losses of a trader’s virtual transaction portfolio exceed the net profits from its FTR portfolio. Nor does it explain why the exclusion of this requirement strikes the appropriate balance between preventing manipulative conduct and not hindering legitimate hedging activity. Absent such explanation of its decision, the Commission’s failure to order a leverage exemption appears arbitrary and capricious. View "XO Energy MA, LP v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2015, two citizens of the United States and one citizen of the United Kingdom brought an action in the federal district court seeking either return of the artifacts or monetary compensation. The plaintiffs trace their lineages to three of the owners of the art firms. They claim that members of the Nazi government coerced the consortium members into selling the collection for far less than its true market value. Their initial complaint was named as defendants the Federal Republic of Germany and its agency – SPK, for short – that now administers the museum where the artifacts are on display. The district court determined in a thorough opinion that plaintiffs had not preserved their notGerman-nationals claim because they failed to raise it in their original complaint, in their amended complaint, or at any point in the lengthy proceedings in the district court, or in their brief or oral argument the first time this case went on appeal to this court. This appeal is the latest chapter dealing with SPK’s immunity defense under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly understood the mandates to preclude Plaintiffs from amending their pleadings with allegations to support arguments not preserved on the existing record. The court explained that the Supreme Court’s mandate directed the court to instruct the district court to determine whether plaintiffs preserved their not-German-nationals argument. That mandate would make little sense if it also allowed the district court to permit plaintiffs to cure any failure to preserve that argument by amending their complaint. View "Alan Philipp v. Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz" on Justia Law

Appellants are survivors and family members of victims of the 1998 U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. They bring suit against Appellee BNP Paribas, S.A. (“BNPP”), an international bank, alleging the bank acted in support of the terrorists who committed those attacks. The district court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ Section 2339A(a) ATA claim using the exact words the court did in Owens: “Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to plausibly allege that any currency processed by BNPP for Sudan was either in fact sent to al Qaeda or necessary for Sudan to fund the embassy bombings. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that they were injured ‘by reason of’ BNPP’s acts and cannot state a claim for relief based on a theory of primary liability under the ATA.” Here, Appellants do not plausibly allege that any money passed from BNPP’s financial support of Sudan to al-Qaeda in preparation for the embassy bombings. View "Mary Ofisi v. BNP Paribas, S.A." on Justia Law

The Sunshine Act’s “agency” definition only encompasses those with a majority of Board members whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms to such position. Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act). For years, the Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Earth, and the Center for International Environmental Law (collectively, CBD) enjoyed the benefits from the Sunshine Act’s application to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). By statute, it reorganized OPIC into the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).  Congress shrunk DFC’s Board of Directors (the Board) from fifteen members to nine. DFC’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) serves by virtue of their appointment to DFC instead of to the Board itself. Thus, DFC thought its Board majority was composed only of ex officio members. Accordingly, it promulgated a rule exempting itself from the Sunshine Act without notice-and-comment. CBD sued. The district court granted DFC’s motion to dismiss.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that CBD clearly had informational standing because the information it statutorily sought is from the agency itself. Next, the court held that the Sunshine Act does not apply to DFC because a majority of its Board members serves ex officio by virtue of their appointments to other positions. Finally, the court held that CBD’s claim that DFC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking fails because CBD did not demonstrate any prejudice arising from the asserted APA violation distinct from the legal question of Sunshine Act compliance. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Intl. Dev. Finance Corp" on Justia Law

In 2018, Congress enacted the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (commonly referred to as “FOSTA”). FOSTA adds a new definitional provision to the Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(e)(4), and authorizes parens patriae suits by States against persons who violate that same Act’s prohibition of sex trafficking. The Woodhull Freedom Foundation and four other plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of FOSTA on numerous grounds, but the district court upheld FOSTA in full.The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither Section 2421A of FOSTA nor FOSTA’s amendments to the Trafficking Act are overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. FOSTA’s clarification that Section 230 withholds immunity for violations of federal sex trafficking laws comports with the First Amendment. And the district court correctly dismissed the challenge to Section 230(e)(5)’s retroactive application. View "Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. USA" on Justia Law

Jones Lang LaSalle Brokerage, Inc. (JLL) represented both parties to an agreement to lease property in northwest Washington, D.C. Because dual representations of that kind pose inherent conflicts of interest, the District of Columbia’s Brokerage Act required JLL to obtain the written consent of all clients on both sides. JLL’s client on the landlord side of the transaction, 1441 L Associates, LLC, declined to pay JLL’s commission. JLL then brought this action to recover the commission. In defending against the suit, 1441 L argued that JLL, when disclosing its dual representation, failed to adhere to certain formatting specifications set out in the Brokerage Act that aim to highlight such a disclosure. The district court granted summary judgment to 1441 L.   The DC Circuit vacated and remand for further proceedings. The court concluded that that the Act does not invariably require adherence to those formatting specifications. Rather, the specifications go to whether the broker can gain an optional presumption that it secured the required written consent for its dual representation. Even without the benefit of that presumption, a broker can still demonstrate that it obtained the requisite written consent. View "Jones Lang Lasalle Brokerage, Inc. v. 1441 L Associates, LLC" on Justia Law