Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jones Lang LaSalle Brokerage, Inc. (JLL) represented both parties to an agreement to lease property in northwest Washington, D.C. Because dual representations of that kind pose inherent conflicts of interest, the District of Columbia’s Brokerage Act required JLL to obtain the written consent of all clients on both sides. JLL’s client on the landlord side of the transaction, 1441 L Associates, LLC, declined to pay JLL’s commission. JLL then brought this action to recover the commission. In defending against the suit, 1441 L argued that JLL, when disclosing its dual representation, failed to adhere to certain formatting specifications set out in the Brokerage Act that aim to highlight such a disclosure. The district court granted summary judgment to 1441 L.   The DC Circuit vacated and remand for further proceedings. The court concluded that that the Act does not invariably require adherence to those formatting specifications. Rather, the specifications go to whether the broker can gain an optional presumption that it secured the required written consent for its dual representation. Even without the benefit of that presumption, a broker can still demonstrate that it obtained the requisite written consent. View "Jones Lang Lasalle Brokerage, Inc. v. 1441 L Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

D.T. and six other Plaintiffs were arrested for violating a citywide temporary curfew in Washington, D.C., in June 2020. At the time of their arrests, Plaintiffs were standing on a public street peacefully protesting police killings of Black Americans. Plaintiffs alleged they were out on the streets four hours after the start of the curfew on June 1, 2020, when they were arrested for violating the mayor’s order. Plaintiffs sued the arresting officers and the city for damages. Their principal claim is that, because they were engaging in peaceful public protests, their arrests for breaking the curfew violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the June 1 curfew order was a constitutionally valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court held that the remaining claims also failed because they were contingent on the order’s asserted invalidity under the First Amendment.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs included an allegation that their overnight detention in handcuffs injured their wrists, but they sued the arresting officers, not persons responsible for the conditions of their detention. That allegation thus does not support an excessive force claim against these Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs argued that the June 1 Order violated their fundamental right to travel, but that claim is forfeited. Plaintiffs neither pleaded nor pressed a right-to-travel claim in the district court. View "Devon Tinius v. Luke Choi" on Justia Law

Intellistop, Inc. (Intellistop) invented and sells a module that fits into a commercial motor vehicle’s existing brake light system and pulses the brake lights with each application of the brakes. Because the module replaces the steady-burning lights with pulsing lights when installed, Intellistop applied for an exemption. The FMCSA denied Intellistop’s application, and Intellistop petitioned for review, arguing that the FMCSA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit denied Intellistop’s petition. The court explained that the FMCSA sufficiently explained the difference between Intellistop’s application and the exemptions it had previously approved. The FMCSA explained that the “crucial distinction” between Intellistop and the previous exemption applicants was that only Intellistop’s technology modified “the functionality of original equipment manufacturers’ lamps, which are covered by an existing FMVSS.” The FMCSA adequately explained that it treated Intellistop’s application differently because Intellistop was the only exemption applicant that altered the vehicle’s brake light system to function in a way that would not maintain steady-burning brake lights.   Finally, the FMCSA’s concern that Intellistop’s exemption would alter original equipment manufacturer's lights covered by an FMVSS buttresses its conclusion that monitoring Intellistop’s module would be more difficult than monitoring other exemptions. Because previous exemptions used a supplemental pulsing light while maintaining steady-burning brake lights, they did not present the monitoring complication both the FMCSA and the NHTSA feared could result from Intellistop’s module. View "Intellistop Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, finding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant.In dissent, Judge Wilkins would have granted Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that police officers acted on a hunch rather than articulable facts supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion.Judges Randolph and Rodgers each wrote concurring opinions. View "USA v. Theodore Douglas" on Justia Law

Congress requires transmission operators to charge reasonable rates, which must be submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission through a tariff before the rates can be levied on generators. Here, a generator, Hectate Energy, accuses a transmission grid operator, the New York Independent System Operator, of charging a rate that it had not filed with FERC. Hecate argues that the System Operator’s filed tariff was not detailed enough and that Hectate was surprised when the System Operator charged it $10 million in grid-upgrade costs to connect its power plant to the grid.FERC rejected Hectate's argument, finding that the tariff imposed by the New York Independent System Operator put Hectate on notice of the cost of grid-update costs.The D.C. Circuit agreed with FERC, denying Hectates' Petition for Review, finding the tariff was detailed enough and gave notice that the System Operator would include non-jurisdictional projects in its interconnection study to determine responsibility for upgrade costs. FERC’s order pointed to three cross-referenced sections of the tariff to find sufficient notice that the interconnection study would include information about non-jurisdictional projects. View "Hecate Energy Greene County 3 LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Last year, the court ordered the Department of Energy to address three different categories of comments raised during its informal rulemaking establishing more stringent energy efficiency standards for commercial packaged boilers ("Final Rule"). In response, the Department of Energy published a supplement to the Final Rule.Petitioners, trade associations and natural gas utilities that asserted they were negatively affected by a Final Rule issued by the Department of Energy, claim that the Department of Energy's Final Rule again failed to support its reasoning and did not provide notice and comment as required under the Administrative Procedure Act.The D.C. Circuit granted Petitioners' request to vacate a Final Rule and Supplement imposed by the Department of Energy, finding that the Department failed to offer a sufficient explanation in response to comments challenging a key assumption in its analysis. View "American Public Gas Association v. DOE" on Justia Law

GMS Mine Repair and Maintenance, Inc. (GMS) is a mining contractor that provides “specialized services” to mines in North America. GMS provided contract services at the Mountaineer II Mine in West Virginia on April 20 and 27, 2021, during which time the MSHA issued several citations against it. Although GMS stipulated the “findings of gravity and negligence,” it contested the $7,331 proposed penalty. Thereafter, GMS went before an ALJ to dispute the MSHA’s method of calculating the penalty. The Secretary, representing the MSHA, argued that all citations and orders that have become final during the 15-month look-back period are counted toward an operator’s history of violations, “regardless of when [the citations or orders] were issued.” The ALJ deferred to the Secretary’s reading, deeming the regulation ambiguous “on its face.” GMS petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s determination, and when the Commission did not act, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that the regulation at issue is ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable, and that interpretation is entitled to deference. The court explained that the Secretary’s interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator’s history as of the date the violation becomes final. Second, the subject matter of the regulation is within the Secretary’s wheelhouse and implicates the Secretary’s expertise. View "GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) petitioned for review of a decision of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) charged with authorizing certain rail carrier transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act. Norfolk Southern is a rail carrier that owns a 57.14 percent share of the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line), the operator of a major switching terminal in Norfolk, Virginia. Norfolk Southern’s majority interest goes back to 1982, when its corporate family acquired and consolidated various rail carriers with smaller ownership interests in the Belt Line. Norfolk Southern’s competitor, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), owns the remainder of the Belt Line’s shares (42.86 percent). This case involves a different question raised before the Board for the first time:  whether the ICC/Board approvals of Norfolk Southern’s subsequent corporate-family consolidations in 1991 and 1998 authorized Norfolk Southern to control the Belt Line. The Board again answered no. Norfolk Southern petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 transactions is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board reasonably sought to avoid an absurd interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Section 1180.2(d)(3)’s corporate-family exemption that would allow a carrier to gain control of a new entity without following the Board’s review requirements and then “cure that unauthorized acquisition by reorganizing the corporate family.” The Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. STB" on Justia Law

In January 2021, the United States House of Representatives adopted Resolution 38, which required wearing a mask when in the Hall of the House and provided fines for the failure to do so. When three representatives entered the House chamber without masks, they were each fined $500. The Representatives sued the Speaker of the House, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the Chief Administrative Officer, challenging the constitutionality of the Resolution and its enforcement. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding the Speech or Debate Clause barred the suit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Speech or Debate Clause’s immunity from suit extends to all legislative acts, including matters within the constitutional jurisdiction of the House. The House adopted the Resolution pursuant to its authority to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” and it fined the Representatives pursuant to its authority to “punish its members for disorderly Behaviour.” Both the adoption and execution of the Resolution are legislative acts over which the Speech or Debate Clause confers immunity. View "Thomas Massie v. Nancy Pelosi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured himself on the job while working as a photojournalist for media corporation Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. In the following years, while he was unable to work, Turner paid him for his leave. Plaintiff claimed that because his injury was job-related, Turner paid him workers’ compensation, while Turner claims that it paid him according to a separate disability policy. This distinction has legal significance because income earned as workers’ compensation is non-taxable, while disability payments are taxed. Turner reported the compensation as part of Plaintiff’s taxable income on the W-2s it filed with the IRS. Plaintiff sued Turner under 26 U.S.C. Section 7434 for willfully filing fraudulent information returns on his behalf. The district court granted summary judgment for Turner.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that under Section 7434, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant filed an information return on his or her behalf, (2) the return was false as to the amount paid, and (3) the defendant acted willfully and fraudulently. The parties agree that the W-2s qualify as information returns, and Plaintiff has raised a dispute of material fact as to the second and third elements. As to falsity, Plaintiff’s injury was job-related, and a reasonable jury could therefore conclude that the W-2s were inaccurate because they overstated his taxable income by including workers’ compensation. And as to scienter, several pieces of evidence including the language of Turner’s own policies as well as communications between the parties could lead a factfinder to conclude that Turner knew or should have known the actual nature of these payments. View "Martin Doherty v. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc." on Justia Law